The chief judge would not reply—could not perhaps, till after he and his brothers had prayed together; and when he did speak, he spoke with a subdued voice, like one troubled with fear.
Gentlemen of the jury, said he; I have but a few words to urge in reply.
1. You have been told that one should be a witch to prove that she is not guilty of witchcraft. I admire the ingenuity of the speaker; but my answer is, that by the same rule, a man should be a wizard to prove that he is not a manslayer—he being proved a manslayer. And yet, being proved a manslayer, we put him to death. So here—being proved a witch, if you are satisfied by the proof, we put the prisoner to death, even though it would require the exertion of diabolical power to overthrow the proof.
2. You are told by one speaker that we are prone to believe in the marvellous; and that, therefore, when a marvellous thing is related, we ought to be on our guard against that proneness to belief, and require more proof. Now it appears to me that if we are prone to a belief in the marvellous, instead of requiring more proof to witchcraft, we should require less. For why require much, if less will do?
3. But by another, it has been said that we are not prone to belief in the marvellous; that on the contrary, so prone are we to disbelieve in what may appear marvellous, that proof, which we would be satisfied with in the ordinary affairs of life, we should pay no regard to, if it were adduced in favor of what we consider preternatural; and that therefore in the case you are now to try, you should require more proof than you would in support of a charge not marvellous. To which we reply—that where you have the same number of witnesses, of the same character, in support of a marvellous charge, you actually have more proof, than you would have in the like testimony of the same witnesses, to a charge not marvellous. And why?—Because by the supposition of the speaker, as they are prone to a disbelief in the marvellous, they would have required much proof, and would not have been persuaded to believe what they testify to, but upon irresistable proof—more proof than would have satisfied them in the ordinary affairs of life.
4. It has been said moreover—that the greater the crime charged, the more incredible it is; that great crimes are perpetrated less frequently than small ones; and that, therefore, more proof should be required of parricide than of theft. Our reply to which is, that if a witness declare to a parricide on oath, you have more proof than you would have to a theft sworn to by the very same witness; that, if the greater the crime, the less credible it is, you are bound to attach more value to his testimony where he testifies to parricide than where he testifies to theft. And why?—Because, the greater the crime charged, the greater the crime of the witness if he charge falsely; and therefore the less likely is it, by the supposition, that he does charge falsely.
But here I would have you observe that proof is proof, and that after all, the proof which at law or otherwise would be enough to establish one charge, would be enough to establish any other. In every case you are to be satisfied—you are to believe: and in the case now before you, perhaps it may be well for you to look upon the two improbabilities which I have now spoken of, as neutralizing each other. If witchcraft is incredible—it is incredible also that one should falsely charge another with witchcraft.
5. It has been said too that the witnesses contradict each other. Be it so. I confess that I see no such contradiction—but if I did, I might be called upon to say that perjured witnesses are remarkable for the plausibility and straight-forwardness of their stories; and that such plausibility and straight-forwardness are now regarded, like unanimity, as a sign of bad-faith by judges of experience. You are to be told moreover, that where slight contradictions appear in what may be said by several witnesses to the same fact, such contradictions are a sign of good-faith—showing that no preconcerted story has been told. I might refer, and I may venture to do so perhaps, in a matter of such awful moment, to the gospels in proof. It is a mighty argument for their truth my friends, that no two of them perfectly agree—no two of the whole as they could have agreed, if, as there have been people wicked enough to say (though not to believe) they had been prepared for deception by a body of conspirators——
Brother—brother—put off thy shoes ... the ground is holy—said Governor Phips.
I have.... I have—