The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any great effect, and their importance should not be exaggerated. The turn of the British Battle Fleet opened the range some 1,750 yards, but it was not this turn which led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy. That difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet made a very large turn to the westward under cover of a smoke screen at the moment of launching the earliest destroyer attacks. Neither our battle cruisers in the van which did not turn away at the time, as it was not necessary in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to regain touch until 8.20 P.M. because of the retirement of the enemy.
The instructions as to my intentions as the Commander-in-Chief, in regard to the ranges at which the opening phases of the action should be fought, remained unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the policy of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line in ordinary circumstances.
As is very frequently the case when naval actions do not result in overwhelming material losses by one side or the other, or the capture or destruction of a large part of the opposing Fleet, both sides at the time claimed a victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped to support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet, besides influencing neutral, and probably in particular American, opinion.
The Germans apparently based their claim on two grounds, the first being that of having inflicted heavier losses than they received. In order to make good this contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk one battleship, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and five destroyers more than actually were sunk on the British side; and they concealed, until further concealment was impossible, the sinking of the battle cruiser Lutzow and the light cruiser Rostock, besides omitting to mention that the Seydlitz had to be beached to prevent her sinking, thereby slurring over the point that the Seydlitz would undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own Warrior did, had the action been fought as far from German bases as it was from British bases. They also said nothing of at least four German battleships being torpedoed, and of several battleships and all their battle cruisers being so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of further fighting for several months. The case was very different with the British ships, as has been already stated. If these points are borne in mind, the original German claim to victory falls to the ground, even on the material side. After the surrender of the German ships in November, 1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed writer on naval matters, stated in the Berliner Tageblatt of November 18th that “our Fleet’s losses were severe,” adding that “on June 1st, 1916, it was clear to every thinking person that this battle must, and would be, the last one. Authoritative quarters,” he declared, “said so openly.”
But a victory is judged not merely by material losses and damage, but by its results. It is profitable to examine the results of the Jutland Battle. With the single exception of a cruise towards the English coast on August 19th, 1916—undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show that it was still capable of going to sea—the High Sea Fleet never again, up to the end of 1917, ventured much outside the “Heligoland triangle,” and even on August 19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made precipitately for home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts of the approach of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the method of procedure that would be adopted by a Fleet flushed with victory and belonging to a country which was being strangled by the sea blockade.
Again, in the German account of the “victory” it is remarked that “as the dawn coloured the eastern sky on the historic 1st of June, everyone expected that the rising sun would illuminate the British line deployed in readiness to renew the battle. This expectation was not realised. As far as the eye could reach the horizon was clear. Not until the late morning did our airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was approaching from the southern part of the North Sea at full speed on a northerly course. To the great regret of all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to overtake and attack theirs.”
What are the facts? We know now that as the sun rose, the High Sea Fleet (except such portions as were escaping via the Skaw) was close to the Horn Reef, steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for home behind the shelter of the German minefields. And the Grand Fleet was waiting for them to appear and searching the waters to the westward and northward of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it maintained the search during the forenoon of June 1st, and the airship, far from sighting the Fleet late in the morning, as stated, did so, first at 3.30 A.M., and on several occasions subsequently during the forenoon. And if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what an opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to annihilate them! One is forced to the conclusion that this victorious fleet did not consider itself capable of engaging only twelve British battleships.
I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland Battle without mentioning the personnel of the Fleet. From the second in command, Sir Cecil Burney, to the youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell in the Chester, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit and determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and trusted friend, a fine seaman who always handled his squadron—or, in my absence, the Fleet—with marked skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a high reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton Sturdee, the victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer who had made a special study of tactics; Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders, including my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir Robert Arbuthnot and Rear-Admiral Hood, by whose deaths the nation and Fleet lost of their best—were all officers of proved ability, in whom not myself only, but the Fleet, had absolute confidence.
In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet possessed a leader who throughout his Service career had shown fighting qualities of the highest order, and he had imbued his force with his own indomitable spirit.
The Flag officers second in command of squadrons had all led divisions for a considerable period, and I was confident that they would handle their divisions as well in action as they did during exercises, as proved to be the case.