[295] To determine a person’s domicile is sometimes a matter of some difficulty. It is determined on two principles: the fact of one’s residence, and the intent of remaining there as at one’s home; or it depends upon habitation and the animo manendi. Residence and domicile are not convertible terms, because they are not the same things. The Roman definition has been admired for its expressiveness and force. It is there defined: “It is not doubted that individuals have a home in that place where each one has established his hearth, and the sum of his possessions and fortunes; whence he will not depart if nothing calls him away; whence if he has departed he seems to be a wanderer, and if he returns he ceases to wander.” (Code, lib. 10, tit. 39.) It must be assumed as a fact that every person has a domicile, or home, and the domicile of origin remains until another is obtained, not by merely moving or changing, but by leaving it with no intention of returning, without animo revertendi. But an intention to change is not sufficient to alter a domicile until it is actually changed. Therefore, death en route does not alter domicile. (State v. Hallet, 8 Ala. 159.) One who goes abroad, animo revertendi, does not change his domicile, because only the fact of residence is changed, and not the intent. But if he remains very long abroad, and in one place, the intent may be inferred from the fact. The Supreme Court of the United States have intimated that an exercise of the right of suffrage would be the highest evidence, and almost conclusive against the party. (Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 185.)
[296] The doctrine was well settled in a very early case in Pennsylvania, decided by Judge Tilgham, in 1808: the case of Desasbats v. Berquier, 1 Binn. 336; and this case has ever since been quoted and approved as a good statement of the law on this point. There, a will was executed in St. Domingo by a person domiciled there, and sought to be enforced in Pennsylvania, where the effects of the deceased were. It appeared not to have been executed according to the laws of St. Domingo, though it was conceded that it would have been a good will if executed by a citizen of Pennsylvania. The alleged will was held to be invalid.
[297] 23 N. Y. 394.
[298] Confl. Laws, Sec. 481; Adams v. Wilbur, 2 Sumner, 266.
[299] Wills, I, 404.
[300] Nat v. Coons, 10 Mo. 543.
[301] 14 How. 400.
[302] Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. Wms. 291. This was accepted as an indisputable proposition, in Lynes v. Townsend, 33 N. Y. 558.
[303] Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596; 9 Wheat. 565.
[304] Vol. I, 1.