When the captors came to reckon the losses, they found their own were trifling. The United States carried four hundred and seventy-eight people all told, out of which number Lieutenant John Messer Funk and six seamen were killed, and five only were wounded. The ship had lost her mizzen topgallant-mast, and some of her yards were slashed a little. Her rigging was cut up somewhat, but only three round shot struck her hull.
On the Macedonian forty-three were killed, including two lieutenants, while sixty-one were wounded, of whom one was the undaunted First Lieutenant David Hope, who was severely hurt. So more than one-third of her crew were in the list of casualties, in spite of the long range. As already told, the ship was practically dismasted and more than one hundred round shot had struck her hull, passing through her side below the water-line—an exhibition of marksmanship not to be forgotten by any naval seaman.
Inevitably a comparison of the forces of the two ships must be made. The United States (according to Roosevelt) fired twenty-seven guns throwing 786 pounds of metal at a full broadside; the Macedonian fired twenty-five guns throwing 547 pounds of metal. The crew of the United States numbered four hundred and seventy-eight and that of the Macedonian three hundred and one. James asserts that the Macedonian carried an unusual percentage of boys, and that the United States carried but one boy who was seventeen years old. Now, what could have been the state of mind of the English officers when they reported at home that all of the dozen and odd twelve-year and thirteen-year old powder-monkeys on the United States were seventeen years old or older?
Because we know just how many of the shot of the enemy struck the Yankee ship, and approximately how many of our shot struck the enemy, it will be of interest to return once more to the stock argument of the British historians who continuously assert that their frigates were whipped by the superior size of the Yankee guns. They point to the fact that the United States fired 786 pounds of metal at a broadside, while the Macedonian fired only 547 pounds. Therefore, they say, the United States whipped because of this preponderance. It was by no means, if they are to be believed, because the Yankees were abler naval seamen. But an unbiassed student of history is likely to point to the record of shots striking each ship as furnishing figures very much more significant than those relating to the preponderance in weight of metal thrown. The British hulled the Yankee but three times. Suppose she had had twenty-four pounders instead of eighteens. Those three shots would then have made three holes (allowing for “windage”) each 5.657 inches in diameter. The aggregate areas of the holes was 72.66 square inches. Suppose the United States had carried eighteen-pounders, she would have made more than 100 holes in the Macedonian, each 5.141 inches in diameter. The aggregate area of the 100 holes in the Macedonian would then have been 2073.39 square inches. So the real damage inflicted, even had the armament been reversed, would have been as 2,073 is to 73.
Surely, this computation of the areas of the holes made is quite as pertinent, to say the least, as the weighing of the shot. The combined holes made by the Macedonian equalled one hole eight inches wide and nine long. The aggregate of those made by the United States almost equalled a single hole four feet square.
The truth is, none of the figures of the defeated ones or of those who strive to explain away the figures which the defeated bring forward, are of more than trifling importance. If any one wants to know of how little importance was the difference between the long eighteen and the long twenty-four, let him consider whether a modern rifle of half the bore of either would not have been more serviceable, say than ten of either. It was not the size of a hole that a gun could make, but the number of holes that the crew behind it could make with it in an enemy. The crew of the United States made more than one hundred holes in the British hulk and got but three in return. With this hard fact in mind, what must a candid student say was the relative efficiency of the two crews as naval seamen?
To make this matter of the relative efficiency in that day of the English and American naval seamen still clearer, it is worth considering the size of the target at which the Englishmen fired and missed so often. The United States stood as high out of water as the second-story windows of ordinary dwellings in any of the large American cities. She was as long as the combined fronts of, say seven houses, standing in a solid row. Incredible as it may seem, it is really a fact, that although the Macedonian was no further away than across the street from this big target, and fired repeatedly at that range with the whole broadside, she only landed three shot in the target. Now what kind of gunners were they that they couldn’t hit a two-story house when firing at “half pistol-shot” range?
It was not for lack of practice either, for Executive Officer David Hope, under the date of June 22, 1824, wrote that “in no ship in the British service could there have been more attention paid to the practical part of gunnery than was done to the crew of the Macedonian. The men were not only well trained, but the greatest attention was paid to every department relating to the guns.” That was in 1812. They do things in different fashion in the British navy now, and they know how to shoot guns and how to hit targets as well.
It is interesting at this point to recall a remark made by Captain Carden of the Macedonian when dining on board the United States at Norfolk before the war. He had been pointing out the superiority of such frigates as the Macedonian to any others afloat—had told how much more rapidly and accurately their long eighteens could be handled than the American’s long twenty-fours—how much more metal they would drive into an enemy in a given time and how much handier in every way the Macedonian was than the United States, when he closed by saying:
“Besides, Decatur, though your ship may be good enough, and you are a clever set of fellows, what practice have you had in war? There is the rub!”