The "brethren" were not quite as willing to "coöperate" as was supposed, but the "great enterprise" was taken in hand a few years later by a man named William Inman, with notable results.
In considering their failures to organize transatlantic steamship companies, these business men did not fail to refer to the fact that the British government was paying subsidies to the Cunard and the Royal Mail steamship companies. The fact that the Cunard subsidy was a hardship for the owners of the unsubsidized steamers in the American trade was not dwelt upon. The people were told that subsidies were given in order to build up a steam merchant marine. Then Congress was invited to consider the fact that in subsidizing two lines of steamships Great Britain had secured eighteen fine ships fit to add to her growing steam naval fleet. Naval officers were carried on all those ships, and they were not only learning how to handle steam, but they were learning to navigate American waters—and all this at a period when England and the United States were on the verge of war.
Thereupon Thomas Butler King, chairman of the House Naval Committee, brought forward a plan for a subsidized mail line under the American flag. (Ho. Reps. 681 and 685, 28 Cong. 1 sess.) His arguments in favor of a subsidy were: That a reduction might be made in the rate of postage, and yet the income from the mails would soon pay all the subsidy that would be required. That our naval officers would learn how to handle steam. That we should learn how to build efficient steamships for deep water. That a line to the north of Europe would promote emigration and trade. In connection with this last argument it was stated that the British post-office authorities were in the habit of holding up all mails bound across England to the continent until the British merchants had had time to read and act upon their advices from America, and the newspapers had had time to print all the American news. After considering the matter for four years, Congress acted, on March 3, 1845, in a bill providing—
"That the Postmaster-general ... is hereby authorized ... to contract for the transportation of the United States mail between any of the ports of the United States, and a port or ports of any foreign Power, whenever, in his opinion, the public interest will thereby be promoted ... for any greater period than four years and not exceeding ten years. All such contracts shall be made with citizens of the United States, and the mail to be transported in American vessels by American citizens."
Thereupon the Postmaster-general contracted with Edward Mills of New York, who agreed to build ships to plans approved by the Secretary of the Navy, and run a steam-packet line from New York to Southampton and Bremen, twenty voyages a year, for a subsidy of $400,000. If alternate voyages were made to Havre instead of Bremen, the subsidy was to be $350,000.
Mills and his associates were incorporated (May 8, 1846), as the Ocean Steam Navigation Company. Contracts were let for the building of two steamships, and then the troubles of the company began. On learning that an American company was to enter the transatlantic trade, the Cunard Company began running packets regularly to New York. The opposition of this established line increased the timidity of capitalists so much that in spite of the guaranteed income of at least $350,000 a year, it was impossible to obtain the needed money in the United States, and "money was furnished for the undertaking by the little government of Bremen, and by individuals connected with the enterprise on the other side of the Atlantic, and pretty largely furnished, too." (App. Cong. Globe, September 4, 1850.)
The one deadly misfortune of the company, however, was found in the fact that the Americans had not yet learned how to build ocean-going steamships. Said the Merchants' Magazine, May, 1849, regarding the first ships of the line:—
"The models of the Washington and Hermann were quite defective, particularly so in having a very narrow bottom, which made them load deep and be tender or even crank at all times.... Their engines also were not quite strong or stiff enough."
The boilers were not large enough to furnish an adequate supply of steam and the paddle-wheels were too large for the engines. The Scientific American, October 7, 1848, said:—
"The great cause of our unsuccess in our Atlantic steamers is owing to our short acquaintance with the building of marine ships. There is science and genius among our nautical engineers, but they want experience."