"And yet, sir, for this alarming condition of the public finances, the administration has no measures of relief except loan bills and paper money in the form of treasury notes. No provision is made for their payment; no measure of retrenchment and reform; but these accumulated difficulties are thrust upon the future, with the improvidence of a young spendthrift. While the secretary is waiting to foresee contingencies, we are prevented by a party majority from instituting reform. If we indicate even the commencement of retrenchment, or point out abuses, on this side of the House, we are at once assailed by members of the committee of ways and means."
I cited the abuses and usurpations of the executive departments in diverting specific appropriations to purposes not authorized by law. I said: "The theory of our government is, that a specific sum shall be appropriated by a law originating in this House, for a specific purpose, and within a given fiscal year. It is the duty of the executive to use that sum, and no more, especially for that purpose, and no other, and within the time fixed."
I pointed out cases where the departments assumed the power to transfer appropriations made for one purpose, to other purposes in the same department. Another abuse by the executive departments was the habit of making contracts in advance of appropriations, thus, without law, compelling Congress to sanction them or violate the public faith. All these evils have since been remedied by restrictive legislation. The habit of the Senate to load down appropriation bills with amendments already refused by the House of Representatives, and then insist that, if not agreed to, the bill would fail, was more frequent then than now, but under the practice now established an amendment finally disagreed to by either House is abandoned.
An illustration of the former practice in the Senate occurred in the 36th Congress, when I was chairman of the committee on ways and means. An appropriation bill was loaded down with amendments, among them an appropriation of $500,000 each for the construction of public buildings in Charleston and New Orleans. The amendments were disagreed to and referred to a committee of conference, of which Senator Toombs was a member. His first expression in the committee was that the House must agree to the items for Charleston and New Orleans or the bill would fail. I promptly answered that I would report what he said to the House, and the bill would fail. He said nothing further, the conference agreed, and the bill passed without any mention of Charleston or New Orleans. Even now the abuse I refer to sometimes occurs, but the general rule and practice is to exclude any item of an appropriation bill not freely agreed to by both Houses.
It was generally agreed that the views expressed by me on the 27th of May were sound in principle, but the strong partisan feeling that ran through the speech weakened its effect. I insert the last two paragraphs:
"But, sir, I have no hope, while this House is constituted as it is now, of instituting any radical reform. I believe that the House of Representatives should be in opposition to the President. We know the intimate relations made by party ties and party feelings. We know that with a party House, a House a majority of whose Members are friends of the President, it is impossible to bring about a reform. It is only by a firm, able, and determined opposition— not yielding to every friendly request, not yielding to every urgent demand, not yielding to every appeal—that we can expect to reform the abuse in the administration of the government.
"At the beginning of this session, I did hope that a majority of this House would compose such an opposition; and while on the one hand it crushed the unholy attempt to impose an odious constitution —by force, or with threats or bribes—upon a free people, it would be prepared to check the reckless extravagance of the administration in the disbursement of the public funds. But the power of party ties and the executive influence were too potent. We can only look now to the virtue and intelligence of the people, whose potent will can overthrow Presidents, Senators, and majorities. I have an abiding hope that the next House of Representatives will do what this should have done, and become, like its great prototype, the guardian of the rights and liberties of the people."
At the beginning of the 35th Congress I was appointed by Speaker Orr a member of the committee on naval affairs, with Mr. Bocock as chairman. Among the subjects referred to the committee was the capture, by Commodore Paulding of the United States navy, of William Walker, engaged in an armed foray against Nicaragua. It was fully considered, and on the 3rd of February, 1858, the majority of the committee, through Mr. Bocock, made a full report, accompanied by the following resolutions:
"Resolved, That the act of Hiram Paulding, a captain of the United States navy, in arresting General William Walker, was not authorized by the instructions which had been given him from the navy department.
"Resolved, That while we have no reason to believe that the said Paulding acted form any improper motives or intention, yet we regard the act in question as a grave error, and deserving, for the reason already given, the disapproval of the American Congress."