In giving this notice I had in view a change in the mode of refunding which would save to the government the whole or large part of the three months' interest pending the call. This notice gave an additional spur to the market for four per cent. bonds. Copies of it were sent to Mr. Conant and to all parties interested in pending operations, and due notice was given to all persons and corporations engaged in the sale of bonds that all existing contracts would terminate when the 5-20 bonds were covered by subscriptions.
At this time there was a good deal of anxiety as to the effect of the large sale of four per cent. bonds. If these could be exchanged, par for par for six per cent. bonds, the operation would be easy, but many holders of called bonds would not accept the lower rate of interest and invested the principal of their bonds in other securities. General Hillhouse, on the 8th of March, expressed the common feeling as follows:
"There is a good deal of speculation in the papers, as well as in business circles, as to the probable effect on the money market of the settlements to be made in April, during which month, if I am not mistaken, about $150,000,000 of calls will mature. It is now seen, however, that investment demand for the fours is much larger than was anticipated by many; and the subscribing banks will be, therefore, likely to find themselves loaded with large amounts which they cannot dispose of. It would not be strange, in the closing of such vast transactions, if there should be some stringency, but with the favorable indications, that the public are taking the bonds freely, and with the power of the secretary in various ways to facilitate the settlements, it can hardly be more than temporary."
Mr. Conant wrote me, on March 8, from London:
"I have called on all the members of the syndicate several times within the past few days, and have urged them very strongly to push the sales of the bonds here. I have persistently tried to persuade them that they ought to conduct the business with far more energy, and I have said to them that, at the time the contract was entered into, representations were made to you that $50,000,000 of the four per cent. consols could be disposed of on this side of the Atlantic, and that as they had undertaken the business they should not disappoint you. I have represented to them the importance of preventing the shipments of gold from New York, and that you supposed that the sales of bonds which you expected they would make would prevent such shipments. . . .
"The feeling which I alluded to in my last letter, that when the time arrives for the settlement of the large subscriptions made in New York and elsewhere at home the market will be found overloaded, and that a fall in price will take place, still exists here, and has the effect of causing certain classes of investors to delay making purchases, which they will ultimately make. I have not hesitated to say to the associates here that when refunding operations shall have been completed the four per cent. consols will soon thereafter go to a premium, and good reasons can be given why such should be the case."
Soon after I commenced receiving prophecies of stringency and disaster. A long letter from Fisk & Hatch, of New York, said that general apprehension had been growing up in financial circles, and was rapidly gaining ground, that the settlements by the national banks with the treasury department, in April and May, for the large subscriptions of four per cent. bonds made in January and February, would occasion serious disturbance and embarrassment in the money market. They advised me to pursue a course that, whether proper or not, was not in accordance with law. Mr. L. P. Morton., on the same date, took a milder view of it, but still suggested a remedy not within my power.
On the 13th, General Hillhouse, in referring to the apprehensions of my correspondents in regard to the settlements in connection with refunding, said that they might be caused in some instances by the suspicion, if not by the conviction, that their subscriptions had been carried beyond the point of absolute safety, "and now that settlement day is approaching they are naturally desirous of ascertaining how far they can count on the forbearance of the government."
This was the same view I had taken of the matter. I did not feel myself officially bound to do anything but to require prompt payment for the bonds subscribed. The treasury, however, was well prepared for any probable stringency, and I was convinced that the settlements would not cause any serious disturbance. The advices from London continued to be unfavorable. The bonds were offered in the market in some cases at a less price than the syndicate were to pay for them.
In the process of selling the four per cent. bonds I had frequently been written to by persons of limited means, who wished to invest their savings in government bonds of small denominations bearing four per cent. interest. I called the attention of the proper committee of each House to the expediency of issuing notes or certificates of that description, and the act of February 26, 1879, already quoted, was passed.