206. Principia probant non probantur. It is not necessary to prove first principles—i.e., maxims (see Preface).
207. Quaelibet concessio fortissime contra donatorem interpretanda est. Every grant is to be interpreted most strongly against the donor.
(See Max. No. 272.)
* 208. Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur et omne per quod pervenitur ad illud. When anything is ordered to be done, everything by which it is to be accomplished is also impliedly authorised.
One of the rules affecting the law of principal and agent, is that the latter’s authority includes all medium powers “per quod pervenitur ad illud.”
209. Quando jus domini regis et subditi concurrunt jus regis praeferri debet. When the right of the king and that of a subject arise simultaneously the former takes precedence.
* 210. Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest. When the law gives a man anything it gives him that also without which the thing itself cannot exist.
Under the following circumstances a way of necessity is implied—e.g., if A. grant to B. a piece of land surrounded on all sides by other land of A.’s B. will (in case there be no right of way to his land) have a right of way over A.’s surrounding land for such time as the necessity exists. The application of this maxim is very limited, and it refers more especially to contracts under seal. (See Chitty on Contracts, 16th ed. p. 115, and Max. No. 42.)
* 211. Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest. When anything does not operate in the way one intends, let it operate as far as it can.
In the case of Roe v. Tranmarr, 2 Sm. L. C. p. 506, a deed purporting to be a release which could not operate as such because it attempted to convey a freehold “in futuro,” was held valid under the circumstances as a covenant to stand seised (see Max. No. 26). A lease in writing but not under seal, is not absolutely void, but held good in equity as an agreement for a lease. (See Maxs. Nos. 271, 273, and 275.)