In view of the report from Sir Cecil Burney that our battle cruisers were steering east, and observing that Sir David Beatty reported at 6.6 P.M. that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore south-east, it appeared from Commodore Goodenough’s signal that the enemy’s Battle Fleet must be ahead of his battle cruisers. On the other hand, it seemed to me almost incredible that the Battle Fleet could have passed the battle cruisers. The conflicting reports added greatly to the perplexity of the situation, and I determined to hold on until matters became clearer.
The conviction was, however, forming in my mind that I should strike the enemy’s Battle Fleet on a bearing a little on the starboard bow, and in order to be prepared for deployment I turned the Fleet to a south-east course, leaders together and the remainder in succession, and the destroyer flotillas were directed by signal, at 6.8 P.M., to take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. This order disposed them as follows:
There was, however, a very short interval between this signal to the destroyers and the signal for deployment, and consequently the destroyers did not reach their positions before deployment. The subsequent alterations of course to the southward and westward added to their difficulties and delayed them greatly in gaining their stations at the van of the Fleet after deployment. The correct position for the two van flotillas on deployment was three miles ahead of the Fleet, but slightly on the engaged bow.
At 6.1 P.M., immediately on sighting the Lion, a signal had been made to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. This signal was repeated at 6.10 P.M., and at 6.14 P.M. he signalled: “Have sighted the enemy’s Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west”; this report gave me the first information on which I could take effective action for deployment.
At 6.15 P.M. Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, in the Barham, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, signalled by wireless that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in sight, bearing south-south-east. The distance was not reported in either case, but in view of the low visibility, I concluded it could not be more than some five miles. Sir Cecil Burney had already reported the 5th Battle Squadron at 6.7 P.M. as in sight, bearing south-west from the Marlborough.
The first definite information received on board the Fleet-Flagship of the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet did not, therefore, come in until 6.14 P.M., and the position given placed it thirty degrees before the starboard beam of the Iron Duke, or fifty-nine degrees before the starboard beam of the Marlborough, and apparently in close proximity. There was no time to lose, as there was evident danger of the starboard wing column of the Battle Fleet being engaged by the whole German Battle Fleet before deployment could be effected. So at 6.16 P.M. a signal was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the port wing column, on a course south-east by east, it being assumed that the course of the enemy was approximately the same as that of our battle cruisers.
Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to admit of our battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet, as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them.
During the short interval, crowded with events, that had elapsed since the first flashes and sound of gunfire had been noted on board the Iron Duke, the question of most urgent importance before me had been the direction and manner of deployment.
As the evidence accumulated that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was on our starboard side, but on a bearing well before the beam of the Iron Duke, the point for decision was whether to form line of battle on the starboard or on the port wing column. My first and natural impulse was to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the Fleet into action at the earliest possible moment, but it became increasingly apparent, both from the sound of gunfire and the reports from the Lion and the Barham, that the High Sea Fleet was in such close proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers would be ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, the operations of destroyers attacking from a commanding position in the van would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers during such a deployment, as such an event would throw the Fleet into confusion at a critical moment.