Without implying any dereliction of intention on their part, then or now, it may be said that few of them had legal training or were otherwise fitted to conduct the government’s part in court proceedings. The training of the examiners always has been of the most haphazard, inadequate character. Even under the operation of the Civil-Service laws, it was held that the kind of experience a man ought to have for the field service was that of general contact with the public—that of policemen, street-car conductors, and the like. Yet, as the practice has grown up, these men have to appear in important courts virtually in the guise of attorneys for the government; they must know the law, not only as set forth in the statutes, but as interpreted in innumerable decisions of Federal and state courts.

NEED OF UNIFYING INFLUENCE

The chief examiners have done their best, but differences of “personal equation” have resulted in a very wide diversity of policy and attitude. There never has been any adequate unifying influence in the service; supervision has been conducted largely by correspondence, and the correspondence has not always been self-consistent. Even in the matter of transmitting to the chief examiners the decisions of courts in naturalization matters, there has been a strong tendency to transmit chiefly those decisions which supported the contentions of the Naturalization Bureau, so that there have been cases in which examiners went on insisting upon interpretations of the law which had been overruled, “getting away with it” in courts whose judges did not keep close track of the decisions, to the detriment of petitioners who could not know their rights—since the alien, as a rule, has no one in court to protect him, and rarely is in a position to take an appeal.

In the majority of the courts, particularly those far from the great centers and having relatively little naturalization business, the judges regard it as more or less of a nuisance, do not keep posted about the law and decisions, and, looking upon the naturalization examiner not only as the accredited representative of the government, but as an expert in this field, follow his recommendations and contentions; and here, again, there being no one in court to represent the frightened or embarrassed petitioner, the point of view of the examiner becomes that of the judge, and the law is handed down accordingly. On the other hand, a few judges have taken the attitude that they would not recognize an examiner who was not an attorney admitted to practice before those particular courts.

“NOTHING TO LITIGATE!”

The Bureau of Naturalization has contended that a naturalization hearing is not a “case”; that there is nothing to litigate; that the examiner is present not as an attorney, but as a friend and informant of the court, with which abides the final responsibility. It holds that the petitioner does not need an attorney, the judge being assumed to be of course as solicitous to protect the interests of the petitioner as those of the country’s citizenship. No allowance is made under this theory for judges like the one, for instance, who regards it as his duty to “construe everything against the petitioner”!

The operation of the system certainly leaves the petitioner frequently, at least, in a most unsatisfactory and perilous posture; as witness the matter of the seven-year limitation upon “old-law declarations.” The crisis came in September, 1913, and there was a decision soon afterward in the United States District Court in New York ruling out all “old-law declarations.” A policy in regard to these declarations should have been made then—a unified policy, applicable throughout the Naturalization Service. Nothing of the sort was done; the decision was heeded in some districts and ignored in others, for five years!—until the Supreme Court of the United States, sustaining the holding of the District Court in New York, at one stroke guillotined, so to speak, thousands of declarants under the old law. In many other matters there is still not only uncertainty, but variety of interpretation and practice; a regrettable lack in effect of the “uniform rule” contemplated by the Constitution.

In many courts the point of view of the judge and that of the naturalization examiner are at variance, and this leads in some cases to open bitterness. Some examiners quibble and irritate the judge with trivial objections; some judges constantly ignore important provisions of the law urged upon them by the examiners. Between such extremes the petitioner is a helpless shuttlecock at the time, and later the victim of cancellation proceedings. There are “too many cooks,” too little supervised and unified, and among them the petitioner’s broth is spoiled. One of the crying needs of the Naturalization Service is a permanent law officer, able and willing and vigilant to watch the making of the statutes and decisions all over the country, and to inform and guide the representatives of the service in their interpretation of the law.

CONFUSED STATE OF THE EDUCATIONAL TEST

It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that, during five years at least immediately preceding the date of his application, he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same.