The Crisis of the Naval War

by John Rushworth Jellicoe

Such measures were supplementary to the work of the destroyers engaged on the regular Dover Patrol, the indomitable Sixth Flotilla.

A great deal depended upon the work of these destroyers. They formed the principal, indeed practically the only, protection for the vast volume of trade passing the Straits of Dover as well as for our cross-Channel communications. When the nearness of Zeebrugge and Ostend to Dover is considered (a matter of only 72 and 62 miles respectively), and the fact that one and sometimes two German flotillas, each comprising eleven large and heavily armed torpedo-boat destroyers, were usually based on Bruges, together with a force of large modern torpedo boats and a very considerable number of submarines, it will be realized that the position was ever one of considerable anxiety. It was further always possible for the enemy to send reinforcements of additional flotillas from German ports, or to send heavier craft with minesweepers to sweep a clear channel, timing their arrival to coincide with an intended attack, and thus to place the German forces in a position of overwhelming superiority.

Our own Dover force at the commencement of 1917 consisted of one light cruiser, three flotilla leaders, eighteen modern destroyers, including several of the old "Tribal" class, eleven old destroyers of the 30-knot class (the latter being unfit to engage the German destroyers), and five "P" boats. Of this total the average number not available at any moment may be taken as at least one-third. This may seem a high estimate, but in addition to the ordinary refits and the time required for boiler cleaning, the vessels of the Dover Patrol working in very dangerous, foggy and narrow waters suffered heavy casualties from mines and collisions. The work of the Dover force included the duty of escorting the heavy traffic between Dover and Folkestone and the French ports, this being mostly carried on during daylight hours owing to the prevalence of submarine-laid mines and the necessity for sweeping the various channels before the traffic—which included a very large troop traffic—was allowed to cross. An average of more than twenty transports and hospital ships crossed the Straits daily during 1917, irrespective of other vessels. The destroyers which were engaged during daylight hours in this work, and those patrolling the barrages across the Straits and off the Belgian coast, obviously required some rest at night, and this fact reduced the number available for duty in the dark hours, the only time during which enemy destroyer attacks took place.

Up to the spring of 1917 the examination service of all vessels passing the Straits of Dover had been carried out in the Downs. This led to a very large number of merchant ships being at anchor in the Downs at night, and these vessels were obviously open to attack by enemy craft of every description. It was always a marvel to me that the enemy showed such a lack of enterprise in failing to take advantage of these conditions. In order to protect these vessels to some extent, a light cruiser from Dover, and one usually borrowed from Harwich, together with a division of destroyers either from Dover, or borrowed also from Harwich, were anchored off Ramsgate, and backed by a monitor if one was available, necessitating a division of strength and a weakening of the force available for work in the Straits of Dover proper.

The result of this conflict of interests in the early part of the year was that for the patrol of the actual Straits in the darkness of night on a line some 30 miles in length, the number of vessels available rarely if ever exceeded six—viz. two flotilla leaders and four destroyers, with the destroyers resting in Dover (four to six in number) with steam ready at short notice as a reserve.

An attack had been made on the Dover Patrol in October, 1916, which had resulted in the loss by us of one destroyer and six drifters, and serious damage to another destroyer. A consideration of the circumstances of this attack after my arrival at the Admiralty led me to discuss with Sir Reginald Bacon the question of keeping such forces as we had in the Straits at night concentrated as far as possible. This disposition naturally increased the risk of enemy vessels passing unobserved, but ensured that they would be encountered in greater, although not equal, force if sighted.

Steps were also taken to reduce the tempting bait represented by the presence of so many merchant ships in the Downs at night. Sir Reginald Bacon proposed that the portion of the examination service which dealt with south-going ships should be moved to Southend, and the transfer was effected as rapidly as possible and without difficulty, thereby assisting to free us from a source of anxiety.

During the early part of 1917 the enemy carried out a few destroyer raids both on English coast towns in the vicinity of Dover and the French ports of Dunkirk and Calais. As a result of these raids, which, though regrettable, were of no military importance, a good deal of ill-informed criticism was levelled at the Admiralty and the Vice-Admiral commanding at Dover. To anyone conversant with the conditions, the wonder was not that the raids took place, but that the enemy showed so little enterprise in carrying out—with the great advantages he possessed—operations of real, if not vital, military value.

The only explanation is that he foresaw the moral effect that his tip-and-run raids would produce; and he considered that the effect of the resulting agitation might be of no inconsiderable value to himself; the actual damage done was almost negligible, apart from the loss of some eight lives, which we all deplored. It is perhaps natural that people who have never experienced war at close quarters should be impatient if its consequences are brought home to them. A visit to Dunkirk would have shown what war really meant, and the bearing of the inhabitants of that town would have taught a valuable lesson.

The conditions in the Straits have already been mentioned, but too much emphasis cannot be laid on them. The enemy who possessed the incalculable advantage of the initiative, had at his disposal, whenever he took heart to plan an attack, a force of at least twenty-two very good destroyers, all unfortunately of higher speed than anything we could bring against them, and more heavily armed than many of our destroyers. This force was based within seventy miles of Dover, and as the Germans had no traffic of any sort to defend, was always available for offensive operations against our up and down or cross-Channel traffic. Our Dover force was inferior even at full strength, but owing to the inevitable absence of vessels under repair or refitting and the manifold duties imposed upon it, was bound to be in a position of marked inferiority in any night attack undertaken by the Germans against any objective in the Straits.