The Crisis of the Naval War

by John Rushworth Jellicoe

Admiral Mayo was also furnished with papers dealing at length with our naval policy at the time and the intended future policy, both in home waters and abroad. Papers were given him relating to our air policy, to the attitude of neutral countries, to the Belgian coast problem, to the blockade, to the defence of trade (including one on the convoy system), to such subjects as the defensive armament of merchant ships with guns, smoke apparatus and mine defence gear, the instruction of the personnel in their use, and the system of issuing route instruction to merchant ships. An important statement was also supplied giving a detailed account of our anti-submarine policy, both at the time and in the future.

These papers gave the fullest information on the naval problem, and were intended to put the United States Naval Department in a position to appreciate the whole position and its many embarrassments, though we realized that these could be appreciated only by those who, like Admiral Sims, were in daily contact with the problems. It will possibly be of further interest if mention is made of some of the points to which attention was drawn.

Admiral Mayo, for instance, was informed that British naval policy was being directed in 1917, as during the remainder of the war, to exerting constant economic pressure upon the enemy with a view to forcing him to come to terms. We also endeavoured to prevent the enemy from interfering with the conduct of the war by ourselves and our Allies. In the effective pursuit of that policy the duty of the Navy involved:

(1) The protection of the sea communications of the Allied armies and the protection of British and Allied trade.

(2) The prevention of enemy trade in order to interfere with his military operations and to exert economic pressure.

(3) Resistance to invasion and raids.

It was pointed out that the question at issue in each case was the control of sea communications, and in order to attain that control permanently and completely the enemy's naval forces both above and below water had to be destroyed or effectually masked. As the weaker German Fleet not unnaturally refused decisive action and as its destruction had hitherto not been achieved, we had adopted a policy of guarding an area between our vital communications and the enemy's ports, and of guarding the areas through which the trade and transports passed; these were the only methods of frustrating attacks made either by surface vessels or by submarines which succeeded in reaching open waters. It was pointed out that a combination of these two methods had been in force during the wars of the eighteenth century, blockades being combined with the convoy system and the patrol of local areas by frigates, etc. History, in fact, was repeating itself.

We mentioned that a close blockade of the German North Sea and Baltic ports presented insuperable difficulties under the conditions of modern warfare, and the alternative of controlling the Dover and Norway-Scotland exits to the North Sea had been adopted. The former protected the communications of the armies in France, whilst the two combined covered the maritime communications of the world outside the North Sea and Baltic, and if they could be effectively guarded our first two objects would be attained.

So far as the Dover exit was concerned we stated that the narrowness of the waters, with the consequent risk to the enemy from our mines and torpedoes, had so far acted as a deterrent to his capital ships; we had to depend on the light forces at Harwich and Dover to deal with any enemy surface craft attacking the southern area from German ports.

We pointed out that the control of the Norway-Scotland exit depended upon the presence of the Grand Fleet at Rosyth or at Scapa. This fleet ensured the safety of all the vessels engaged in protecting trade and in hunting submarines outside the North Sea.