The reader is requested to note that he says “within four or five hundred yards of Fort Fisher.” His idea was submitted to the Administration and approved, although Mr. Lincoln accepted it “with more caution” than the others. Admiral Porter accepted it because “it was considered advisable to try almost any expedient.” When it came to details, Butler says on page 800 of his book: “My proposition to the Navy Department contemplated using but one hundred tons of powder ... that this one hundred tons of powder should be put into a light-draught steamer, and arranged and packed in such a way that either by electrical or other apparatus fire could be communicated all through the vessel into every part of the mass of powder at one and nearly the same instant; that that vessel should be run ashore; that time fuses or other means of calculating the time necessary for the explosion should be put in operation, and that with the vessel hard and fast on shore so that none of the powder substantially could go down into the water until it had time to take fire, the whole mass should explode. The effect that I expected from that was that the gases from the burning powder would so disturb the air as to render it impossible for men to breathe within two hundred yards; that the magazines of the fort would be burst in and possibly the magazines themselves be exploded; that by the enormous missiles that would be set in motion and by the concussion many men would be killed, and if the explosion were to be followed immediately by an attack of even a small number of effective men, the fort could be captured.”
Accordingly, an old and worthless steamer, the Louisiana, was fitted for the purpose. Instead of 100 tons, 215 tons of powder were put on board. Part of it was not of full power, but nearly 200 tons of the best was stowed in the ship. The work of preparing her delayed the expedition some days, and it was valuable time. However, the expedition finally arrived on the coast, Butler, with his transports, at Masonboro’ Inlet, twenty-five miles up the beach from Fort Fisher, and Porter out at sea, twenty-five miles from the fort. The transports had water and coal for but ten days, but there were delays due partly to weather and partly to the ill feeling between the commanders, and eventually Butler, with most of his transports, went away to Beaufort to take on water for the troops.
Favorable (smooth-water) weather was had on the night of December 23, 1864, and the powder-boat Louisiana was sent in. She was in charge of Commander A. C. Rhind, who had with him Lieut. S. W. Preston, Engineer A. T. E. Mullen, Master’s Mate Boyden, and seven men. The tug Wilderness towed the Louisiana in toward the fort near the north end of the sea-front until the water was fifteen feet deep, when the Louisiana cast off the line and proceeded under her own steam until she was in nine feet of water, when she was anchored. She was then 300 yards or less from the fort. Butler says she should have been beached, although he also says (see ante) 400 or 500 yards was near enough. Captain Rhind says he did not beach her because she would have been strained on the sand, and was likely to open a seam and let in the water and spoil the experiment. Clocks had been arranged to drop weights on explosive mixtures, and these were now set. Then a fire was built in the shaft tunnel in the stern to make sure that she exploded if the clocks failed, after which Rhind and his men returned to the tug. It was then exactly midnight. The tug ran twelve miles out to sea and stopped to watch the explosion. It took place at 1.40 o’clock, and amounted to absolutely nothing.
An army engineer found the wreck of a blockade-runner, called the Condor, 800 or 900 yards from the fort, assumed that it was the wreck of the Louisiana, and so reported. This report was used to discredit Commander Rhind. It seems, on the face of it, to have been a fraud, for the army officer should have known that nothing would remain of the Louisiana after such an explosion. But if so much had remained, what became of Butler’s theory?
The idea that exploding any possible mass of gunpowder in the open air outside of such a fort could hurt any one or anything inside was simply childish. But Butler never ceased to argue that it ought to have been a tremendous success. And it is a most sorrowful fact that, because of Butler’s political influence, the magnificent bravery of the powder-boat’s crew was never in any public manner recognized.
The next day, December 24, 1864, the warships steamed in and anchored at fair range, with the ironclads in one line and the wooden ships some distance outside. They bombarded the fort from 11.30 A.M. until sunset. At night Butler, with a part of his transports, came from Beaufort, and next morning the others arrived. It was arranged to land the troops, undercover of the gunboats, at a point two miles up the beach from the fort. Butler’s orders were to make an assault, if that were deemed feasible, but if not, he was to throw up intrenchments and lay siege to the fort in the usual fashion. Soundings were made in the morning, a more effective line of fire was planned, and, late in the forenoon, the fleet steamed in and once more opened fire. This was on December 25, 1864.
Nearly 3,000 troops were landed, with General Weitzel in command. They captured a couple of little outworks three miles north of the landing place, and then advanced with skirmishers. One of the skirmishers captured a flag from one point on the parapet, and another passed through the sally-port, bayoneted a man on a horse inside, and captured the horse. Weitzel says (see “Butler’s Book”) that he was within 600 yards of the fort, and from a sand-dune examined the work carefully. Butler ran down the beach in a shoal-draft transport, and at a range of 500 yards, as he says, looked at the fort for himself. He continues: “I there met General Weitzel returning from a reconnoissance. He stated to me that he had been out to the front line, and had seen Fort Fisher. As a defensive work the fort was uninjured.” He continues: “I said to Colonel Comstock, who was on board with me [Butler did not land], ‘jump into a boat with General Weitzel, pull ashore and examine with him and report to me if an assault is feasible; to me it does not look so, but I am unwilling to give it up.’” This is from “Butler’s Book,” page 794. Being so primed by Butler, Comstock reported an assault not feasible, and Butler wrote to Admiral Porter that night as follows:
“Upon landing the troops and making a thorough reconnoissance of Fort Fisher, both General Weitzel and myself are fully of the opinion that the place could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially uninjured as a defensive work by the navy fire. We found seventeen guns protected by traverses, two only of which were dismounted, bearing up the beach, and covering a strip of land, the only practicable route, not more than wide enough for a thousand men in line of battle.... I shall therefore sail for Hampton Roads as soon as the transport fleet can be got in order.”
By Confederate reports it appears that the fort was garrisoned by “900 veterans, sixty C. S. N. sailors and marines and 450 junior reserves between sixteen and eighteen years of age.” On December 24th three guns had been disabled in the fort, and on the 25th five others were disabled. Two more had exploded. Including howitzers, the fort had left thirty-four guns, of which twenty pointed up the beach toward an assaulting column. There were also some torpedoes planted in the sand, and a very good line of palisades “made of heavy timber pointed on top.” But for the delay due to the wild powder-boat scheme, the Confederates would have been caught with only 667 men in the fort, according to General Whiting, who commanded the Confederate forces of the Wilmington district. Whiting wrote that he believed an assault on Christmas day would have failed. In his official report he said of the fort: “The delay due to the heavy weather of Wednesday and Thursday after the arrival of the fleet was its salvation.”
With these facts in mind, a student of history may find the following words in Admiral Porter’s report of December 27, 1864 (see Report Sec. Navy, 1865, p. 51): “My despatch of yesterday will scarcely give you an idea of my disappointment at the conduct of the army authorities in not attempting to take possession of the forts which had been so completely silenced by our guns; they were so blown up, burst up and torn up that the people inside had no intention of fighting any longer.”