At 10.10 A.M. a report was received from submarine E 23, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight, that she had sighted ships of the High Sea Fleet steering west at 9.19 A.M.; the position as received in the signal appeared incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20 N., Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our directional wireless stations also led me to consider that a ship of the High Sea Fleet was in the position named at 5.30 A.M., instead of at 9.19 A.M. On the return of E 23 to Harwich, her captain reported that he had attacked the battle cruiser Derfflinger unsuccessfully at 3.13 A.M. on the 20th. At 5 A.M., in spite of the strong enemy destroyer screen, he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battleship of the first Battle Squadron, a ship of the “Nassau” type. This ship turned for home on being torpedoed, and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but at 7.20 A.M. E 23 succeeded in again torpedoing her, and the captain of E 23 was of opinion that the ship was sunk. Subsequent information, however, showed that she reached port in a damaged condition; the persistent action of the captain of E 23 in the face of great opposition, was a fine example of the determined spirit animating our submarine service.
On receipt of the reports from E 23, and from our directional wireless stations, speed was increased, and course shaped to a position at which it was hoped the High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective of that fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in the neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention was to make for a position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40 E., where the Fleet would be favourably placed either to engage the enemy before he closed the coast or to cut him off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his objective the bombardment would be carried out either shortly before dusk, or at daylight, in order to facilitate escape afterwards, or approach before, unobserved. In the possible alternative of the movement being designed to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably placed to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steering south-south-east. Submarines were sighted by the cruiser Minotaur at 1.23 P.M., and by the light cruiser Boadicea at 1.38 P.M.; both these ships were in the vicinity of the Battle Fleet which was manœuvred as necessary to avoid the submarines; this caused some slight delay in the southward movement.
The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea in readiness to meet the Fleet, if required, and during the forenoon of the 19th, was directed to spread on a line running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0, where the submarines would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a position to attack the enemy’s vessels should they proceed towards our coast north of Flamborough Head; in such an event the enemy would be between the Fleet and the submarines.
The Active, with nine destroyers of the newly formed 4th Flotilla in the Humber, which was also at sea, was directed to join the Battle Fleet.
At 1.45 P.M. I received information by wireless that directional wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30 P.M. in a position approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long. 1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45 P.M. was in Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was well ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the same course after 12.30 P.M. as it had steered between 5.30 A.M. and 12.30 P.M., which would take them to Hartlepool, it was evident that it might be sighted at any moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance between the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal was therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High Sea Fleet might be encountered at any moment. The meeting appeared to be so certain that I arranged the distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the assumption that the enemy would turn to the eastward on meeting us, I directed a concentration of fire of ships that would be ahead of the Iron Duke on deployment, of two ships on one, leaving the Iron Duke to deal with one ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate firing at Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to us. The weather was clear. There seemed to be a very good prospect that we might, on gaining touch with the enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was in a position to cut off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was probable that we should be to the eastward, although farther north. Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy elect to make for our coast and try to escape to the northward, where he would have found himself between the Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time passed, however, and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came in from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High Sea Fleet had turned back, probably owing to the fact that the Zeppelins had warned the German Commander-in-Chief of our presence and movements. On this assumption, at 2.35 P.M. I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to steer for a position to the north-westward of Terschelling, so that he might be ready to deliver a night attack on the enemy’s fleet with the Harwich force.
It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would leave a trap behind him in the shape of mines or submarines, or both; and, indeed, the numerous submarines already sighted made it probable that the trap was extensive; it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters which he had occupied unless there was a prospect of bringing the High Sea Fleet to action.
It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight by 4 P.M., and if he had turned for home, it would be impossible to bring him to action; I therefore passed a visual signal out at 3.5 P.M. to Sir David Beatty to the effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was in sight by 4 P.M.
At 3.20 P.M., however, the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron reported a submarine in sight, and I signalled to Sir David Beatty to turn at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to the submarines was correct.
At 3.40 P.M. I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and the cruisers ahead to turn. At this time I received information from our directional wireless stations that enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0 E., at 2.45 P.M. It was evident then that the enemy was returning to his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore turned the Battle Fleet at 3.56 P.M., when in Lat. 54.40 N., Long. 1.01 E., reversing the course to pass up the searched channel so as to avoid mines.
At 4.52 P.M. the Falmouth of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron in Lat. 54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by two torpedoes, one right forward, and one right aft. The ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the time, and the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the starboard bow after she had been hit. The Chester, stationed astern of the Falmouth, proceeded at full speed to zigzag in the vicinity with the object of keeping the submarine submerged and preventing further attack. Another torpedo was fired at the Falmouth at 5.14 P.M., but missed.