A consideration of all the circumstances had led to the adoption by the Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the Admiralty had determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in the event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that the Grand Fleet would control the North Sea, and that the Channel Fleet would watch the English Channel, thus, in combination, holding the enemy’s main force.
To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main Battle Fleet should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a strategic position in the North Sea where it would act in support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying out sweeps to the southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to action should it put to sea.
This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the result of experience in the various naval manœuvres carried out in previous years in the North Sea. These had demonstrated quite clearly that the alternative policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an impracticable one, it having been shown on many occasions that evasion of a single patrol line during the hours of darkness, or even daylight, under the conditions of visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is a very simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying regular patrol positions is always in peril of successful submarine attack; the loss of the cruisers Hogue, Cressy and Aboukir showed this. It is also open to a concentrated attack by surface vessels.
The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet were based, therefore, on this general idea, and when the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders at 8.30 A.M. on August the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out this general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in the Channel in accordance with the general strategic dispositions.
The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand Fleet comprised the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, with their attached cruisers; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron, strengthened by the addition of the Falmouth and Liverpool; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These dispositions continued in force for some three weeks, when the strong influence of the submarine on naval strategy began to make itself apparent.
The ideas held in pre-War days as to the capabilities of submarines were found, after a short experience of war, to need modification. In the first place, it became quickly apparent that the German submarines possessed a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably greater than those of our own submarines. It had been, for instance, looked upon as a considerable achievement for our submarines to keep the sea for a period of five to seven days, and they had not operated at any great distance from the coast. It is true that submarines had on occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but they were then usually escorted, or even towed, and the number of days from port to port did not approach the length of time for which German submarines remained at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans possessed a considerable superiority in the number of submarines which were capable of operating overseas, and the frequent sighting of enemy submarines as far north as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War, combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy had established a regular submarine patrol in the centre of the North Sea, made it evident that the German submarines would constitute a very serious menace to our heavy ships.
The comparative strength in submarines in Home Waters at the outbreak of war was as follows:
| German— | ||||
| U Boats | 28 | of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea work, but were as good as our D class. | ||
| British— | ||||
| D Class | 8 | { | of which D 1 was unreliable and the remaining units of the D class were not equal to the U boats. | |
| E Class | 9 | |||
| C Class | 34 | } | Unfit for oversea work and used only for local defence of the coast or in the Channel. | |
| B Class | 3 | |||
The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under construction, whilst we were building 19, apart from two experimental vessels of which nothing resulted.
Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in pursuance of a policy introduced by the Admiralty in 1913–14 of widening the area of supply of these vessels. This policy had far-reaching and beneficial results on the subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it enabled us to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case.