"It seems to me that in the present condition of our finances there is no necessity for conferring these large powers on the Secretary of the Treasury. The people are not generally aware of the favorable condition of our finances. The statement of the public debt laid on our tables the other day does not show fully the condition of the finances. It is accurate in amounts, but does not give dates of the maturity of our debts. But a small portion of the debt of the United States will be due prior to August, 1867, that will give the secretary any trouble. But little of the debt which he will be required to fund under the provisions of this bill matures before August, 1867. The temporary or call loan, now over one hundred millions, may readily be kept at this sum even at a reduced rate of interest. The certificates of indebtedness, amounting to sixty- two millions, may easily be paid from accruing receipts, or, if necessary, may be renewed or funded at the pleasure of the secretary. None of the compound interest notes or the seven-thirty notes mature until August, 1867. . . .

"There is, therefore, no immediate necessity for these vast powers. The question then naturally occurs, why grant them? I have carefully considered this question, and I do not think there is now any immediate necessity for granting these powers. No debt is maturing that is likely to give the government any trouble; and yet we are now about to confer upon the Secretary of the Treasury, powers that we cannot, in the nature of things, recall. It is true we may repeal this law next year, but we know very well that when these large powers are granted they are very seldom recalled; they are made the precedents of further grants of powers and are very rarely recalled. It seems to me that the whole object of the passage of this bill is to place it within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to contract the currency of the country, and thus, as I think, to produce an unnecessary strain upon the people. This power I do not think ought to be given to him. The House of Representatives did not intend to give him this power. They debated the bill a long time, and it was defeated on the ground that they would not confer on the secretary this power to reduce the currency, and finally it was only passed with a proviso contained in the bill which I will now read:

'Provided, That of United States notes not more than $10,000,000 may be retired and canceled within six months from the passage of this act, and thereafter not more than $4,000,000 in any one month.'

"The purpose of the House of Representatives was, while giving the secretary power to fund the debt as it matured or even before maturity, giving him the most ample power over the debt of the United States, to limit his power over the currency, lest he might carry to an extreme the view presented by him in his annual report. If this proviso would accomplish the purpose designed by the House of Representatives, I would cease all opposition to this bill; but I know it will not, and for the very obvious reason, that there is no restraint upon the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to accumulate legal tender notes in the treasury. He may retire $200,000,000 of legal tender notes by retaining them in his possession without cancellation, and thus accomplish the very purpose the House of Representatives did not intend to allow him to accomplish. He may sell the bonds of the United States, at any rate he chooses, for legal tenders, and he may hold those legal tenders in his vaults, thus retiring them from the business of the country, and thus produce the very contraction which the House of Representatives meant to deny him power to do. Therefore, this proviso, which only limits the power of canceling securities or notes, does not limit his power over the currency, and he may, without violating this bill, in pursuance of the very terms of this bill, contract the currency according to his own good will and pleasure.

"My own impression is, that the Secretary of the Treasury, in carrying out his own policy, will do so. He says he will not contract it unreasonably or too rapidly, but I believe he will contract the currency in this way. He has now in the vaults of the treasury $60,000,000 in currency and $62,000,000 in gold—a larger balance, I believe, than was ever before kept in the treasury until within the last two or three months; a larger balance than was ever found in the treasury during the war. What is the object of accumulating these vast balances in the treasury? Simply to carry out his policy of contraction. With this power of retaining in the treasury the money that comes in, what does he care for the limitation put upon this bill by the House of Representatives? That says that he shall not retire and cancel more than $10,000,000 of United States notes within six months, and not more than $4,000,000 in any one month thereafter; but why need he retire and cancel them when he can retain them in the vaults of the treasury, and thus contract the currency? . . .

"I do not doubt in the least either the integrity or the capacity of the present incumbent of the treasury department. I have as much confidence in him as anyone; but this question of the currency is one that affects so intimately all the business relations of life, the property of every man in this country, his ability to pay taxes, his ability to earn food and acquire a living, that no man ought to have the power to vary the volume of currency. It ought to be regulated by law, and the law ought to be so fixed and so defined that every business man may transact his business with full knowledge of the amount of the currency, with all its limits and qualifications. I ask you, sir, how any prudent or judicious man can now engage in any important business, in which he is compelled to go into debt, with this large power hanging over him. It would be unsafe for him to do so. The amount of the currency ought to be fixed by law, whether much or little. There ought to be a limit, and no man ought to have the power at pleasure to enlarge or contract that limit. . . .

"Then there is the further power to reduce the currency, a power that has not heretofore been granted to any Secretary of the Treasury. The amount heretofore has been fixed and limited by law. By the first clause of this bill the secretary is authorized to receive treasury notes, or United States notes of any form or description, and there is no limitation to this power, except the clause which I have read to you. That limits his power to retire and cancel the United States notes, but not to accumulate the enormous balances on hand. My own impression has been, and when this bill was before the committee on finance I believed, it would be better for that committee to report to the Senate a financial project to fund the debt of the United States. I believe that now is the favorable time to do it. If a five per cent. bond, a long bond of proper description and proper guarantee, was now placed upon the market, with such ample powers to negotiate it as ought to be given to the Secretary of the Treasury, such a loan as was authorized two years ago, at a reduced rate of interest, to be exempt from taxation, I have no doubt whatever, the Secretary of the Treasury could fund every portion of the debt of the United States as it matured. . . .

"I do not like to embarrass a bill of this kind with amendments, because I know it is difficult to consider amendments of this sort, requiring an examination of figures and tables. I have prepared a bill very carefully, with a view to meet my idea, but I will not present it now in antagonism to this bill passed by the House of Representatives and the view taken by the finance committee, because I know, in the present condition of the Senate, it would not probably be fully considered. My only purpose now is to point out the fact that is perfectly clear to the mind of every sensible man who has examined this bill, that the bill as it stands does not carry out the manifest intention of the House of Representatives when they passed it, and that the proviso, limiting the power of the secretary over the legal tender currency, does not accomplish the purpose which they designed, and without which I know the bill never could have passed the House of Representatives."

Mr. Fessenden: "If the House of Representatives did not understand what they were doing when they passed this bill, it arises from the fact that they did not give the rein to their imagination, as the honorable Senator from Ohio seems to have done to his, and take it for granted that the Secretary of the Treasury had a purpose to accomplish, and that he would not hesitate to take any means in his power to accomplish it, improperly against the manifest will of Congress, against the interests of the country, and against his own interests as Secretary of the Treasury."

I replied: