Papers were prepared under my direction for Admiral Mayo giving full information of our immediate needs, of past procedure and of future plans. As to our needs, the main requests were:
(1) An increase in the number of destroyers, in order to enlarge the convoy system and to provide better protection for each convoy. An additional 55 destroyers were stated to be required for this service.
(2) An increase in the number of convoy cruisers for the same reason. The total addition of cruisers or old battleships was given as 41.
(3) An increase in the number of patrol craft, tugs, etc., for anti-submarine work.
(4) The rapid building of merchant ships.
(5) The supply of a large number of mines for the proposed barrage in the North Sea, and assistance towards laying them by the provision of United States minelaying vessels.
(6) Aircraft assistance in the shape of three large seaplane stations on the coast of Ireland, with some 36 machines at each station.
(7) The provision of four coal-burning battleships of the "Dreadnought" type to replace Grand Fleet "Dreadnought" battleships which it was desired to use for other purposes.
Admiral Mayo was informed that some 100,000 mines would be required from the Americans for forming and maintaining that portion of the North Sea Barrage which it was suggested should be laid by them, in addition to the large number that it was proposed that we ourselves should lay in the barrage, and that as the barrage would need patrolling by a large number of small craft, great help would be afforded if the United States could provide some of these vessels. It was estimated at that time that the barrage would absorb the services of some 250 small vessels in order that a sufficient number might be kept constantly on patrol.
It may be of interest to give the history of the North Sea Barrage so far as I can recollect it. Our views on such a scheme were sought by the United States Navy Department in the spring of 1917. Owing to various military circumstances, even at that time we had no prospect of obtaining mines in adequate numbers for such work for at least nine to twelve months, nor could we provide the necessary craft to patrol the barrage. Our view was that such mines as became available during the last months of 1917 would be more effective if laid nearer to the German North Sea naval bases, and in the Straits of Dover, than at such a distance from these bases as the suggestion involved. Apart from our desire to stop the submarines near their bases, the pros and cons of the scheme were as follows: