“The greatest credit is due to the troops at Masnières (29th Division), Bourlon and Mœuvres for the very gallant service performed by them on this day. But for their steady courage and staunchness in defence the success gained by the enemy on the right of our battle front might have had serious consequences.”
Paragraph 13, withdrawal from Bourlon, etc., night of 4th/5th December, 1917: “Much skill and courage were shown by our covering troops in this withdrawal, and an incident which occurred on the afternoon of 6th December, in the neighbourhood of Graincourt, deserves special notice. A covering party, consisting of two companies of the 1/15th Battalion London Regiment, 47th Division, much reduced in strength by the fighting at Bourlon Wood, found their flank exposed by a hostile attack further east and were enveloped and practically cut off. These companies successfully cut their way through to our advanced line of resistance, where they arrived in good order after having inflicted serious casualties on the enemy.” As to the Cambrai battle see also under 51st, 55th, 56th and 62nd Divisions.
The Division was moved south, and in January 1918 took over in the Ribecourt area of the Flesquières salient, east of Havrincourt Wood. As part of the V. Corps, Third Army, it was involved in the March Retreat although perhaps not so seriously as the Fifth Army further south. In his despatch of 20th July, 1918, paragraph 17, speaking of the events of 21st March, Sir Douglas Haig said: “The enemy’s advance south and north of the Flesquières salient rendered a withdrawal by the V. Corps and by the 9th Division on its right necessary also.” Orders were issued accordingly. These different withdrawals were carried out successfully during the night. Paragraph 21: “The Divisions holding the Flesquières salient were not seriously involved during the morning of 22nd March but in the evening strong attacks were made both at Villers Plouich and at Havrincourt. All these attacks were repulsed with great slaughter.”
Paragraph 28, 23rd March: “At the junction of the Third and Fifth Armies the situation was less satisfactory and as the day wore on it became critical.”
As the result of the withdrawal of the VII. Corps, Fifth Army, a gap was formed between the flanks of the V. and VII. Corps though “vigorous efforts were made” by the 47th Division of the V. Corps and the 2nd of the VII. Corps to establish touch. These were unsuccessful; consequently, “The right of the V. Corps was forced back by pressure from the south-east first to Four Winds Farm, south of Ytres, where troops of the 47th Division made a gallant stand until nightfall.”
Paragraph 30, as to 24th March: “The 47th Division held the village of Rocquiny from sunrise until well into the afternoon, beating off all attacks with rifle and machine-gun fire until the enemy worked round their flank and forced them to withdraw.”
On the 25th the Division, now very exhausted, was again heavily attacked near Contalmaison but successfully repulsed the enemy. The retreat was continued across the Ancre to about Bouzincourt north of Albert and, with intervals of rest, the Division remained in that area till the British advanced in August, although not always exactly in the same portion of the line.
The fighting 21st-23rd March is now designated the “Battle of St. Quentin,” and that on the 24th-25th the “First Battle of Bapaume.”
The Division was engaged near Albert when the enemy attacked the four British Divisions in that neighbourhood, 4th, 5th, and 6th April, the “Battle of the Ancre, 1918.” The attack was pressed by large forces with great vigour and determination, but the line, though dented, remained unbroken. The depleted and weary ranks of the 47th responded to every call.
In his Fifth Army in March 1918 (John Lane, 1921), perhaps the most searching, fearless, and able work published in Britain on the war on land, Mr. Sparrow comments on those passages of the despatch which deal with the withdrawal from the Flesquières salient and the subsequent loss of connection between the Third and Fifth Armies. Mr. Sparrow thinks that the gap was caused primarily by the delay on the part of the V. Corps in withdrawing from the salient, and secondly because that corps, of which the 47th was the right division, tended north from the boundary line previously laid down by G.H.Q. He shows that the VII. Corps of the Fifth Army, although hardly pressed, did its best to maintain connection, and with that object crossed the boundary into Third Army ground. He concludes that the northward trend of the V. Corps was partly attributable to the break in the Third Army front about Lagnicourt. Doubtless this was the case. Certainly the Third Army was in very serious difficulties between the 21st and 29th, and its withdrawals were sometimes more rapid and carried further than those of the Fifth. To assume that all the “breaks” were on the front of the Fifth is to ignore the despatch itself.