The equitable doctrines of satisfaction (see Talbot v. Duke of Shrewsbury and Chancey’s Case, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C. Eq. 8th ed. pp. 378–9) and performance (see Wilcocks v. Wilcocks, and Blandy v. Widmore, 2 Wh. and Tud. L. C. Eq. 8th ed. pp. 413–14 respectively), have recourse to this maxim, and the principle upon which they are founded is the one therein contained.
73. Equity never wants a trustee.
Where a valid trust exists, equity will impose on the person in whom the legal estate is vested the duty and obligation of carrying out such trust.
* 74. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter.
Equity looks at the intention of the parties, and not at the actual words employed in any transaction. Equity always regarded a mortgage as an instrument to secure the repayment of money, and allowed the mortgagor to redeem at any time, but at Common Law, unless the mortgagor paid back the money by the day named in the mortgage deed, his right of redemption was gone. (See Maxs. Nos. 11 and 196.)
75. Erant omnia communia et indivisa omnibus, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium esset. All things were common and undivided to all people, as if there were one property for all.
See Justin I. 43, c. 1. While there were yet few inhabitants on the face of the globe, it seems probable and reasonable that all things were in common among them, and that each took from the public stock what he might require for immediate purposes, and that the right of possession was coexistent only with actual possession. (See Steph. Comm. Vol. I. Book II.)
76. Esse optime constitutam rempublican, quae ex tribus generibus illis, regali (monarchy), optimo (aristocracy), et populari (democracy), sit modice confusa. That State is the best constituted which is made up in moderation of the three classes, royalty, nobility, and commons.
The truth of this is generally admitted—our own country, which comprises the three above essentials, being universally acknowledged the best governed kingdom in the world.
77. Est boni judicis ampliare jurisdictionem (et justitiam). It is the duty of a good judge to enlarge his jurisdiction and also justice itself; i.e., to extend the remedies of the law, and without usurping jurisdiction, to apply its rules to the advancement of justice.