It was at this time that it was alleged that Mr. Tappan, a New York bank president, said that he would pay $50,000 to stand at the head of the line when the government began to pay out gold; that he could put in $29,000,000 United States notes held by the New York banks and break the government and take out all the gold. It was said that Mr. Coe, a prominent banker in New York, was asked his opinion whether I could resume, and that he said: "Well, yes, I would let the government resume, but it must sell a certain number of bonds to the banks at such a figure." Sensational reports were sent out from Washington to discredit the contract lately made with the syndicate. It was reported that the terms were concealed, that only ten millions were contracted for, part of which it might be necessary to take back, and that the banking and currency committee had summoned me to explain the contract. So far from being true the contract itself was printed in all the papers and the utmost publicity was given to every step taken.
I had a very friendly acquaintance with Peter Cooper, for whom I had the highest respect, but he had fallen into the general ideas of the greenbackers. When in New York, early in April, I called upon him and had a pleasant interview. Soon after I received from him the following letter:
"New York, April 18, 1878.
"Hon. John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury.
"Dear Sir:—In the brief interview which you did me the honor to give me at my house a few days ago, I was impressed with your desire to give all the information that would throw light upon the financial policy of the government, and on the department of which you are the executive head.
"But we had not the time to discuss fully some of those practical questions that involve this financial policy, and I therefore now take the liberty, in a more deliberate manner, to ask of you an answer to questions, which might throw light upon the public mind on these great interests, and allay the anxiety which pervades the hearts of our people in reference to their future prospects of business and employment, and show more clearly how the present policy of the government in enforcing 'specie payments' by law and carrying out the 'resumption act,' could be attended with any wholesome results to the financial interests of this country both in the present and in the future.
"First. Can you resume in the presence of $645,000,000 of legal tender and bank notes with what gold and silver you may have at your command, without an actual shrinkage of this currency, either on the part of the government or of the banks?
"Second. Can 'resumption' be maintained after the law has placed a premium on coin, and virtually demonetized the paper, by rendering its convertibility compulsory? In other words, can the present 'par value' of paper and coin be taken as an index that after the law has thrown its whole weight in favor of coin, by making the paper 'convertible,' the present equilibrium between the two can still be maintained?
"Third. In connection with the fact that by purely commercial laws, we have already arrived at specie payments, or the par between coin and paper money, what good will it do to thrust the further power of the law on the side of coin? How can we avoid placing the paper at the mercy of those who will have control of the coin —especially the paper of the national banks, whose chief credit will consist in maintaining 'specie payments?'
"Fourth. After 'resumption,' how much money will the people have with which to transact business, employ labor, enter into new enterprises, and use 'cash payments' instead of 'inflating credit' to a ruinous degree, as in times past, under the system of specie payments, and convertibility by law?
"Fifth. It being the duty of Congress to make the necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution a system of money, weights and measures as the only means to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, to provide as far as possible an 'unfluctuating currency,' a steady measure of prices, how can you prevent great and disastrous fluctuations in our 'convertible money' and coin, arising out of the great demands for gold and silver that may, at any time, be made upon us from the commercial relations of this country with Europe over which the government can have no direct control? With great respect I remain,