The light cruiser Fearless, with destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, were now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers, and the light cruiser Champion, with destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, joined the 5th Battle Squadron. The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been in the rear during the southerly course, now took up a position on the starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle cruisers, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. During this northerly run the fire from our ships was very intermittent, owing to the weather thickening to the eastward, although the enemy was able at times to fire with some accuracy.
From 5 P.M. until after 6 P.M. the light was very much in favour of the enemy, being far clearer to the westward than to the eastward. A photograph taken on board the Malaya at 5.15 P.M. towards the western horizon established this clearly. Our destroyers, shown silhouetted against the bright horizon, were at this time at least 16,000 yards distant.
Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30 minutes after 5.12 P.M. owing to the enemy’s ships being invisible, fire being reopened at about 5.40 P.M. on the enemy’s battle cruisers, three or four of which could be seen, although indistinctly, at a distance of some 14,000 yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52, however, our fire seemed to be effective, the Lion alone firing some 15 salvoes during this period.
At 5.10 P.M. the destroyer Moresby, which had rejoined the Battle Cruiser Fleet after assisting the Engadine with her sea-plane, fired a torpedo at the enemy’s line at a range of between 6,000 and 8,000 yards from a favourable position—two points before the beam of the enemy’s leading battle cruiser.
At 5.35 P.M. the Lion’s course was gradually altered from N.N.E. to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled movements and resulting position of the British Battle Fleet. The enemy’s battle cruisers also gradually hauled to the eastward, being probably influenced in this movement by reports received from their light cruisers, which were by this time in contact with the light cruiser Chester and in sight of our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Hood.
The proceedings of these vessels will now be described.
At 4 P.M., in accordance with my directions, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, proceeded at full speed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 5 P.M. the squadron, comprising the Invincible (Flag), Inflexible, and Indomitable, in single line ahead in that order, with the destroyers Shark, Christopher, Ophelia, and Acasta, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had the light cruiser Canterbury five miles ahead and the light cruiser Chester bearing N. 70° W., and was steering S. by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was rapidly decreasing. According to the Indomitable’s report, objects could be distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings, and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then onwards, according to the same report, the visibility varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards, although other reports place it higher at times.
At 5.30 P.M. the sound of gunfire was plainly heard to the south-westward, and the Chester turned in that direction to investigate, and, at 5.36 P.M., sighted a three-funnelled light cruiser on the starboard bow, with one or two destroyers in company. The Chester challenged and, receiving no reply, altered course to west to close, judging from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel was hostile.
As the Chester closed, course was altered to about north in order to avoid being open to torpedo attack by the destroyer on a bearing favourable to the latter. This turn brought the enemy well abaft the port beam of the Chester and on an approximately parallel course. During the turn the Chester sighted two or more light cruisers astern of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser opened fire on the Chester, the latter replying immediately afterwards, at a range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility at this time, judging by the distance at which the enemy’s light cruisers were sighted from the Chester, could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy’s fourth salvo hit the Chester, put No. 1 gun port out of action, and killed and wounded a large proportion of the gun crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 port guns. The light cruisers sighted by the Chester undoubtedly belonged to one of the enemy’s scouting groups stationed on the starboard bow of their battle cruisers.
Captain Lawson of the Chester, in view of the superior force to which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. and towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing the enemy’s light cruisers, all of which had opened a rapid and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy vessels turned after the Chester, and during the unequal engagement, which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson successfully manœuvred his ship with a view to impeding the accuracy of the hostile fire, realising that she was in no condition to engage such superior forces successfully in her damaged state.