When we come to a consideration of the crews it is worth noting first of all that the Americans were commanded by Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, a man of twenty-eight years, who was called commodore by courtesy because he commanded a squadron. The British were under Captain George Downie, a man of mature years and wide experience. The whole number of men on each fleet cannot now be ascertained beyond dispute, but the Americans had, as already said, eight hundred and eighty-two, as near as can be determined. The British historians place their force at a smaller figure, and denounce as cowards the Canadians who manned the British gun-boats. The highest number of men they allow to their flagship is three hundred, although there were more than this number of dead and prisoners taken out of her after the battle, and not a few of the dead were thrown overboard from her during the battle to get them out of the way. Moreover, there was no reason why any vessel of their squadron should be undermanned, for they had a great army on which to draw for men who could handle cannon and muskets. The lowest American estimate in any printed table of the forces is given by Roosevelt, who says they had nine hundred and thirty-seven men, and then adds, in a footnote, “About; there were probably more rather than less,” nevertheless the reader must keep in mind that this battle was fought and won at long range, save for a small part at the tail of the line, and neither the actual nor the relative number of men engaged is of any material consequence. Each side had enough men to handle the guns and the ships when the fight began, and that was all either side could wish for. It was a battle of practical seamanship and accuracy in aiming long-range guns. The men that could show the better seamanship and the greater accuracy were to win, in spite of odds; and this is the way they did it:

Major-General Alexander Macomb.

From an engraving by Longacre of the portrait by Sully.

To begin at the beginning of the preparations, Macdonough chose the best place on the lake for receiving the enemy that was to come against him. With the chart of the lake in mind—possibly with the story of Arnold’s battle behind Valcour Island also in mind—Macdonough carried his squadron to Plattsburg Bay. For Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, with an army that, at the lowest estimate, contained 11,000 men, chiefly “Wellington’s Invincibles,” was coming to Plattsburg, where General Alexander Macomb could muster at first only 1,500 effective men to meet him, although some thousands of militia, including 2,500 hardy Green Mountain Boys, came to help before the battle occurred. But the supporting of Macomb was only one of the lesser reasons that led the able Yankee lieutenant to anchor his squadron in Plattsburg Bay. As was said in describing Arnold’s battle, the wind comes either from the north or the south when it blows in the gorge of Lake Champlain. The British were coming from the north. Their ships were of shoal draught. The water was very narrow. The current runs toward the north. They could come only when the wind was from the north. Now Plattsburg Bay opens toward the south. It is enclosed on the east by a point of land that, at places, is two hundred feet high, called Cumberland Head. The British squadron in coming from the north with a fair wind would have to round Cumberland Head and then go up into this bay against the wind that had brought them before they could reach the Yankee ships. And reach the Yankee ships they must—they could not go on to the south leaving a Yankee squadron behind them any more than Carleton could go on leaving Arnold behind him.

So the position in Plattsburg Bay gave Macdonough the weather gage of the enemy beyond peradventure. But that was not all of the advantage. Macdonough anchored his vessels in a line, nearly north and south, at a distance of about one hundred yards from each other, placing the brig Eagle, that was at the north end of the line, so near to Cumberland Head that the enemy could not easily pass around that end of the line and double up on it. Indeed, since the enemy was sure to have a head wind in the bay, it was practically impossible to double around the north end of the line. Next to the Eagle lay the corvette Saratoga; astern of her was the Ticonderoga, and, last of all, was the little sloop Preble. Observe that the head of the line was the Eagle, the second best Yankee ship, and next to her lay the best of the Yankee squadron. The head of the line concentrated the strength of the squadron and the tail held the weakest ship. The tail was therefore strengthened by the gun-boats; but more than that was provided for, because in case the weak Preble were attacked by the British flagship the big Saratoga or the Eagle could go down-wind to help her.

Still another advantage is found in this position chosen by Macdonough. The British were obliged to come in between his line and Cumberland Head, and so could not take a position wholly beyond the range of the Yankee short guns. As a matter of fact, the British commander anchored as far away as he could, but he was obliged by the conformation of the land to come in and take his chances with the carronades.

Having placed his ships in the best possible position for receiving the enemy, Macdonough made one other provision for the battle, and it was one that really saved the day. He hung anchors from the sterns as well as from the bows of his ships. Just how he arranged the stern anchors is not made clear to a landsman in Macdonough’s report or in any documents relating to the fight. If the reader will keep in mind the fact that a ship when at anchor always swings with her bow toward the wind, the matter will appear clearer. As the Yankee ships swung thus a hawser was carried from the stern of each ship either to the anchor or to some point on its cable, and made fast. These were the springs. So, then, the ship was held at each end to the anchor and could be made to swing broadside to the wind. And that means that while the wind was blowing out of the bay and the British ships had to come into the bay against it, the Yankee ships lay with their broadsides toward the enemy. But that was not all. Both cable and spring might be shot away, although both were on the side of the ship away from the enemy. So an extra anchor was planted broad off on each bow. By hauling on hawsers leading to the various anchors the ship could be turned one way or another. Further than that, an anchor was provided at the stern. If this was dropped and the bow cable cut, the wind would swing the ship around so that she would lie stern to it instead of bow to it. And this is called “winding” a ship. In short, Macdonough, though but twenty-eight years old, was a thorough seaman. He prepared and could handle every device for working his ships in the battle that was to come. He could, in perfect confidence, await the onslaught of the enemy.

CHAPTER VII
MACDONOUGH’S VICTORY ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN

THOUSANDS GATHERED ON THE HILL-TOPS OVERLOOKING THE SCENE—THE BRITISH CHOSE TO MAKE A LONG-RANGE FIGHT—INFLUENCE OF THE FIRST BRITISH BROADSIDE ON A SPORTING ROOSTER—MACDONOUGH’S FIRST SHOT—A REELING BLOW FROM THE ENEMY’S FLAGSHIP—FIGHTING AGAINST TREMENDOUS ODDS—TOO HOT FOR ONE YANKEE SHIP—THE SARATOGA’S GUNS DISMOUNTED—THE SWARMING BRITISH GUNBOATS—“WINDING SHIP” WHEN DEFEAT IMPENDED—THE BRITISH FAILURE WHEN IMITATING THE MOVEMENT—THE STUBBORN BRAVERY OF A BRITISH CAPTAIN—WHEN THE FIRING CEASED AND THE SMOKE DRIFTED DOWN THE GALE—A MEASURE OF THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE TWO FORCES—TWO YANKEE SQUADRON VICTORIES COMPARED—A STIRRING TALE OF MACDONOUGH’S YOUTH—REWARD FOR THE VICTORS—RESULTS OF THE VICTORY.