Now, a few words on a question which has been discussed in West Africa and, to a certain extent, in England, namely, the selection of Zungeru as the administrative headquarters and its future. Sir Frederick Lugard has been criticised for the choice, though, considering what he did in and for the country with the means at his disposal, I marvel at any nature hardy enough to comment in an adverse sense. Still, I suppose the former High Commissioner would be one of the last to complain of his actions being scrutinised. I can write without subjecting myself to the suggestion of personal influence, for I have never met Sir Frederick Lugard. I merely speak as one who for several years has been a close student of West African affairs, who has had the advantage of looking at matters on the spot, and who for a long period wrote publicly on military operations. I make bold to assert that all the complaints on the selection of Zungeru are made by persons who do not study what the conditions were in 1902 when Jebba was discarded.
Let any reader take a map of Northern Nigeria and argue out the question for himself. Zungeru was decided upon, not, I should say, solely because it was in a central position, but on the strategic ground that it occupied a point extreme north of the territory then actually controlled, with an excellent administrative base from which movements of troops and political officers could be directed. It was also comparatively easy of access from the south.
No man was less ready than Sir Frederick Lugard to fussily interfere with the petty acts of subordinates. One of his primary principles was that of delegation and personal responsibility. But in the critical years between 1900 and 1907 the presence of the High Commissioner was continually essential in the Provinces northwards of Zungeru, and in those days of bush trekking, when covering 100 miles would be calculated at little less than a week, being as much “on the spot” as possible was a weighty consideration. The Sultans and Emirs to be visited or to be installed would regard nobody in the same light as they would the High Commissioner, whose name and fame had spread through the land. What Kitchener was and Wingate is in the Sudan, Lugard has been to Northern Nigeria.
Take a map and consider the situation in 1902. The Provinces of Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Kantagora (although the town of that name had been taken), and the walled city of Zaria, and the large town of Bida, were all either actually or passively hostile. One of 3 courses: They would have to be brought into line with the rest of Northern Nigeria or there was the alternative of maintaining a large standing army or of retiring south. Zungeru was the best pivot on which to turn wherever attention might be required. Why, it has been asked, select a place which was not easily accessible in the dry season and a low river? No other spot presented even the qualities of Zungeru. It was within 10 miles of the navigable part of the Kaduna River—with which it was connected by a steam tramway—and through the town itself there ran a stream of pure water all months of the year. The climate has proved to be as healthy as at any other station.
Sooner or later, however, a decision must be taken whether Zungeru is to be retained as Capital. On it being now the most suitable spot I do not feel qualified to give an opinion. But Lokoja and Jebba, which have each been spoken of as the “natural Capital” may be dismissed. Both have been tried. Kano has also been referred to in the same connection, so put forward for the glamour of its name and the prominent place it has become in recent history, as well as for its commercial importance.
The very qualities cited operate against the central authority being established in or near Kano. A largely populated centre is not the best situation for a government. The local powers-that-be are unfairly dwarfed and the neighbouring population likely to exercise an undue influence on the executive. Possibly, London is an example of these drawbacks. On the one hand, the L.C.C., bearing in mind the interests and area it represents, is overshadowed by its towering legislative big brother at Westminster. On the other hand, an outdoor demonstration of large dimensions in the metropolis has more influence on the Cabinet than a similar gathering five times the size in Lancashire, Dublin, or Glasgow. South Africa has shown wisdom by not locating the Parliament at Johannesburg.
The Bauchi Highlands have been brought forward as the coolest, best temperature for a new Capital. Much water will flow down the Niger before any such scheme is practicable. At present the main obstacle to Bauchi is lack of transport. When a railway makes it like Zungeru, within a few days of Lagos, instead of two or three weeks, then Bauchi will come within the sphere of practical politics. Lastly, the administrative headquarters of Northern Nigeria may, in the near future, be of less importance than it has been, for by the union with Southern Nigeria, the seat of the Lieutenant-Governor of each—assuming that be the form adopted—will obviously fulfil quite a secondary rôle. And to me it seems inevitable that Lagos will become the capital of United Nigeria.
CHAPTER V
ZUNGERU TO KANO
Everybody his own porter—Religion and missions—Divining water—Carriages patchy in parts—Native passengers—In the track of the slave-raider—Engine sustenance—Kaduna Bridge—A tight-rope performance—Close cultivation—“The lazy negro”—Two civilisations—At Kano.