So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course at this time, the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly course before, through, and immediately subsequent to deployment, gradually hauling round afterwards, first through south to south-west, and, then, to west, but it was not until 8 P.M. that a westerly course was being steered.
The only point that is not clear is the identity of the light cruiser engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The ship engaged by the Defence and Warrior was apparently the Wiesbaden. It seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have been another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two engagements took place at almost the same time, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opening fire at 5.55 P.M., and the Defence and the Warrior (the 1st Cruiser Squadron) commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at about 5.50 P.M. and continuing it with the port guns at 6.5 P.M. It is hardly possible, even in the conditions of low visibility that prevailed, that the two squadrons could have been engaging the same vessel.
Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer Onslow, commanded by Lieut.-Commander J. C. Tovey, which at 6.5 P.M. sighted an enemy’s light cruiser in a position on the bows of the Lion and favourable for torpedo attack on that ship. The Onslow closed and engaged the light cruiser with gunfire at ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely damaged by shell fire, succeeded in closing a German battle cruiser to attack with torpedoes; she was struck by a heavy shell before more than one torpedo could be fired. Lieut.-Commander Tovey thought that his order to fire all torpedoes had been carried out, and finding that this was not the case, closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, and then sighting the Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes at battleships. The Onslow’s engines then stopped, but the damaged destroyer Defender, Lieut.-Commander Palmer, closed her at 7.15 P.M. and took her in tow under a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night and the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought her back to home waters, transferring her on June 1st to the care of a tug.
CHAPTER XIII
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND—(Continued)
II.—The Battle Fleet in Action
The “plot” made on the reports received between 5 and 6 P.M. from Commodore Goodenough, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and the report at 4.45 P.M. from Sir David Beatty in the Lion giving the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, showed that we, of the Battle Fleet, might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately ahead and that the cruiser line ahead of the Battle Fleet would sight the enemy nearly ahead of the centre. Obviously, however, great reliance could not be placed on the positions given by the ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had been in action for two hours and frequently altering course. I realised this, but when contact actually took place it was found that the positions given were at least twelve miles in error when compared with the Iron Duke’s reckoning. The result was that the enemy’s Battle Fleet appeared on the starboard bow instead of ahead, as I had expected, and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated. There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the reckoning on board the Iron Duke, as the movements of that ship could be “plotted” with accuracy after leaving Scapa Flow, there being no disturbing elements to deal with.
The first accurate information regarding the position of affairs was contained in a signal from the Black Prince, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron (the starboard wing ship of the cruiser screen), which was timed 5.40 P.M., but received by me considerably later, and in which it was reported that battle cruisers were in sight, bearing south, distant five miles. It was assumed by me that these were our own vessels.
Prior to this, in view of the rapid decrease in visibility, I had directed Captain Dreyer, my Flag-Captain, to cause the range-finder operators to take ranges of ships on bearings in every direction and to report the direction in which the visibility appeared to be the greatest. My object was to ascertain the most favourable bearing in which to engage the enemy should circumstances admit of a choice being exercised. Captain Dreyer reported that the visibility appeared to be best to the southward.
At 5.45 P.M. the Comus (Captain Hotham), of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which was stationed three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, reported heavy gunfire on a southerly bearing, i.e., three points from ahead, and shortly afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing south-south-west although no ships could be seen.
At about 5.50 P.M. I received a wireless signal from Sir Robert Arbuthnot, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, reporting having sighted ships in action bearing south-south-west and steering north-east. There was, however, no clue as to the identity of these ships. It was in my mind that they might be the opposing battle cruisers.