The Military Society of Massachusetts has published a volume of papers on the Fitz John Porter case, which contains a letter from Gen. B. H. Robertson to Gen. Porter, in which he says, "There was no cavalry in that direction [Manassas Junction] but mine, which was held there the remainder of the day;" and again he says: "I have no knowledge of bushes having been dragged by cavalry to create the impression of large forces coming, or for any purpose. Had these directions been given, the order would naturally have been transmitted through me. I heard no order on that subject." And Gen. Porter says, "There was no dragging of brush, nor such a project thought of, although Gen. Stuart so states in his report. Gen. Pope harps on it." The conclusion suggested is that the statement contained in Stuart's report is false, because Robertson had never heard of it.
"There are more things in heaven and earth than were ever dreamt of in your philosophy, Horatio!" Now, Gen. Robertson is mistaken in saying that we had no cavalry in the direction from which Porter approached but his; Stuart was there in person with a part of Fitz Lee's brigade. Gen. Rosser, who was then a colonel in Lee's brigade, says: "When Stuart joined me he notified me that the enemy was moving on our right flank, and ordered me to move my command up and down the dusty road, and to drag brush, and thus create a heavy dust, as though troops were in motion. I kept this up at least four or five hours." Robertson was relieved by Stuart of his command immediately after the battle, and sent back to a camp of instruction. As Gen. Porter was not inside the Confederate lines that day, it is hard to understand how he could know that the brush was not dragged to raise a dust to deceive him, or that nothing of the sort was thought of. I am glad that he has been relieved of an unjust sentence; but I am not willing to be silent now, when "young Harry Percy's spur is cold," and see his reputation sacrificed to save Gen. Porter's.
Footnotes
[1 ] [Telegram.] Kernstown, Va., Nov. 26, 1864. Sheridan To Halleck:—"I will soon commence work on Mosby. Heretofore I have made no attempt to break him up, as I would have employed ten men to his one, and for the reason that I have made a scapegoat of him for the destruction of private rights. Now there is going to be an intense hatred of him in that portion of the valley which is nearly a desert. I will soon commence on Loudoun County, and let them know there is a God in Israel. Mosby has annoyed me considerably; but the people are beginning to see that he does not injure me a great deal, but causes a loss to them of all that they have spent their lives in accumulating. Those people who live in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry are the most villanous in this valley, and have not yet been hurt much. If the railroad is interfered with, I will make some of them poor. Those who live at home in peace and plenty want the duello part of this war to go on; but when they have to bear the burden by loss of property and comforts, they will cry for peace." When Sheridan started in March, 1865, from Winchester, to join Grant in front of Petersburg, he left my command behind him, more flourishing than it ever had been. The "intense hatred" he had hoped to excite in the people of the valley for me, by burning their homes, was only felt for him. They were not willing that I should be a scapegoat to bear another's sins.
[2 ] I had no subordinate officer to help me in command.
[3 ] [Telegram.] Headquarters, May 30, 1863. Stahel to Heintzelman:— We had a hard fight with Mosby this morning, who had artillery,—the same which was used to destroy the train of cars. We whipped him like the devil, and took his artillery. My forces are still pursuing him. A more full report will follow, hoping the General will be satisfied with this result. Jul. Stahel, Major-General. Major-General Stahel reports of the above affair, that "The train for Bealeton had just passed up, and believing it to have been attacked, he [Col. Mann] immediately went with a detachment of the 5th N.Y. Cavalry, under command of Capt. A. H. Hasbrouck, a detachment of the 1st Vermont, under command of Lieut.-Col. Preston, and a small detachment of the 7th Michigan. The detachment of the 5th New York was sent directly across the country, in order to intercept the Rebels, while the balance of the command went directly to the scene of action. The advance of the 5th New York, led by Lieut. Elmer Barker, came up with the enemy first, and found them with the howitzer posted on a hill, with the cavalry drawn up in line in the rear to support it. Lieut. Barker, with his small detachment of about 25 men, dashed up the hill, and when within about 50 yards of the gun, received a charge of grape and canister, which killed three (3) and wounded seven (7) of our men, and several horses. The enemy then charged upon us, but were met with a stubborn resistance by the Lieutenant and his men, although the Lieutenant had received two grape-shots in his thigh. We were, however, overpowered and driven back a short distance. Just then Col. Preston of the 1st Vermont (Lieut. Hazleton, with companies H and C, being in advance) came up at a full charge upon their flank, and were received with a discharge from the howitzer of grape and canister. Our men pressed on, however, until they came to a hand-to-hand conflict, when the enemy gradually fell back. We took their howitzer, and they fled in every direction…. Our loss was four (4) killed, fifteen (15) wounded, the names of which please find enclosed. We also lost eleven (11) horses killed and several wounded."
[4 ] In his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, Gen. Hooker says, vol. I, page 162: "I may here state that while at Fairfax Court House my cavalry was reinforced by that of Maj.-Gen. Stahel. The latter numbered 6100 sabres, and had been engaged in picketing a line from Occoquan River to Goose Creek. This line was concentric to, and a portion of it within, the line held by my army. The force opposed to them was Mosby's guerillas, numbering about 200 [not over thirty men]; and, if the reports of the newspapers were to be believed, this whole party was killed two or three times during the winter. From the time I took command of the army of the Potomac there was no evidence that any force of the enemy, other than that above named, was within 100 miles of Washington City; and yet, the planks on the chain bridge were taken up at night during the greater part of the winter and spring. It was this cavalry force, it will be remembered, I had occasion to ask for, that my cavalry might be strengthened when it was numerically too weak to cope with the superior numbers of the enemy."
[5 ] The following correspondence between Gen. Pleasanton, chief of cavalry, and Gen. Ingalls, chief quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, which I recently found in the archives of the war department, shows the anxiety at that time to suppress my command. I had never heard of it before I saw it there. It is evident that somebody had hoaxed Gen. Pleasanton, as the whole negotiation was confined to himself and Gen. Ingalls. The fact that he had an unlimited amount of money placed at his disposal for buying me, and did not do it, is conclusive proof that there never had been a chance for it:— Headquarters Cavalry Corps, June 12, 1863. Gen. R. Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster:—Your despatch received. Ask the general how much of a bribe he can stand to get Mosby's services. There is a chance for him; and just now he could do valuable service in the way of information, as well as humbugging the enemy. There's no news. The rebels are like the boy the President tells about who stumped his toe and was too big to cry. Birney is up. A. PLEASANTON, Brigadier-General. Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
June 12, 1863. Gen. Pleasanton:—If you think your scheme can succeed in regard to Mosby, do not hesitate as to the matter of money. Use your own judgment, and do precisely what you think best for the public interest. ROBERT INGALLS,
Brigadier-General.
[6 ]Middleburg, Va., June 10, 1863. General:—I left our point of rendezvous yesterday for the purpose of making a night attack on two cavalry companies of the enemy on the Maryland shore. Had I succeeded in crossing the river at night, as I expected, I would have had no difficulty in capturing them; but, unfortunately, my guide mistook the road, and, instead of crossing by 11 o'clock at night, I did not get over until after daylight. The enemy (between 80 and 100 strong), being apprised of my movement, were formed to receive me. A charge was ordered, the shock of which the enemy could not resist; and they were driven several miles in confusion, with the loss of seven killed, a considerable number wounded, and 17 prisoners; also 20 odd horses or more. We burned their tents, stores, camp equipage, etc. I regret the loss of two brave officers killed—Capt. Brawner and Lieut. (George H.) Whitescarver. I also had one man wounded. Respectfully your obedient servant, JOHN S. MOSBY,
Major of Partisan Rangers. Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. [Indorsement.] Headquarters Cavalry Division, June 16, 1863. Respectfully forwarded. In consideration of his brilliant services, I hope the President will promote Maj. Mosby. J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General.