The story of the impressment, service and sufferings of Fernando Stevens and his friends are no exaggerations. Well authenticated history shows that there were thousands of cases similar, and even worse than theirs. The conduct of England was without precedent and unbearable. Their great need of men might have been some excuse for impressment of Americans; but there was a spice of hatred in their cruel treatment of the unfortunate sailors.

We read much about the rulers moulding the destiny of the people; but in our republic the people mould the destiny of the rulers. Long before the president had dared express a thought of war, there were staid old western farmers, level-headed old fellows, who declared that war was inevitable. America is not a country to be ruled by one man. The people rule it, and every man thinks for himself, so that out of the conflict of opinions the truth is usually reached. Before even the fiery congress of 1812 had taken up the subject of hostilities, the legislatures of the several States, urged by their farmer constituency, had by concurrent resolutions declared in favor of war; but the timid president, influenced by his own convictions and the opinions of his cabinet, still hesitated. Finally a committee of Democrats waited on Mr. Madison and told him plainly, in substance, that the supporters of his administration had determined upon war with England, that the patience of the people had become exhausted at his delay, and that unless a declaration of war should soon be made, his renomination and re-election would probably not be accomplished. The president consented to yield his own convictions to the will of his political friends. Thus we see that President Madison was not moved through patriotic motives to declare war against Great Britain, but from personal ambition. Patriotic motives follow personal convictions, be they right or wrong.

On the first of April, 1812, he sent a confidential message to congress, proposing, as a measure preliminary to a declaration of war, the passage of a law laying an embargo upon all commerce with the United States for the space of sixty days. This was done on the fourth of April, and on the eighth, Louisiana was admitted into the Union as a State.

At the end of the sixty days embargo, Madison sent a message to congress in which he reviewed the difficulties with Great Britain, portrayed the aggressions of that power, and intimated the necessity of war for the maintenance of the honor and dignity of the republic. The message was referred to the committee on foreign relations, when a majority of them--John C. Calhoun of South Carolinia, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, John Smillie of Pennsylvania, John A. Harper of New Hampshire, Joseph Desha of Kentucky and Seaver of Massachusetts reported, June 3, a manifesto as the basis of a declaration of war. On the next day, a bill to that effect, drawn by Attorney-General Pinckney in the following form was adopted and presented by Mr. Calhoun:

"That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their Territories, and that the president of the United States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods and effects of the government of the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the subjects thereof."

Pending these proceedings, congress sat with closed doors. The bill passed the house of representatives by a vote of 75 to 49, and the senate by 19 to 13. The president's immediate signature made it a law; and two days later, June 19, 1812, Mr. Madison issued a proclamation, in which he formally declared war against the offending government and people.

Thus began the second war with Great Britain, generally known in the annals of history as the War of 1812, though it was in reality the second war for independence. It was the war which established independence beyond the cavil of a doubt and sustained the honor of the nation.

Immediate measures were taken by congress to sustain the declaration of war. The president was authorized to enlist 25,000 men for the regular army, accept 50,000 volunteers and call out 100,000 militia for the defence of the seacoast. About $3,000,000 were appropriated for the navy.

There were very few men in the United States trained in the art of war at this time. West Point was in its infancy, having been authorized only ten years before, and as yet had not been able to accomplish anything. The older officers of the Revolution were already in their graves, and the younger ones were far advanced in life; yet to the latter alone, the government felt compelled to look for its military leaders. Henry Dearborn, a meritorious New Hampshire colonel in the continental army, was commissioned major-general and commander-in-chief. His principal brigadiers were James Wilkinson, who was on the staff of General Gates in the capture of Burgoyne, Wade Hampton, who had done good partisan service with Marion, Sumter, and others in South Carolinia, William Hull, who had served as colonel in the old war for independence, and Joseph Bloomfield, who had been a captain in the New Jersey line.

At that time, Hull was a governor of the territory of Michigan. Satisfied that the American navy could not cope with that of Great Britain, the Americans based their hopes for success largely upon the supposed dissatisfaction of the inhabitants of Canada and other British colonial possessions on their border. It was believed that the Canadians would flock to the American standard as soon as it was raised on their soil. The American people have always clung to the belief that Canadians were not loyal to Great Britain. It was the mistake of 1775, it was the mistake of 1812, and strange to say Americans still hug the delusion to their breasts that Canada favors annexation. They have reason for their belief only in the doctrine that such an annexation would be in the interests of Canada, disregarding the stubborn fact that in political matters, prejudices, rather than interests, control.