Although under a Christian dispensation the king could no longer be considered as appertaining to a family exclusively divine, yet the old national tradition still aided in securing to him the highest personal position in the commonwealth. He had a wergyld indeed, but it far exceeded that of any other class: nor was it in this alone that his paramount dignity was recognized, but in the comparative amount of the fines levied for offences against himself, his dependents or his property. And as the principle of all Teutonic law is, that the amount of bót or compensation shall vary directly with the dignity of the party leased, the high tariff appointed for royalty is evidence that the king really stood at the summit of the social order, and was the first in rank and honour, whatever he may have been in power. This is equally apparent in the earliest law, that of Æðelberht, as in Eádweard the Confessor’s, the latest. Thus, if he called his Leóde, fideles or thanes, to him, and they were injured on the way, a compensation double the ordinary amount could be exacted, and in addition a fine of fifty shillings to the king[[32]]. And so likewise, if he honoured a subject by drinking at his house, all offences, then and there committed, were punishable by a double fine[[33]]. Theft from him bore a ninefold, from a ceorl or freeman only a threefold, compensation[[34]]. His mundbyrd or protection was valued at fifty shillings; that of an eorl and ceorl at twelve and six respectively[[35]]: this applied to the cases where a man slew another in the king’s tún, the eorl’s tún, or the ceorl’s edor[[36]]; and to the dishonour of his maiden-serf, which involved a fine of fifty shillings, while the eorl’s female cupbearer was protected only to the amount of twelve, the ceorl’s to that of six shillings[[37]]. His messenger or armourer, if by chance they were guilty of manslaughter, could only be sued for a mitigated wergyld, by which they, though probably unfree, were placed upon a footing of equality with the freeman[[38]]. His word, like that of a bishop, was to be incontrovertible, that is, no oath could be tendered to rebut it[[39]]. He that fought in the king’s hall, if taken in the act, was liable to the punishment of death, or such doom as the king should decree[[40]]: the king’s burhbryce, or violence done to his dwelling, was valued at 120 shillings, an archbishop’s at 90, a bishop’s or ealdorman’s at 60, a twelfhynde man’s at 30, a syxhynde’s at 15, but a ceorl’s or freeman’s only at 5; and these sums were to be doubled if the militia was on foot[[41]]. His borhbryce, or breach of surety, and his mundbyrd or protection were raised by Ælfred to five pounds, while the archbishop’s was valued at three, the bishop’s or ealdorman’s at two pounds[[42]]. He could give sanctuary to offenders for nine days[[43]], and peculiar privileges of the same kind were extended to those monasteries which were subject to his farm or pastus[[44]]. His geneát or comrade, if of the noble class, could swear for sixty hides of land[[45]]. His horsewealh, the Briton employed in his stables, was placed on an equal footing with the freeman, at a wergyld of 200 shillings[[46]]; and even his godson had a particular protection[[47]]. Lastly, high-treason, by compassing the king’s death, harbouring of exiles, or of the king’s rebellious dependents, was made liable to the punishment of death[[48]].
The political position of the king, at the head of the state, was secured by an oath of allegiance taken to him, by all subjects of the age of twelve years[[49]], the ealdormen in the shires, the geréfan in the various districts or towns, summoned his witan and the legal period of majority among the Germans, for public purposes. In this capacity he appointed named the members of their body[[50]]. In this capacity he was empowered to inflict fines upon the public officers, and even private individuals, for such neglect of duty as endangered the public interests: these fines were paid under the title of the king’s oferhýrnes, literally his disobedience: thus, if a man when summoned refuse to attend the gemót; if a geréfa refuse to do justice, when called upon, or to put the law in execution against offenders[[51]], and in other similar cases where the whole framework of society requires the existence of a central support, having power to hold its scattered elements together, and in their places.
The maintenance of the public peace is the first duty of the king, and he is accordingly empowered to levy fines for all illegal breaches of it, by offences against life, property or honour[[52]]: in very grave cases of continued guilt, he is even entrusted with the right of banishing and outlawing offenders, whose wealth and family connexions seem to place them beyond the reach of ordinary jurisdictions[[53]]. Where the course of private war is to be settled by the legal compensations, it is the king’s peace which is established between the contending parties, the relatives and advocates of the slayer and the slain[[54]]. And in accordance with these principles, we find the kings’s peace peculiarly proclaimed upon the great roads which are the highways of commerce and means of internal communication, and the navigable streams by which cities and towns are supplied with the necessary food for their inhabitants[[55]]. And hence also he was allowed to proclaim his peace over all the land at certain times and seasons; as, for eight days at his coronation, and the same space of time at Christmas, Easter and Whitsuntide. He might also, either by his hand or writ, give the privileges of his peace to estates which would otherwise not have possessed it, and thus place them upon the same footing of protection as his own private residences[[56]]. The great divisions of the country, that is the shires, could only be determined by the central power: it is therefore provided that these shall be in the especial right of the king: “Divisiones scirarum regis proprie cum iudicio quatuor chiminorum regalium sunt[[57]].” And to the end of maintaining peace, it appears to me that the king must also have been the authority to whom, at least in theory, it was left to settle the boundaries even of private estate; which on the conversion of folcland into bócland, he did, generally by his officers, but sometimes in person[[58]].
But the great machinery for keeping peace between man and man, is the establishment of courts of justice, and a system by which each man can have law, by the consent and with the co-operation of his neighbours, without finding it necessary to arm in his own defence. It has been shown in the First Book, that such means did exist in the Mark and Gá courts; and that for nearly all the purposes of society, it is sufficient and advisable that justice should be done within the limits and by the authority of the freemen. A centralized system however brings modifications with it, even into the administration of justice. If, as I believe, the original king was a judge, who superinduced the warlike upon his peaceful functions, we can easily see how, with the growth of the monarchy, the judicial authority of the king should become extended. I cannot doubt that, in the historical times of the Anglosaxons, the king was the fountain of justice; by which expression I certainly do not mean that every suit must be commenced in one of the superior courts, or by an original writ, issuing out of the royal chancery[[59]], but that the king was looked upon as the authority by whom the judges were supported and upheld, who was to be appealed to, if no justice could be got elsewhere, and who had the power to punish malversation in its administration by his officers.
We may leave the tale of Ælfred’s hanging the unjust judges to the same veracious chapter of history as records his invention of trial by jury: but it is obvious, from the words of his biographer, that he assumed some right to direct them in the exercise of their functions. He there appears not to have waited until complaints were made of their maladministration; but to have adopted the Frankish and Roman custom of dispatching Missi or royal commissioners into the provinces subject to his rule, in order to keep a proper check upon the proceedings of the public officers of justice. Asser says,—and I record his words with the highest respect and admiration of Ælfred’s real and great deserts,—that “he investigated with great sagacity the judgments given throughout almost all his region, which had been delivered when he was not present, as to what had been their character, whether they were just, or unjust. And if he detected any injustice in such judgments, he, either in person, or by people in his confidence, mildly enquired why the judges had given such unjust decisions, whether through ignorance, or through malversation of another kind, as fear, or favour, or hope of gain. And then, if the judges admitted that they had so decided, because they knew no better in the premises, he would gently and moderately correct their ignorance and folly, and say: ‘I marvel at your insolence, who, by God’s gift and mine, have taken upon yourselves the ministry and rank of wise men, but have neglected the study and labour of wisdom. Now it is my command that ye either give up at once the administration of those secular powers which ye enjoy, or pay a much more devoted attention to the studies of wisdom.’”
A certain pedantry is obvious enough in all this story, which, taken literally, under the circumstances of the time, is merely childish. Still, as Asser, though he may not entirely represent the facts of this period[[60]] in their true Germanic sense, does very likely represent some of the king’s private wishes and opinions, this, among other passages, may serve to show why, in spite of his great merits, Ælfred once in his life had not a man to trust to in his realm. Let us look at the matter a little more closely. In the many kingdoms and districts which by conquest or inheritance came under the Westsaxon rule, various customary laws had prevailed[[61]]. It is very natural that judgments given in accordance with these customs should often appear inconsistent and discordant to a body of men collected from different parts of the realm. Asser is therefore very probably in the right, when he says: “The nobles and non-nobles alike were frequently at variance in the meetings of the comites and praepositi, [that is, in the Witena gemóts,] so that scarcely any one would admit the decisions of the comites and praepositi [that is, in the shire, hundred and burhmót] to be correct.” But it is also probable that he misstates or overstates the extent of the royal power, when he continues: “But Ælfred, who for his own part knew that some injustice arose thereby, was not very willing to meddle with the decision of this judge or that; although he was compelled thereunto both by force of law and by stipulation[[62]].”
For in fact the king was the authority to be resorted to in the last instance; not because he could introduce a system of jurisprudence founded upon Roman Decretals or Alaric’s Breviary,—which his favourite advisers would probably have liked much better than his ealdormen, præfects and people,—but because he could lend the aid of the state to enforce the judgments of the several courts, or even compel the courts to give judgment, by reason of the central power which he wielded as king. As long however as the courts themselves were willing to decide causes brought before them, which the people assembled in the gemóts did, under the presidency and direction of the customary officers, the king had no right to interfere: and even to appeal to the king until justice had been actually denied in the proper quarter was an offence under the Saxon law, punishable by fine[[63]]. In short, under that law, the people were themselves the judges, and helped the geréfa to find the judgment, be the court what it might be. The king’s authority could give no more than power to execute the sentence. It is remarkable enough that while Asser speaks of the instruction and correction which Ælfred administered to his judges, he does not even insinuate that their decisions were reversed,—a fact perfectly intelligible when we bear in mind that these decisions were not those of judges in our sense of the word, and as the Mirror plainly understood them, but of the people in their own courts, finding the judgment according to customary law. It would have been a very different case had the courts been the king’s courts; and in those where the class called king’s thanes stood to right either before the king himself, or the king’s geréfa, it is possible that Ælfred may have interfered. This he had full right to do, inasmuch as these thanes were exclusively his own sócmen, and must take such law as he chose to give them[[64]]. Indeed the words of Asser seem reconcileable with the general state of the law in Ælfred’s time only on the supposition that he refers to these royal courts or þeningmanna gemót; for the king could never have been expected to be present at every shire- or hundred-mót, and yet Asser says he diligently investigated such judgments as were given when he was not present, almost all over his region. This only becomes probable when confined to the administration of justice in the several counties in his own royal courts, and by his own royal reeves, in whose method of proceeding he was at liberty to introduce much more extensive alterations at pleasure, than he could have done in the customary law of the shires or other districts.
If however justice was entirely denied in the shire or hundred, then, iure imperii, the king had the power of interfering: and as it seems clear that such a case could only arise from the influence of some great officer being exerted to prevent the due course of law, it follows that the only remedy would lie in the king’s power to repress him; either by removing him from his office, if one derived from the crown, or iure belli, putting him down as a nuisance to the realm[[65]].
In the later times of the Anglosaxon monarchy, a more immediate interference of the king in the administration of justice is discernible. It consists in what might be called the commendation of suits to the notice of the proper courts: and this, which was done by means of a writ or insigel, probably at first took place only in the case where a sócman of the king was impleaded in the shiremoot touching property subject to its jurisdiction, in fact where one party was a free landowner, the other in the king’s service or sócn; where of course the first would not stand to right in the royal courts, but before his peers in the shire or hundred[[66]]. There is no mention in the laws of the Insigel or Breve[[67]], but the charters give some evidence of what has been averred. In a very important record of the time of Æðelrǽd[Æðelrǽd] (990-995) these words occur[[68]]:— “This writing showeth how Wynflǽd led her witness at Wulfamere before King Æðelrǽd; now that was Sigeríc the archbishop, and Ordbyrht the bishop, and Ælfríc the ealdorman, and Ælfðrýð the king’s mother: and they all bore witness that Ælfríc gave Wynflǽd the land at Hacceburnan, and at Brádan-felda in exchange for the land at Deccet. Then at once the king sent by the archbishop and them that bore witness with him, to Leófwine, and informed him of this. But he would consent to nothing, but that the matter should be brought before the shiremoot. And this was done. Then the king sent by Ælfhere the abbot, his insigel to the gemót at Cwichelmeshlǽw, and greeted all the Witan who were there assembled,—that is, Æðelsige the bishop, and Æscwig the bishop, and Ælfríc the abbot, and all the shire, and bade them arbitrate between Leófwine and Wynflǽd, as to them should seem most just[[69]].”
There can be no mistake about the fact; but it does not amount to a proof that the cause could not have been settled without this formality: both parties to it were of the highest rank; but if the king’s arbitration were refused, the title to the land at Bradfield could legally be tried only in the county of Berkshire in which it lay. Something similar may have been intended by the notice which occurs in the record of another shiregemót (held about 1038 at Ægelnóðes stán in Herefordshire) where it is said that Tófig Prúda came thither on the kings errand[[70]].