There is nothing in any report on either side to show that the flag was “promptly” rehoisted. There is nothing to show that Ingraham had any idea of taking possession of the Mercedita. In fact, he had no such idea. Scharf’s “Confederate States Navy” says (and, fortunately for this occasion, Scharf is a violent partisan rather than a historian) that “other vessels of the fleet assisted her to Port Royal for repairs.”
The Confederates followed this success by capturing the gunboat Isaac Smith in the Stono River, where, when scouting, she got among the Confederate batteries. Then the Union forces had a turn of good luck. The Confederate cruiser Nashville had been lying blockaded for a long time in the Great Ogeechee River. Fort McAllister guarded the river, and a line of piles prevented a dash past the fort, but Capt. John L. Worden, who commanded the Monitor, took a new monitor, the Montauk, to the line of piles, on February 28th, and while four other Union vessels fired on the fort, Worden shelled the Nashville at a range of 1,200 yards. The fort gunners kept up a furious but wild fire on Worden’s boat, but he got the range and burned the cruiser. Worden was always at least as proud of this event as he was of his fight with the Merrimac, and he had a right to be, for the marksmanship of his gunners was very much better on this occasion.
Ironclads and Monitors Bombarding the Defences at Charleston.
From an engraving.
After all this preliminary work came the first serious attack on the Charleston defences.
“The order of battle was as follows: The Weehawken, Capt. John Rodgers, with a raft on the bows to explode torpedoes, led the line; the Passaic, Capt. Percival Drayton; the Montauk, Capt. John L. Worden; the Patapsco, Commander Daniel Ammen; the New Ironsides, Commodore Thomas Turner (as flagship), followed by the Catskill, Commander George W. Rodgers; the Nantucket, Commander D. M. Fairfax; the Nahant, Commander John Downes, and the Keokuk, Commander A. C. Rhind.
“The vessels were ordered to pass without returning the fire from batteries on Morris Island; when within easy range of Fort Sumter they were to open upon it, and take position to the north and west, at a distance of 800 yards, firing low, and at the centre embrasure. The necessity for precision of fire was enjoined.”
Of these nine ships the New Ironsides was a big broadside steamer with heavy iron plating, and she carried two 150-pounder rifles and fourteen eleven-inch Dahlgrens. The Keokuk was a sort of monitor with two fixed turrets, and the others were new monitors carrying one fifteen-inch Dahlgren, the solid shot of which weighed 440 pounds, and one eleven-inch Dahlgren, save only that the Patapsco carried a 150-pounder rifle in place of the smaller Dahlgren.
On April 7th this formidable squadron steamed up the channel. They did not get started until 1.15 P.M. because of the fouling of the big raft that was expected to serve as a torpedo-catcher in front of the leading monitor (Weehawken), but at 2.50 o’clock the squadron was within range of Fort Moultrie, and the Confederates opened fire. It was a battle in enclosed water—the Confederate gunners had the range marked to a yard with colored buoys, and the fire was hot from the first gun. But the squadron steamed slowly on until within about 1,000 yards of Fort Sumter. There is a clash of authorities as to the exact distance, but the point is of no consequence because it is certain that the distance of the ships was in no case less than 800 yards from Sumter. At 3.05 the ship at the head of the line opened fire. “A fifteen-inch shell fired at Sumter was watched until it struck on the northeast face; the fort was covered with a mass of dust from the bursting shell.” So says Ammen, and that tells the whole story of the effect of the attack. It kicked up a mighty dust. Some of the ships, including the flagship, became unmanageable. “Disregard motions of flagship” was signalled by Admiral Dupont, commanding. The ships were in a turmoil because of the tidal currents and the difficulty of seeing through the peep-holes and through the smoke. But they did not try to pass into the harbor and attack the forts in the rear. Capt. John Rodgers, of the Weehawken, in his report, tells why for himself and all the squadron: