Moreover, if a monarchy is permanently continued in Spain and in Portugal, the hereditary tendency and disposition will be against a federation {40} of all the Spanish people, because federation eventually means republicanism; and it is not natural to believe that the families, in whose hands the monarchical titles are now lodged, can be convinced that the good of the whole Spanish and Portuguese people demands the relinquishment and abandonment of their kingly titles and possessions. Monarchs are sometimes forced to yield up their thrones, or are driven therefrom, by the people; but the spectacle of a king voluntarily surrendering his title for the benefit of his subjects is a rare one. Besides, the indications are that the Spanish people are at heart monarchical. France and her unsatisfactory example may, as a determining cause, have much to do with this tendency.
And in this instance the monarchs of Spain and Portugal can point with considerable force to South and Central America to show that the effort to establish republics among their branch of the Latin race has not been thus far satisfactory, or at least, successful.
But another party whose assent is essential to establish a federation of the whole Spanish people is the United States of America. What are her interests in the premises? What will she say to the formation of a government of this kind, in which two of the leading spirits would be European monarchies, i.e., Spain and Portugal? What application would be made of the "Monroe Doctrine" to such a condition? I conclude, therefore, that neither Spain nor Portugal would or could be an {41} influential factor in the consolidation of the people speaking their languages.
Can such a federation be established between the republics of South and Central America and Mexico? This would be a government which could start with a population of about 58,500,000 and 7,600,000 square miles of territory.
A common cause and a common necessity drove the thirteen original American States together. But no such force is operating upon the republics of Central, and South America; and they failed to utilise the opportunities presented to them in the past. They are all, more or less, suffering from internal dissensions, and the precariousness of their republican governments is not calculated to impress independent observers with their efficacy, strength, or permanency; yet these republics have no common enemy in Europe or in this country. In fact, from the former, if one existed, they would be protected by the well-settled policy of the United States. Is the United States likely, in any just sense, to become their enemy—an enemy, not of the people, but of the form and method of administering their government? Will not such a condition soon exist in some, or all, of these republics, as will justify and make intervention necessary, on the part of the United States, as was made in Cuba? Could such a possibility drive these republics into a federation, to anticipate what their leaders might term "a coming danger"?
Common jealousies and internal disorders will {42} for some time keep the South American republics from consolidation; but the people of the United States are coming closer and closer, each year, to all of these Spanish republics, and will sooner or later, unless avoided by delicate diplomacy, become actively interested in the affairs of their governments. At that time either one of two things will ensue: the formation of a Latin American federation; or gradual annexation to the United States. As a preliminary to either, or to any, event, would it not be wisdom in this country to tender these republics absolute freedom of commercial intercourse?
And how does Mexico stand? At present she occupies a peculiar and wholly anomalous position. Although in form a republic, Mexico is in fact a despotism. She is ruled by one man, whose authority is unlimited. President Diaz is the absolute and only power in the Mexican government. In theory he holds his title from the people, but his will is omnipotent. And withal, the thirteen millions of Mexicans who make up the population of the different states of the so-called Mexican republic are well governed: thus lending confirmation to the statement, often made, that a despotism, when the despot is a patriot and a wise and pure man, is the best form of government that can be established. As long as President Diaz lives, Mexico will probably continue to be well governed, because her ruler is competent in every sense—honest, capable, strong; and ambitious only to behold his country {43} develop and prosper. But when he dies, what will ensue? Not the regime of another patriotic despot. They do not come in succession, and they do not have political heirs. "God makes not two Rienzis." Diaz's death will reveal to the Mexican people—what they seem, notwithstanding their theories, never clearly to have appreciated—that they live under a republic which gives them the control of all political power. When this period arrives, how many Mexicans will be found capable of exercising the functions of citizenship intelligently and patriotically? Will not a majority of them be dupes or tools in the hands of designing political leaders? Who can assume to rule as Diaz? Whom do they know but Diaz? Is not the population of Mexico inferior, in general intelligence and in the duties of citizenship, to that of any other South American republic? What of the Mexican Indians? How far have they been instructed in the duties of government? What kind of a candidate would they favour? And what will be the outlook for the people under an administration elected by popular vote? I shall attempt to answer all these questions together. The mass of the Mexican people have had no preliminary training for true republican citizenship and government. Diaz's death will produce revolution,—peaceable or armed,—and it will occasion such trouble and turbulence, along the border lines of their territories, that it will become the duty of the United States to preserve order thereon. The interior of Mexico will be thrown {44} into confusion, and the conservative people of the Mexican republic will, in due course of time, appeal to and demand aid from the American republic, as the Cubans did; they will ask for protection, or perhaps annexation. This will not transpire over-night, but it will be the inevitable outcome of history.
The difficulties in the way of consolidation of the Spanish and Portuguese people, therefore, seem to me to be insurmountable. A necessary party to any such federation of a part or all of them is the United States of America; and her consent probably could never be obtained. She is the great, dominating, absorbing power, of the North and South American continents. Her policy must be freedom, equality, and protection to all. She will invade no territories, nor deprive any people, against their will, of the government under which they live. What comes into her family from Mexico will fall into her possession as a ripe apple drops into the lap of earth, naturally, and because the period of complete fruition has arrived.
I have endeavoured to sketch frankly, though briefly, the conditions of the Spanish people and the relation which the United States bears to them, especially to those of this continent. I may be in advance of political thought and judgment—I may have attempted to reveal too much of the future horizon to suit the tardy progress of political calculations. But in considering great international questions, frankness and broad views are necessary. The future is generally of more importance than the present. A policy of patching {45} up or mending existing conditions is always misleading and dangerous. This was seen in our treatment of the Chinese question. We are already experiencing it in relation to Cuba. We started out with a high-sounding proclamation of our intentions, which overlooked, or ignored, the true and permanent interests of the people of that island. "Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."[5] Our hands ought to be free to act as circumstances should disclose or dictate. We are now, or soon shall be, confronted with conditions in Cuba which will require us to retreat from our lofty premises and to violate our own declaration. It is a crying evil that in the treatment of great public questions our statesmen will not act with openness and frankness, but constantly seek refuge behind false or hypocritical explanations, or use subterfuges to conceal their real thoughts and purposes. It was perfectly manifest that without a preliminary or probative period, the Cubans would not be in any condition to govern themselves, and that an experiment of the present kind must end in misfortune to these people. To put the tools or implements of a free government in their hands and turn them loose to experiment among themselves was an act of folly on our part, {46} and dissipated the advantages gained by independence.
But one word more, apropos of the whole question of the relations of the Anglo-Saxon race to the Russians, Chinese, Spaniards, and Portuguese. Considered either separately or as a whole, they furnish a subject of supreme interest and importance to our people. To me they alone are sufficient and a full cause for a prompt understanding between us. United and acting sympathetically, we can more or less shape the events of the future by a wise and truly beneficent policy. If the English and American statesmen do not agree with me, but leave this question to fate, as it were, there may come storms, cross-currents, deflections, and all manner of unforeseen opposing forces, which will render the unification of our people impossible or futile. Perhaps this is our destiny—but I think not.[6]