But if the Scripture, instead of being totally silent on the subject, had plainly and categorically declared, that general councils are infallible, we should only be involved in fresh perplexities: for the question would immediately arise, what is a general council? How do we know a spurious from a genuine council? Councils have been assembled by opposite parties on purpose to give opposite decrees; and how shall we distinguish the fallible and heretical, from the orthodox and infallible assembly? This vital question cannot be determined by the numbers present, or the portion of the Christian world represented by them. The orthodox Athanasius was condemned successively by councils representing the Eastern and the Western Church. Various councils condemned by the Church of Rome for heresy, were as numerously and respectably attended, as more orthodox conventions. The Council of Milan consisted of 300 Bishops. At Ariminum not less than 400 Bishops were assembled. The Council of Ephesus included 10 Metropolitans and 130 Bishops. The Council of Constantinople included 338 Bishops. And when the rival Councils of Sardica and Philippopolis fulminated mutual anathemas, the latter, which was heretical, consisted of 94 Bishops, while their orthodox opponents amounted only to 76. As most of these councils were convened by imperial authority; represented large portions of Christendom; and included men of the greatest learning and ability, there seems nothing to distinguish them from other synods, which are acknowledged to be general and infallible—nothing, if we except the sanction of the Roman Pontiff.
Here we are informed by our pertinacious disputant, that the papal sanction is commonly regarded in the Church of Rome, as the essential distinction between a mere provincial synod, and a general council; that the decrees of an alleged general council, not ratified by the Pope, are not infallible; while the decrees of any council, after that ratification, must be looked upon as infallibly determined.
But our ingenuity must again be exercised in finding our way through this labyrinth: for, first of all, no Scriptural reason can be found, or is even pretended, for the limitation of infallibility to councils of the description mentioned. The authority, therefore, exists only in the well-stored imagination of our Romish friend. [26] And in addition, we are perplexed to ascertain how two authorities, separately fallible, should become infallible by their conjunction. The council is fallible. The Pope is fallible. But unite these two fallibles, and you give them infallibility. If it be asked, Is the council liable to err which passes the decree?—Certainly, is the answer: for otherwise the council would, without the Pope, be all-sufficient. If it be further demanded, Is the Pope, also liable to err who confirms the decree?—Certainly, is again the answer: for he would otherwise be all-sufficient without the council. This is a strange dilemma: we must believe the decree to be infallibly determined, and yet must neither ascribe infallibility to the council which passes it, nor to the Pope who confirms it.
Another consideration is the uncertainty and arbitrariness of this papal act of confirmation. The Protestant must not take for granted that the eighteen Councils, acknowledged by the Church of Rome to be general, have the seal of St. Peter affixed to all their canons and decrees. In some cases a general council is partly confirmed and partly rejected (partim confirmatum, partim reprobatum); [27a] in some cases neither confirmed nor rejected (neque approbatum neque reprobatum): in some it is pronounced uncertain whether the decrees are confirmed or rejected; and in others they are confirmed by one Pope, and rejected by another. Sometimes the general council did not proceed with due form (conciliariter), or did not proceed with due deliberation (re diligenter examinatâ); sometimes the questions to be determined were not stated with sufficient clearness (satis apertè), and sometimes there is a want of evidence whether the council was general or provincial. “All this,” exclaims Bishop Taylor, “is the greatest folly and most prodigious vanity.” [27b]
Again, we might observe, that if infallibility be granted to the Church through its representatives in a general council, the privilege has been for many centuries in abeyance, and (considering the aspect of Christendom) is never likely to be renewed. And further, with respect to the reception of these infallible decrees by provincial Churches, we might bring forward the doubts which have prevailed among Romanists, whether the decrees are binding immediately on being passed, or only after they have been received. [27c] Next with reference to the doctrines which they inculcate, these are often grievously contradictory to reason and Scripture. Transubstantiation, for example, is contrary to reason. If therefore we believe the infallibility of general councils on grounds of reason, the reasons against transubstantiation must be fairly balanced in our minds with the reasons in favour of infallibility. And as examples of contradiction to Scripture, we might instance the adoration of the Blessed Virgin, the worshipping of images and relics, the invocation of saints and angels, purgatory, and the sacrifice of the mass. We might then go on to show that if the infallibility of general councils be Scripturally maintained, the texts adduced in support of infallibility are to be weighed against the numerous and explicit texts which oppose these corrupt doctrines and idolatrous practices. Lastly, we might contend that, in the primitive ages, when councils were continually assembled, neither those councils themselves, nor any one writer who defended their decrees, ever spoke of them as infallible. We need scarcely add that councils could not be infallible without knowing it; nor would hear their infallible decrees disputed without asserting their infallibility.
3. Having now vainly endeavoured to procure conclusive and satisfactory information on two of the essential points indispensable for our conversion to Romanism; namely, first, by what organ the infallible oracles are delivered, and, secondly, by what evidence the claim to infallibility is established; we proceed to the third and last topic of investigation, and inquire on what security we can rely, that we shall not misunderstand the doctrine propounded to our belief?
We have already seen that the Romanist is unable to decide with certainty in what person or persons infallibility resides; and that he cannot prove the person or the persons for whom he claims it, namely, a Pope or Council, jointly or severally, to be infallible. Let us next consider, in conclusion, (and the consideration need not occupy us long,) whether he is more successful in establishing the third particular, which we began by laying down as necessary to the tranquillization of our minds; whether, in short, it can be proved to us incontestably, that we shall comprehend with clearness and practical certainty the bulls and canons promulgated for our guidance to the truth.
Security on this point is obviously indispensable. The inspired volume is allowed by all Christians to contain unerring rules of faith and practice. But our erring reason, we are told, is liable to misconceive them. Hence the supposed necessity for another guide. But the very same liability to error which exposes us to mistake in interpreting the Scriptures, exposes us to mistake also in interpreting the bulls of a Pope, or the canons of a general council. God Himself inspired his chosen servants to write the Scriptures “for our learning.” God nevertheless is misunderstood. Neither Pope nor Council, therefore, is secure from being so. Their decisions, jointly or separately, may be misinterpreted through our weakness of apprehension. We consequently need a new interpreter for expounding their interpretation. But the expositions of this new interpreter may, like those of his unerring predecessors, be erroneously understood; and thus we should require an infinite series of infallible guides, and at the end of this elaborate process we should not be nearer to infallibility than we found ourselves at the beginning. [29a]
Accordingly, we read, without surprise, that there are disputes among Romanists in regard to the right construction of their infallible decrees and canons; disputes as constant and as vehement as those unhappily subsisting among Protestants, in regard to the meaning of our inspired Scriptures. [29b] In the celebrated Council of Trent, the last, and by the Romanists regarded as the greatest ever held, many points of doctrine which had called forth the most violent and argumentative disputation were purposely expressed with ambiguity in the canons, that the consent of all parties might be obtained. Even on that all-important article of faith, respecting the proper object of religious adoration, the Tridentine Fathers were satisfied with a vague declaration, that “due worship should be given to images,” without informing the conscientious worshipper, (in a strait betwixt the danger of profaneness on one hand and of idolatry on the other,) what kind of worship that doubtful phrase was intended to imply. [29c] It may be also noticed that there are several controverted points in religion, (the very points, in fact, most frequently contested among Protestants,) on which no unerring oracle has yet pronounced a decision, and on which variations of opinion may be discovered in the papal Church analogous to those prevailing throughout Protestant communions. I allude to the numerous questions connected with election, foreknowledge, predestination, grace, free-will, and the perseverance of the Saints.
Nor will the force of our objections be evaded by the reply that actual conformity of faith to the decisions of Popes and Councils is not required; that intentional conformity will suffice; and that every man, whatever be his errors and misconceptions, is capable of salvation who is willing and inclined to believe as the Church believes. For if the Romanist is willing to believe as his Church believes, the Protestant is willing to believe as the Apostles and Evangelists believed. If then this willingness will suffice for the Romanist, why should it not be sufficient for the Protestant? If the one, when he falls into error, is held excused by intentional conformity to the Romish creed, why should not intentional conformity to the creed of the Apostles and Evangelists excuse the errors of the other? Let this be granted, and both parties are equally safe, equally infallible. [30]