And here it seems necessary to recur to a definition of words. With us, a king is the source both of the military and the judicial powers; he is chief judge and general in chief; among protestants he is head of the church, and only wants the functions of high priest, because the nature of the church of Christ admits of no priestly body exclusively engaged in the sacrifices, or in possession of the exclusive secrets, of the cult[[221]]. But in the eye of the state, and as the head of a state clergy, he is the high priest, the authority in which ultimately even the parochial order centres and finds its completion. He is an officer of the state; the highest indeed and the noblest, but to the state he belongs as a part of itself: with us a commission of regency, a stranger or a woman may perform all the functions of royalty; the houses of parliament may limit them; a successful soldier may usurp them. With the early Germans, the king was something different from this.
The inhabitants of the Mark or Gá, however numerous or however few they may be, must always have some provision for the exigencies of peace and war. But peace is the natural or normal state, that for which war itself exists, and the institutions proper to war are the exception, not the rule. Hence the priestly and judicial functions are permanent,—the military, merely temporary. The former, whether united in the same person, or divided between two or more, are the necessary conditions of the existence of the state as a community; the latter are merely requisite from time to time, to secure the free exertion of the former, to defend the existence of the community against the attacks of other communities.
We may admit that the father is the first priest and judge in his own household; he has, above all other, the sacerdotal secrets, and the peculiar rites, of family worship; these, not less than age, experience and the dignity of paternity, are the causes and the justification of his power. The judicial is a corollary from the sacerdotal authority. But what applies to the individual household applies to any aggregate of households: even as the family worship and the family peace require the exertion of these powers for their own maintenance and preservation, so do the public worship and the public peace require their existence, though in a yet stronger degree. From among the heads of families some one or more must be elected to discharge the all-important functions which they imply. If the solemn festivals and public rites of the god are to be duly celebrated, if the anger of the thunderer is to be propitiated, and the fruits of the earth to be blessed,—if the wounded cattle are to be healed, the fever expelled, or the secret malice of evil spirits to be defeated,—who but the priest can lead the ceremonies and prescribe the ritual? Who but he can sanctify the transfer of land, the union of man and wife, the entrance of the newborn child upon his career of life; who but himself can conduct judicial investigations, where the deities are the only guardians of truth and avengers of perjury, or where their supernatural power alone can determine between innocence and guilt[[222]]? Lastly, who but he can possess authority to punish the freeman for offences dangerous to the wellbeing of all freemen? To what power less than that of God will the freeman condescend to bow[[223]]?
How then is it to be determined to whom such power, once admitted to be necessary, shall be at first entrusted? The first claim clearly lies with those who are believed to be descended from the gods, or from the local god of each particular district[[224]]. They are his especial care, his children; he led them into the land, and gave them the secret of appeasing or pleasing him: he protects them by his power, and guides them by his revelations: he is their family and household god, the progenitor of their race, one of themselves; and they are the best, indeed the only, expounders of his will. A single family, with which others have by slow degrees united themselves, by which others have been adopted, and which in process of time have thus become the nucleus of a state, will probably remain in possession of this sacerdotal power; the god of the land does not readily give place to others, and those with whom his worship identifies him will continue to be his priests long after others have joined in their ceremonies. Or it is possible that a single household wandering from a more civilized community may be admitted among a rude people, to whom they impart more perfect methods of tillage, more efficient medical precepts, more impartial maxims of law, better or more ornamental modes of architecture, or more accurate computations of time, than they had previously possessed: the mysterious courses of the stars, the secrets of building bridges[[225]], towers and ships, of ploughing and of sowing, of music and of healing, have been committed to them by their god: for the sake of the benefits they offer, their god is received into the community; and they remain his priests because they alone are cognizant of, and can conduct, the rites wherewith he is to be served.
Even in periods so remote as not to be confounded with those of national migrations, a small body of superior personal strength, physical beauty, mental organization, or greater skill in arms, may establish a preponderance over a more numerous but less favoured race: in such a case they will probably join the whole mass of the people, receiving or taking lands among them, and they will by right of their superiority constitute a noble, sacerdotal, royal race, among a race of freemen[[226]]. They may introduce their religion as well as their form of government, as did the Dorians in the Peloponesus. Or if, as must frequently be the case, a compromise take place, they and their god will reserve the foremost rank, although the conquered or otherwise subjected people may retain a share in the state, and vindicate for their ancient deities a portion of reverence and cult: the gods of nature, of the earth and agriculture, thus yield for a while to the supremacy of the gods of mental cultivation and warlike prowess: Demeter gives way before Apollo, afterwards however to recover a portion of her splendour: Odinn obtains the soul of the warrior and the freeman; Ðórr must content himself with that of the thrall.
In all the cases described,—to which we may add violent conquest by a migratory body, leaving only garrisons and governors behind it[[227]],—the family or tribe which are the ruling tribe, are those in whom the highest rank, dignity, nobility and power are inherent: but unless some peculiar circumstances, arising within the ruling tribe itself, limit the succession to the members of one household, as for example among the Jews, the sanctity of the tribe will be general and not individual. They will be alone qualified to hold the high and sacred offices; but the will of the whole state[[228]], i. e. popular election, must determine which particular man shall be invested with their functions. Out of the noble race the election cannot indeed be made, but the choice of the individual noble is, at first, free. This is the simplest mode of stating the problem: history however is filled with examples of compromise, where two or more noble tribes divide the supreme authority in even or uneven shares: two kings, for instance, represent two tribes of Dorians in the Spartan πολιτεια[[229]]. The seven great and hereditary ministerial houses in the German empire, the five great Ooloos of the Dooraunee Afghans, with their hereditary offices, represent similar facts. Among the old Bavarians, the Agilolfings could alone hold the ducal dignity, but three or four other families possessed a peculiar nobility, raising them nearly as much above the rest of the nobles, as the nobles were raised above the rest of the people. Under these circumstances the attributes of sovereignty may be continually apportioned: to one family it may belong to furnish kings or judges; to another, generals; to a third, priests[[230]]; or this division may have arisen in course of time, within a single family. Or again, the general may only have been chosen, pro re nata, when the necessity of the case required it, from among the judges or priests, or even from among those who were not capable by birth of the judicial or sacerdotal power. We are able to refer to an instance in support of this assertion; Beda[[231]] says of the Oldsaxons, that is, the Saxons of the continent: “Non enim habent regem iidem antiqui Saxones, sed satrapas plurimos, suae genti praepositos, qui, ingruente belli articulo, mittunt aequaliter sortes, et quemcumque sors ostenderit, hunc tempore belli ducem omnes sequuntur, huic obtemperant; peracto autem bello, rursum aequalis potentiae omnes fiunt satrapae.” And this throws light upon what Tacitus asserts of the Germanic races generally[[232]]: “Eliguntur in iisdem conciliis et principes, qui iura per pagos vicosque reddunt.”
The early separation of the judicial from the strictly sacerdotal functions, to a certain degree at least, is easily conceived. It would be mere matter of convenience, as soon as a population became numerous and widely dispersed. Yet to a very late period among the Teutons we find traces of the higher character. The ordeal or judgment of God, the casting of lots and divination, are all derived from and connected with priesthood. The heathen place of judgment was sanctified to the gods by priestly ceremonies; nor can it be supposed that the popular councils were held without a due inauguration by religious rites, or a marked exertion of authority by the priests. Tacitus speaking of these parliaments makes the intervention of the priest the very first step to business: “Ut turbae placuit, considunt armati. Silentium per sacerdotes, quibus tum et coercendi ius est, imperatur[[233]].” The Witena-gemót of later times was opened by the celebration of mass[[234]], and even yet Mr. Speaker goes to prayers. During the flourishing period of Christianity among the Anglosaxons, synods of the bishops and their clergy were commanded to be held twice a year, to act as supreme courts of justice, at least in civil causes[[235]]. The law of the Visigoths, while it recognizes a separation of the persons, implies a confusion of the jurisdiction: “Si iudex vel sacerdos reperti fuerint nequiter iudicasse[[236]].” The people, it is true, found the judgment or verdict, but the judge declared the law, pronounced the sentence, and most probably superintended the execution: in this he represented at once the justice of the god, and the collective power of the state. Thus then we may conclude that at first in every Mark, and more especially in every Gá or Scír, when various Marks had coalesced, there was found at least one man of a privileged family, who either permanently or for a time conducted the public affairs during peace, and was, from his functions, not less than his descent, nearly connected with the religion of the people and the worship of the gods: whether this man be called ealdorman, iudex, rex, satrapa or princeps, seems of little moment: he is the president of the freemen in their solemn acts, as long as peace is maintained, the original King of the shire or small nation. If he be by birth a priest, and distinguished by military talents, as well as elected to be a judge, he unites all the conditions of kingship[[237]]: and, under such circumstances, he will probably not only extend his power over neighbouring communities, but even render it permanent, if not hereditary, in his own: a similar process may take place, if the priest or judge be one, the general another, of the same household. We may conclude that the regal power grows out of the judicial and sacerdotal, and that, whether the military skill and authority be superadded or not, king is only another name for the judge of a small circuit[[238]]. It is only when many such districts have been combined, when many such smaller kings have been subdued by one more wise, more wealthy, powerful or fortunate than themselves, that the complete idea of the German kingdom developes itself: that the judicial, military, and even, in part, the priestly powers sink into a subordinate position, and the kingdom represents the whole state, the freemen, the nobles, and the folcriht or public law of both. It is thus that the king gains the ultimate and appellate jurisdiction, the right of punishment, and the general conservancy of the peace, as well as the power of calling the freemen to arms (cyninges ban, cyninges útware). When this process has taken place the former kings have become subreguli, principes, duces, ealdormen: they retain their nobility, their original purity of blood, their influence perhaps over their people; but they have sunk into subordinate officers of a state, of which a king at once hereditary and elective is the head[[239]].
We are tolerably familiar with the fact that at least eight kingdoms existed at once in Saxon England; but many readers of English history have yet to learn that royalty was much more widely spread, even at the time when we hear but of eight, seven or six predominant kings: as this is a point of some interest, a few examples may not be amiss.
It is probable that from the very earliest times Kent had at least two kings, whose capitals were respectively Canterbury and Rochester, the seat of two bishoprics[[240]]. The distinction of East and West Kentings is preserved till the very downfall of the Saxon monarchy: not only do we know that Eádríc and Hlóðhere reigned together; but also that Wihtred and his son Æðelberht the Second did so[[241]]. Óswine is mentioned as a king of Kent during the period when our general authorities tell us of Ecgberht alone[[242]]; contemporary with him we have Swæbheard, another king[[243]], and all these extend into the period usually given to Eádríc and Hlóðhere. The later years of Æðelberht the Second must have seen his power shared with Eádberht[[244]], Eardwulf[[245]], Sigirǽd[[246]] and Ecgberht[[247]], and Sigirǽd deliberately calls himself king of half Kent. A very remarkable document of Eádbehrt is preserved in the Textus Roffensis[[248]]; after the king’s own signature, in which he calls himself Rex Cantuariorum, his nobles place their names, thus, “Ego Wilbaldus comites meos confirmare et subscribere feci:” and in the same words Dimheahac, Hósberht, Nothbalth, Banta, Ruta and Tidbalth sign. Now the fact of these persons having comites at all is only conceivable on the supposition that they were all royal, kings or sub-kings. That they were subordinate appears from the necessity of the grant being confirmed by Æðelberht, which took place in presence of the grantor and grantee, and the Archbishop, at Canterbury. Among the kings of this small province are also named Æðelríc, Heardberht, Eádberht Pren[[249]] and Ealhmund[[250]], the last prince, father of the celebrated Ecgberht of Wessex.
Among the territories which at one time or other were incorporated with the kingdom of Mercia, one is celebrated under the name of Hwiccas: it comprised the then diocese of Worcester. This small province not only retained its king till a late period[[251]], but had frequently several kings at once; thus Ósric[[252]] and Óshere[[253]]; Æðelweard[[254]], Æðelheard[[255]], Æðelríc[[256]] and in all probability Óswudu, between an. 704-709. A few years later, viz. between an. 757 and 785, we find three brothers Eánberht[[257]], Ealdred[[258]] and Uhtred[[259]] claiming the royal title in the same district, while Offa their relative swayed the paramount sceptre of Mercia. That other parts of that great kingdom had always formed separate states is certain: even in the time of Penda (who reigned from 626 to 656) we know that the Middle Angles were ruled by Peada, his son[[260]], while Merewald, another son, was king of the West Hecan or people of Herefordshire[[261]]. In the important battle of Winwidfeld, where the fall of Penda perhaps secured the triumph of Christianity, we learn that thirty royal commanders fell on the Mercian side[[262]]. Under Æðilræd, Penda’s son and successor, we find Beorhtwald calling himself a king in Mercia[[263]]. During the reign of Centwine in Wessex, we hear of a king, Baldred, whose kingdom probably comprised Sussex and part of Hampshire[[264]]; at the same period also we find Æðilheard calling himself king of Wessex[[265]], and perhaps also a brother Æðilweard[[266]] unless this be an error of transcription. Friðuwald in a charter to the Monastery of Chertsey, mentions the following subreguli as concurring in the grant: Ósríc, Wighard and Æðelwald[[267]].