[289.1] Analysis, ii. 137, 139.
[293.1] Emotions and Will, xv. p. 290.
[293.2] On Consciousness; Works, i. 195.
Βίας ἐρωτηθεὶς τὶ ἂν εἴη τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀφόβων εἶπεν ἀγαθὴ συνείδησις. Περίανδρος ἐρωτηθεὶς τὶ ἔστιν ἐλευθερία εἶπεν ἀγαθὴ ουνείδησις. Stobæus, Sermon, cvi.
[298.1] Bentham said, “I am a selfish man, as selfish as any man can be; but in me somehow or other selfishness has taken the shape of benevolence” (Works, xi. 95). This is neither wit nor sense, but an affectation of humility of which one should have thought Bentham would not have been guilty.
[300.1] The value of Mr. Austin’s work is more juridical than moral, and the ethical part of it is so entirely identical with Paley that for the purposes of the present survey it did not seem to demand special notice.
[304.1] On the Different Species of Philosophy.
[305.1] From a letter written in 1734.—Burton’s Life of Hume, i. p. 35. In Sect. I. of the “Inquiry into the Principles of Morals,” he says, “The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet in general seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment.” This is directly contrary to the fact.
[307.1] Sceptical Solutions of Sceptical Doubts.