CHAPTER XVII
THE HAYES-TILDEN CONTEST. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Although the action of the returning boards in South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, gave Mr. Hayes a majority of one vote in the Electoral College, the Democrats, who were largely in the majority in the National House of Representatives, were evidently not willing to acquiesce in the declared result,—claiming that Mr. Tilden had been fairly elected and that he ought to be inaugurated.
Hon. Henry Watterson, of Kentucky,—who was at that time a member of the House,—delivered a fiery speech in which he declared that a hundred thousand armed men would march to Washington to see that Mr. Tilden was inaugurated. The situation for a while looked very grave. It seemed as if there would be a dual government, Hayes and Tilden each claiming to be the legally elected President. To prevent this was the problem then before Congress and the American people. Conferences, composed of influential men of both parties, were being frequently held in different parts of the city.
The creation of an electoral commission to pass upon and decide the disputed points involved was finally suggested, and was accepted by a majority of both parties. The name of the originator of this suggestion has never been made public; but it is believed by many that Senator Edmunds, of Vermont, was the man, since he was the principal champion of the measure in the Senate. Subsequent events appeared to indicate that Hon. Wm. M. Evarts of New York, was also an influential party to the scheme, if not the originator of it. At any rate, no one seemed to have been sufficiently proud of it to lay claim to its paternity. It was merely a temporary scheme, intended to tide over an unpleasant, and perhaps dangerous, condition which existing remedies did not fully meet. It was equivalent to disposing of the Presidency by a game of chance,—for the composition of the proposed commission was, politically, purely a matter of chance.
As finally agreed upon, the measure provided for a commission to be composed of fifteen members,—five from the House, five from the Senate, and five Justices of the Supreme Court. As the Democrats had a majority in the House, it was agreed that they should have three, and the Republicans two of the five members of that body. Since the Republicans had a majority in the Senate it was agreed that they should have three, and the Democrats two of the five members of that body. Of the five justices of the Supreme Court, two were to be Republicans and two, Democrats; the fifth Justice to be an independent,—or one who was as near an independent as could be found on the bench of that Court.
When the bill creating this commission came before the House I spoke against it, and voted against it, for two reasons. In the first place, I believed it was a dangerous precedent to subject the Presidency of the United States to such a game of chance as was contemplated by the bill then under consideration. Either Hayes or Tilden had been elected, and the result ought to be ascertained according to legal forms. In the second place, I had a suspicion that it was the outgrowth of an understanding or agreement which would result in the abandonment of Southern Republicans by the National Administration.
Mr. Lamar, for instance, did not hesitate to declare that it was more important that the South should have local self-government than that the President should be a Democrat. In other words, what Southern Democrats wanted was to be let alone,—was to have the National Administration keep its hands off, and allow them to manage their own affairs in their own way, even if that way should result in a virtual nullification, in part at least, of the War Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
I had a suspicion that this concession had been granted upon condition that the southern Democratic leaders in Congress would consent to the creation of the proposed commission, and to the ratification of its decision, whatever that decision might be. To such a bargain I did not care to be even an innocent party. My suspicions were strengthened by the fact that the principal opposition among Democrats to the creation of the commission and to the ratification of its decision came from northern Democrats. Southern Democrats, with a few notable exceptions, not only favored the creation of the commission and the ratification of its decision, but even the fiery Watterson was induced to hold his peace and to give expression to his righteous indignation through the medium of a silent vote. That my suspicions were well founded subsequents events more than demonstrated. I took the position that Mr. Hayes had been legally elected, at least according to the forms of law and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution,—and that he should, therefore, be duly inaugurated even if it should be necessary for President Grant, as Commander-in-chief of the Army, to use the military force of the Government for that purpose. I contended that, having been thus legally elected, Hayes should not be subjected to the chance of losing his title to the office and that the incoming President should not be bound by any ante-inauguration pledges, which, in the opinion of some, would have a tendency to cast a cloud upon his title to the office. But the bill was passed and the commission was duly appointed.