Clearly Gen. Lee did not intend to involve himself in the contradiction of saying that he expected Stuart personally to perform at the same time the double duty of watching Hooker along the Potomac, and guarding Ewell's flank on the Susquehanna.[16] Gen. Lee in thus referring to Stuart was somewhat careless and inaccurate in his language, as he was when, in describing the battle of Gettysburg, he said that Robertson's command arrived on July 3d, when, in fact, it never got nearer than Cashtown, some eight miles from the battle-field. But Gen. Lee is explicit in saying, in his report, that he gave Stuart full authority to make the movement around the enemy's rear. Among the Confederate archives in Washington, I have at last found in Gen. Lee's confidential letter-book his final instructions to Stuart, which have never been published, which must set this controverted question at rest forever. At the time when they were written, Gen. Lee's headquarters were at Berryville. They are dated June 23, 1863, 5 P.M.
In them Gen. Lee presents to Stuart the alternative of crossing the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge at Shepherdstown and moving over to Frederick, Md., or, "you will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc." In a letter to Stuart dated June 22, he had said: "If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank and keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmetsburg route, another by Chambersburg." The intention of General Lee clearly was that Stuart with one portion of the cavalry was to guard Ewell's flank and give him information of the enemy. The other was to be left[17] behind, as he says in his report, "to hold the mountain passes as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac." To suppose that Gen. Lee intended them to remain there after the enemy had gone is to suppose that he was not only unfit to command an army, but even a corporal's guard. It is clear that he intended the two brigades under Robertson to perform the same service for the column of Longstreet and Hill (with whom he had his headquarters) as Stuart was to do for Ewell, who was separated from him. When these two corps crossed the Potomac on the 25th, he knew that Stuart had not crossed west of the Ridge in advance of them. He would not have committed the blunder of marching all his infantry into Pennsylvania knowing that all his cavalry was in Virginia. He must, therefore, have expected for Stuart to cross the Potomac on the same day to the east of the Ridge; which he would have done but for Hancock's movement. Some have contended that his anxious inquiries for Stuart when he got to Chambersburg prove that he did not know which way he had gone. They only show that he did not know where Stuart was at that time. As Stuart had been directed to open communication, as soon as he got into Pennsylvania, with Ewell, and had not been able to do so on account of the Federal army getting between them, Gen. Lee, not having heard from him, very naturally felt a great deal of solicitude for his safety. If Gen. Lee had not thought that he would cross the Potomac somewhere on the same day that he did, he would have waited and sent for him. But again, Gen. Lee would not assume the responsibility of authorizing Stuart to go around Hooker's rear unless the movement had the approval of Gen. Longstreet, whose headquarters were at Millwood, not far from Berryville. Gen. Lee's instructions to Stuart were therefore sent through Longstreet. In a letter to Stuart, Longstreet not only approves of Stuart's going into Maryland around the rear of the enemy, but opposes his going the other route through the Shenandoah Valley, on the ground that it would disclose their plans to the enemy. In concluding his letter he says:
"N.B.—I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will in a measure disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy." By "our rear" Longstreet meant through the Shenandoah Valley. The reasons he gave Stuart were conclusive in favor of the course he took. It was Gen. Lee's policy to detain Hooker as long as possible in Virginia. But if Stuart passed to the west of the Ridge and crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, he would be discovered by the signal stations of the enemy on Maryland heights. This would indicate, of course, that the infantry was to follow him. On the contrary, Hooker would interpret a movement around his rear as nothing more than a cavalry raid, and it would be a mask to conceal Lee's designs. It was no fault of Stuart's that he was unable to execute his plan.
The Count of Paris says that it was impracticable from the first, and differed in its condition from his other operations of this kind, because they were undertaken while the armies were both stationary. Now, at the time when Stuart resolved on going into Maryland by this route, both armies were as stationary as when he rode around McClellan on the Chickahominy; and Hooker was waiting for the Confederates to move. But it could not be expected for Hooker to stand still while his adversary was in motion. Now it so happened that the corps of Longstreet and Hill moved from Berryville on June 24, towards the Potomac, which they crossed the next day, Hill at Shepherdstown, and Longstreet at Williamsport.[18] Their route of march was in plain view of Maryland Heights, and the news was immediately telegraphed from there by General Tyler. This set the whole of Hooker's army in motion, on the morning of the 25th, for the Potomac. About the time, therefore, that Stuart's column appeared on the eastern side of Bull Run, on the morning of the 25th, Hancock broke up camp and started on the same road that Stuart intended to march. Hancock was ahead of him, and had the right of way. Gen. Longstreet had urged Stuart to go that route, for fear that if he went through the Shenandoah Valley, the plans of the commanding general would be disclosed to the enemy.
I am unable to understand why he could not foresee that the march of all the Confederate infantry in full view of the enemy would have the same effect. If the corps of Longstreet and Hill had delayed a single day in leaving Berryville, Stuart would have landed on the north bank of the Potomac on the night of the 25th. Hooker would then have been utterly confounded. Before he could have made up his mind what to do, the Confederate cavalry would have been watering their horses in the Susquehanna, and all the communications between Washington and the North would have been broken. But now to return to the cavalry which Stuart, under Gen. Lee's orders, had left in front of the enemy in Virginia, as he says, "to observe his movements, and follow him in case of withdrawal." Of course, this duty could not be discharged without keeping in sight of the enemy. But instead of following, they fell back in an opposite direction, and gave no information to Gen. Lee and no trouble to the enemy. Gen. Lee says that on the night of the 28th he heard through a scout that had come in that Hooker was over the river, and was moving north. He is mistaken as to the date, as there is a letter of his to Gen. Ewell, dated Chambersburg, June 28th, 7.30 A.M., which says, "I wrote you last night, stating that Gen. Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac, and is advancing by way of Middletown,—the head of his column being at that point in Frederick County, Md." He directs Ewell to move to Gettysburg, which had become to him what Quatre Bras was to Wellington, when he learned that Napoleon was over the Sombre. In his report of the campaign, Gen. Lee says that as soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to Gen. Robertson to rejoin the army "without delay." The very fact that Gen. Lee had to send back for this cavalry shows that it was in the wrong place, and where he did not intend it to be. In his instructions to Stuart, when leaving, he had said: "Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, bringing everything clean along the valley, close upon the rear of the army." It is clear that the instructions to Gen. Robertson were to leave Virginia when the enemy left; for how could he otherwise "watch the flank and rear" of the Confederate army, and be "close upon" it. Gen. Robertson[19] says that during the time he was lying in the gaps of the Virginia mountains, after the enemy had crossed the river, he was in daily communication by couriers with Gen. Lee's headquarters.[20] Then so much the worse if he did not inform him that the enemy had disappeared from his front. The inquiry is now naturally suggested, What did he communicate?
Again he says, "He [Gen. Lee] was fully aware of my position and the specific duty I was then performing." But what that specific duty was no one knows. If Gen. Lee ordered him to remain there unemployed, then he could blame no one but himself for the want of cavalry, and the responsibility would rest on him.[21] But the fact that Gen. Lee sent for him to join the army as soon as he heard that the enemy was advancing north, is proof that he never intended him to stay in Virginia after they had gone. Gen. Lee had issued orders from Chambersburg for the concentration of his army at Gettysburg, and as he says, sent back for Robertson's command to join the army without delay. When the order was read, Gen. Robertson marched his two brigades that night to Berryville, which is west of the mountain, on a route almost parallel and in an opposite direction from Gettysburg, which is east of it. On June 30, he continued his westerly and circuitous march to Martinsburg, and on July 1, the day of the battle, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. If he had crossed at Shepherdstown and gone to Boonesboro, he might easily have reached Gettysburg after receiving Gen. Lee's order on the morning of July 1, when it was held by Buford with only two brigades of cavalry. Gen. Meade had sent off most of his cavalry in search of Stuart. It was this diversion created by Stuart that saved Gen. Lee's communications from attack. Buford was too weak to assume the offensive. On June 24, when Gen. Lee moved with Longstreet and Hill down the Shenandoah Valley, he left Gen. Robertson's command between him and the enemy. On July 3, Gen. Robertson had so manœuvred that Gen. Lee had got between him and the enemy. Stuart had ridden around Gen. Hooker while Gen. Robertson rode around Gen. Lee. Sic itur ad astra.
Since the above was written, I have found in the archives of the war office a copy of Stuart's orders to Gen. Robertson when leaving Virginia; but he does not appear to have been in the least governed by them. They confirm all I have said as to the duty required of the cavalry that were left under his command. Through abundant caution Stuart repeated them to Gen. Jones. He was instructed to watch the enemy and report their movements through a line of relay couriers to Gen. Longstreet; and when the enemy withdrew, to harass his rear and impede his march, and follow on the right of our army. There seems to have been no effort made to execute these orders; for both Gens. Lee and Longstreet say that no intelligence having been received through the cavalry of Hooker's crossing the Potomac, it was supposed that he was still south of it; while Pleasanton says that he never had a skirmish in retiring. The fact that Pleasanton's cavalry corps reached Leesburg by noon of the 26th shows that they must have left Gen. Robertson's front at Aldie early that morning. In a despatch[22] from Leesburg to Hooker's headquarters dated June 26, 12.45 P.M., he significantly says that all is quiet towards the Blue Ridge, and that only a few cavalry videttes were seen about Middleburg, and none on the Snickersville Pike. If his flank and rear had been harassed, all would not have been quiet. Again, Gen. Robertson was directed to keep his command on the right of the army and in contact with the enemy when they left, in order that he might keep the commanding general informed of their movements.
But when Gen. Lee had sent an order for him to come on and join the army, as there could be no reason for his remaining any longer in Virginia after the enemy had left, he actually followed on the left and crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. Gen. Lee's right flank was thus left exposed to the enemy's cavalry, but fortunately they had nearly all been sent in search of Stuart. If the pressure of the column of three thousand cavalry with two batteries under Robertson had been brought to bear on the flank of the Union army, its advance into Pennsylvania would have been less rapid, and Meade could not have spared two-thirds of his cavalry to send after Stuart to embarrass his march. If the force of cavalry which Stuart left behind him had promptly moved in obedience to his orders on the 26th to place itself in its proper position on the right of the army, then it could easily have occupied Gettysburg in advance of the enemy. It did nothing of the kind, but quietly rested three days at Ashby's Gap to learn through Gen. Lee where the enemy had gone. The professed historians of the war make no mention of these facts. Stuart is dead: "O! for one hour of Dundee."
Headquarters, June, 22, 1863.
Major-General J. E. B. Stuart,
Commanding Cavalry.