31. Real (Synthetic), Verbal (Analytic or Synonymous), and Formal Propositions.—(1) A real proposition is one which gives information of something more than the meaning or application of the term which constitutes its subject; as when a proposition predicates of a connotative subject some attribute not included in its connotation, or when a connotative term is predicated of a non-connotative subject. For example, All bodies have weight, The angles of any triangle are together equal to two right angles, Negative propositions distribute their predicates, Wordsworth is a great poet.
Real propositions are also described as synthetic, ampliative, accidental.
(2) A verbal proposition is one which gives information only in regard to the meaning or application of the term which constitutes its subject.[53]
[53] Although verbal propositions may be distinguished from real propositions in accordance with the above definitions, it may be argued that every verbal proposition implies a real proposition of a certain sort behind it. For the question as to what meaning is attached to a given term in ordinary discourse, or by a given individual, is a question of matter of fact, and a statement respecting it may be true or false. Thus, X means abc is a verbal proposition; but such propositions as The meaning commonly attached to the term X is abc, The meaning attached in this work to the term X is abc, The meaning with which it would be most convenient to employ the term X is abc, are real. Looked at from this point of view the distinction between verbal and real propositions may perhaps be thought to be a rather subtle one. It remains true, however, that the proposition X means abc is verbal relatively to its subject X. Out of the given material we cannot by any manipulation obtain a real predication about X, that is, about the thing signified by the term X, but only about the meaning of the term X. The real proposition involved can thus only be obtained by substituting for the original subject another subject.
50 Two classes of verbal propositions are to be distinguished, which may be called respectively analytic and synonymous. In the former the predicate gives a partial or complete analysis of the connotation of the subject; e.g., Bodies are extended, An equilateral triangle is a triangle having three equal sides, A negative proposition has a negative copula.[54] Definitions are included under this division of verbal propositions; and the importance of definitions is so great, that it is clearly erroneous to speak of verbal propositions as being in all cases trivial. In general they are trivial only in so far as their true nature is misunderstood; when, for example, people waste time in pretending to prove what has been already assumed in the meaning assigned to the terms employed.[55]
[54] Since we do not here really advance beyond an analysis of the subject-notion, Dr Bain describes the verbal proposition as the “notion under the guise of the proposition.” Hence the appropriateness of treating verbal propositions under the general head of Terms.
[55] By a verbal dispute is meant a dispute that turns on the meaning of words. Dr Venn observes that purely verbal disputes are very rare, since “a different usage of words almost necessarily entails different convictions as to facts” (Empirical Logic, p. 296). This is true and important; it ought indeed always to be borne in mind that the problem of scientific definition is not a mere question of words, but a question of things. At the same time, disputes which are partly verbal are exceedingly common, and it is also very common for their true character in this respect to be unrecognised. When this is the case, the controversy is more likely than not to be fruitless. The questions whether proper names are connotative, and whether every syllogism involves a petitio principii, may be taken as examples. We certainly go a long way towards the solution of these questions by clearly differentiating between different meanings which may be attached to the terms employed.
Besides propositions giving a more or less complete analysis of the connotation of names, the following—which we may speak of as synonymous propositions—are to be included under the head of verbal propositions: (a) where the subject and predicate are both proper names, e.g., Tully is Cicero ; (b) where they are dictionary synonyms, e.g., Wealth is riches, A story is a tale, Charity is love. In these cases information is given only in regard to the application or meaning of the terms which appear as the subjects of the propositions.
Analytic propositions are also described as explicative and as essential. Very nearly the same distinction, therefore, as 51 that between verbal and real propositions is expressed by the pairs of terms—analytic and synthetic, explicative and ampliative, essential and accidental. These terms do not, however, cover quite the same ground as verbal and real, since they leave out of account synonymous propositions, which cannot, for example, be properly described as either analytic or synthetic.[56]
[56] Thus, Mansel calls attention to “a class of propositions which are not, in the strict sense of the word, analytical, viz., those in which the predicate is a single term synonymous with the subject” (Mansel’s Aldrich, p. 170).