The Anglo-Saxon Century and the Unification of the English-Speaking People

by John R. Dos Passos

IV.—RUSSIA, CHINA, FRANCE—THEIR RELATIONS TO EACH OTHER AND TO THE WORLD

The Russian and Spanish races will furnish two absorbing problems of this century to Europe and the United States.

Let us take up the Russian question first.

There are to-day three great rivals in the commercial world,—the United States, England and Germany. We might add France in some branches of trade, and Japan in others. The commercial ambition of the United States will be, and that of England and Germany is, world-wide. What the natural rivalry between these powers will result in I need not undertake to predict. The laws of trade, however, are unerring, and the cheapest and best seller will eventually secure the customer. As the manufactories of England, Germany, and France close their doors before the keen business genius and competition of the Yankees, immigration to the United States will increase: a hegira of foreign labourers and mechanics will set in, which will greatly thin out, if not depopulate, the old countries of Europe of their best manufacturing ability. This result is inevitable under any conditions; but it must be regarded as separate and apart from the considerations to which allusion is hereafter made. The relations of Russia to this commercial question and to the general status of European affairs, are unique and of the deepest importance. Russia to-day is {11} in the process of governmental and national development. She is not yet, in any complete sense, an integral, sympathetic, national whole, as are the United States, England, and Germany. Her government is still experimental. She is not yet a firm, stable, political unity, but is working with tremendous activity to build up and operate a plan of internal policy. At the same time she is developing a broad, well defined, ambitious, but not unnatural external career. She is now, as ever, grasping for contiguous territories. The one policy is largely dependent for success upon the other. If she overcomes the fires of revolution that burn within her people; if she can, in spite of the diffusion of education and the principles of liberty, maintain the particular species of arbitrary government which now exists; if she succeeds in continuing a despotism, and can present an unbroken front to the civilised powers of the world, maintaining peace and order within, while she asserts and sustains her policy without,—in that event the external policy of Russia may become the second, if not the first, great and absorbing question of the century. If Russia does not succeed with her people; if discontent and revolution ensue; if the present dynasty is overthrown; if a new and different, government is installed in that country, or it is split up into different governments, her power as an international factor will naturally be so weakened and reduced that she may be compelled to agree to any territorial partition or adjustment which may be eventually fixed upon by the other powers, {12} if they act together. In shaping their commercial policies, however, it will not be prudent for the United States, England, Germany, and France to rely upon the weakness of Russia's internal government, although its overthrow is an event by no means unlikely, engaged as she is in building and sustaining a political fabric contrary to modern tendencies and modern thought, and inimical to those nations which possess them. But the powers mentioned above must assume that her internal policy will succeed, and the probabilities of such success, at least for some years to come, make it important for them to act conjointly and promptly in matters pertaining to China, South-eastern Europe and Asia. No matter how they may diverge in other questions, upon the subject of China their true interests demand joint action. Under no circumstances, at least for many years, will Russia be a general commercial rival to these four powers. She has no ambition, for instance, in the direction of Africa, now covered by England, Germany, and France; nor has she any present intention of exploiting the fields of South America or Mexico. The sphere of her external policy embraces South-eastern Europe, Asia, and China, and in these fields she has always met and been checked by Great Britain. It is an absolute, indisputable fact of history, that but for the predominating influence and power of England, Russia would to-day be the complete master of China, Turkey, Persia, and other parts of Asia—in fact, of all Asia. England, alone, might still continue to check Russia's {13} designs on these countries, but in so doing she would be acting not only for Germany, but for the United States, hence the Eastern policy of England must be radically changed, or she must act co-operatively with the United States, France, and Germany, or with one or two of these powers. She cannot for ever continue in the unavowed invidious role of defender of Europe against this gigantic, ever-advancing, all-absorbing antagonist. But eternal gratitude is due to her from the United States and the other powers of Europe for what she has already done in this direction.

Unless some general check, such as is suggested in these pages, be applied, the dream of Peter the Great would seem to be in a fair way of fulfilment. That dream was, first, the acquisition of all Asia; second, the conquest of all Europe—the latter by the instrumentality of its own dissensions, and the playing off of the rival interests, as Austria against France, afterwards France against Germany—a state of things which has an approach to realisation at the present moment. The royal dreamer did not embrace America within the scope of his vision,—a very important and ever-growing factor in the general problem, whether for good or evil.[1]

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In the new diplomatic advent, the United States, Germany, England, and Russia, and, perhaps, France, must be the principal factors. What shall their policy be? Undoubtedly England, the United States, and Germany would never consent to allow Russia to carry out her present ambition to become the owner of China and the other Eastern possessions, which every one knows she covets, and covets quite naturally, because her contiguity to these territories makes it of vital importance for her to obtain a predominating control there, when they pass from the weak hands in which they now rest. Moreover, the strong, despotic government {15} of Russia is suited to Chinese education and intelligence, perhaps much more so than that which any European power could establish there. But behold the proportions and strength of the Russian Empire with China and the Chinese under her control! Does any European power look with equanimity upon such a picture? Naturally, Russia will hesitate long before she will consent to relinquish her cherished dream of eventually controlling these possessions.

It has been manifest for years that China could not take care of herself, and what little diplomacy {16} exists in modern times has been exercised in guarding the present and future integrity of that country from the grasp of rival foreign powers. Until the late war (if the anomalous events which recently transpired in China can be correctly called a war) these diplomatic questions had really involved only England and Russia. At present, the situation is as follows: China and the East must be opened to meet the increasing commercial growth of the United States, England, Germany, and France. There are not enough customers to go round; the domain of commercial activity is too narrow; competition is becoming so close and hot, especially {17} when the United States invades those grounds heretofore exclusively occupied by England, Germany, and France, that new territories must be found, and fresh fields of trade exposed. The doors of China must be thrown wide open to the manufacturers of all these countries, on terms of equality. The policy of Russia is to delay the consummation of this event. She may at some future time be in a situation where she can occupy the disputed field against all comers. She is near the ground, and is becoming more powerful every day, in proportion as her internal policy is fixed, and her laws, religion, and government are made satisfactory to her subjects.

If all these things turn out favourably for Russia, and she can secure the co-operation of China, it is not unlikely or improbable that she will one day say to the other powers, "Hands off!" and be prepared to enforce her words.

Under these circumstances, it is the unquestionable policy of England, the United States, Germany, and France, at least so far as China is concerned, to have their relations with Russia settled at once. If Russia can maintain the status quo until events are ripe for her to act aggressively, it is her plain policy to do so. On the other hand, England, the United States, France, and Germany can gain nothing by the delay, but everything by quick, present, concerted action. The division of China once made, Russian ambition and diplomacy are for ever checked. Of course there is the Franco-Russian alliance. I pay no attention to it. It is a {18} farce—a diplomatic paradox; so suicidal to France's real interest that it is liable to drop to pieces at any change in the French Ministry.