As an example, we may take a syllogism in Barbara:[445]
| All M is P, | (1) | |
| All S is M, | (2) | |
| therefore, | All S is P. |
From (1),
| Everything is m or P, | |
| therefore, | Every S is m or P. |
Combining this with (2) we have
Every S is M, and also m or P ; (3)
therefore, Every S is MP (since nothing can be Mm);
therefore, Every S is P.
[445] In the argument that follows m = not-M, s = not-S.
424 All the above steps are immediate inferences, except the combination which yields (3). Hence, if we hold that syllogism is inference while so-called immediate inference is not, we must regard the whole of the inference as concentrated in the mere combination of two propositions into a single proposition; and this is hardly a position that can be accepted.