Single ships and squadrons that might by any possibility pass close to one another during hours of darkness were warned beforehand of the danger, and arrangements made so that they should be aware of each other’s positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions so as to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which otherwise might open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all sorts were similarly warned so far as this was possible, but in their case the conditions, owing to difficulties of communication, were frequently much more embarrassing.
Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night had to be such as to reduce to a minimum the necessity for signals, whilst giving freedom of action in an emergency. What applied to conditions of darkness applied equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for ensuring safety in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren, could not as a rule be employed, since the blasts might give warning to the enemy and place the Fleet open to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in close company with the larger ships for screening purposes against submarines led, in the case of sudden fog, to a difficult situation, as, before the Fleet could safely carry out any manœuvre, it was essential to get the destroyers clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by the large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued to meet all these conditions, and the best testimony to the training of the Fleet prior to the War was the remarkable freedom from accident during the early months after the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by no means handy vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisation, was also a source of great gratification to me, and must have been most satisfactory to the officers and men concerned.
The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particularly in light craft, the higher speeds attained by its units, the extreme importance of reducing signalling by wireless at sea to an absolute minimum, except in the presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate attention on the question of the efficiency of our signal arrangements. Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to be stopped, because by means of directional wireless stations the positions of ships using wireless telegraphy could be determined by the enemy. As time went on, we felt that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and in some cases even the name of the ship so signalling. This we deduced from the fact that we ourselves made progress in this direction. The fact of a German fleet being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally concluded that the enemy could similarly locate any of our squadrons using the same means of communication. That was an inevitable inference.
The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in the first place, to endeavour, by means of carefully compiled and elaborate orders, to reduce the amount of signalling that would ordinarily be required after the Fleet had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions that could be anticipated, and whilst this made the orders somewhat lengthy so as to meet every possibility, the object was achieved.
Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea in daylight, arrangements were made to pass signals in and out between the most advanced cruisers and the Fleet Flagship by searchlight, except in the presence of the enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet manœuvring when much to the southward of the latitude of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of Aberdeen, was also carried out by visual signalling.
Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the Fleet to enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not possible to use visual signalling at night, except with carefully shaded lamps which were only visible at a distance of about a quarter of a mile, and then only by the ship addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort had then to be made to wireless, but by signalling before dark all expected movements during the night, and by arranging the course of the Fleet so that few alterations were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost absolute wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when important information from the Admiralty and elsewhere was to be transmitted to the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior officers of squadrons, or to single ships when at sea engaged in operations, etc., and early in the War we had to devise a method by which this could be done without calling up the ships in question by wireless, thus necessitating a reply from them, and thus possibly acquainting the enemy of their position.
After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of communicating the required information without causing the ship herself to divulge her position was devised by the Fleet Wireless officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. L. Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and gradually was greatly extended during the later stages of the War.
It must not be thought that, because wireless signalling at sea was restricted, it was not intended to make full use of it when necessary and when silence was no longer required, such as when the fleets were within sight of one another. On the contrary, a great advance was made during the War in the use of wireless telegraphy for manœuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in every other direction. So proficient did the ships become under the organisation introduced by Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in 1916 I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as much ease and rapidity as by visual signals. At the beginning of the War ten minutes to a quarter of an hour would elapse before I could be sure that all ships had received a manœuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to three minutes. This great improvement was due to new methods introduced, as well as to incessant practice in harbour.
Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was very considerable indeed, and I owed a great debt of gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, the other wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and the wireless officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme shortage of wireless personnel for the expanding Fleet and the large number of auxiliary vessels commissioned, we were forced to discharge many of the best operators in the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by boys trained in the Wireless School established by the Fleet at Scapa Flow.
A point which war experience brought into considerable prominence was the difficulty of distinguishing, with sufficient rapidity, enemy vessels from our own ships both before, and, more particularly during, action. The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but was greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines. Steps were taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrangements made for certain distinguishing marks visible at long distances to be worn during daylight by our own surface vessels. The question of identification at night was more difficult, and although we effected improvement in this respect also, the results were not so satisfactory.