So one who enables another to commit a fraud is answerable. A person who has a title to property offered for sale at an auction, and, knowing his title, stands by and encourages the sale or does not forbid it, will be bound by the sale, for “Qui non obstat quod obstare potest, facere videtur.” Teasdale v. Teasdale, Sel. Ch. Cas. 59. (See Snell’s Eq. 16th ed. cap. 3, and also Maxs. Nos. 35, 98, 216, and 222.)
218. Qui parcit nocentibus, innocentes punit. He who spares the guilty, punishes the innocent.
219. Qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius. Let him who sins when drunk, be punished when sober.
An intoxicated person can derive no privilege from a madness thus voluntarily contracted. On an indictment for murder, however, intoxication may be taken into consideration, to show that the act was not premeditated, and if there has been some contrivance or inducement to allure the party into drink, or any unfair advantage taken of his intoxication, the Court will sometimes relieve. (But see Chitty on Contracts, 16th ed. pp. 161–162.)
* 220. Qui prior est tempore potior est jure. He who is first in point of time is preferred in law.
(See Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Wms. 49 1, and Marsh v. Lee, 2 Wh. and Tud. L. C. Eq. 8th ed. p. 118.) Subject to the provisions of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, a mortgagee may recover in ejectment without giving notice to quit against a tenant who claims under a lease from the mortgagor, granted after the mortgage without the privity of the mortgagee. The rule stated in this maxim applies as between finders of “treasure trove,” derelicts, and such like. (See also Keech v. Hall, 1 Sm. L. C. 11th ed. p. 511.) Where several persons have interests in the same property, and equal equities in every point except time, as in the case of a third mortgagee who had no notice of a second mortgage when making his advance, here both mortgagees have equal equities, but the second mortgagee, being first in point of time, has the prior right. In this instance, however, the third mortgagee could avail himself of the advantages of tacking. (See Max. No. 288, and Snell, 16th ed. pp. 10, 262–3.)
* 221. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus. He who receives the advantage ought also to suffer the burden.
Equity always acted on this principle when enforcing contribution between co-sureties. (Dering v. Earl of Winchilsea, 2 Wh. and Tud. L. C. Eq. 8th ed. 539, and Waugh v. Carver, 2 Hen. Blackstone, 235; Cox v. Hickman, 1 Sm. L. C. 414.)
222. Qui tacet sentire videtur. He who is silent appears to consent.
(See Maxs. Nos. 35, 216, 217.)