In the subsequent editions, the attempt to improve the work by additions and corrections, suggested by criticism or by thought, has been continued. In the present (seventh) edition, a few further corrections have been made, but no material additions.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] In the later editions of Archbishop Whately's Logic, he states his meaning to be, not that "rules" for the ascertainment of truths by inductive investigation cannot be laid down, or that they may not be "of eminent service," but that they "must always be comparatively vague and general, and incapable of being built up into a regular demonstrative theory like that of the Syllogism." (Book IV. ch. iv. § 3.) And he observes, that to devise a system for this purpose, capable of being "brought into a scientific form," would be an achievement which "he must be more sanguine than scientific who expects." (Book IV. ch. ii. § 4.) To effect this, however, being the express object of the portion of the present work which treats of Induction, the words in the text are no overstatement of the difference of opinion between Archbishop Whately and me on the subject.

[2] Now forming a chapter in his volume on The Philosophy of Discovery.

CONTENTS
OF
THE FIRST VOLUME.

[INTRODUCTION.]

§ [1.]A definition at the commencement of a subject must be provisional[1]
[2.]Is logic the art and science of reasoning?[2]
[3.]Or the art and science of the pursuit of truth?[3]
[4.]Logic is concerned with inferences, not with intuitive truths[5]
[5.]Relation of logic to the other sciences[8]
[6.]Its utility, how shown[10]
[7.]Definition of logic stated and illustrated[11]

[BOOK I.]
OF NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS.

[Chapter I.] Of the Necessity of commencing with anAnalysis of Language.

§ [1.]Theory of names, why a necessary part of logic[17]
[2.]First step in the analysis of Propositions[18]
[3.]Names must be studied before Things[21]

[Chapter II.] Of Names.

§ [1.]Names are names of things, not of our ideas[23]
[2.]Words which are not names, but parts of names[24]
[3.]General and Singular names[26]
[4.]Concrete and Abstract[29]
[5.]Connotative and Non-connotative[31]
[6.]Positive and Negative[42]
[7.]Relative and Absolute[44]
[8.]Univocal and Æquivocal[47]

[Chapter III.] Of the Things denoted by Names.

§ [1.]Necessity of an enumeration of Nameable Things. The Categories of Aristotle[49]
[2.]Ambiguity of the most general names[51]
[3.]Feelings, or states of consciousness[54]
[4.]Feelings must be distinguished from their physical antecedents. Perceptions, what[56]
[5.]Volitions, and Actions, what[58]
[6.]Substance and Attribute[59]
[7.]Body[61]
[8.]Mind[67]
[9.]Qualities[69]
[10.]Relations[72]
[11.]Resemblance[74]
[12.]Quantity[78]
[13.]All attributes of bodies are grounded on states of consciousness[79]
[14.]So also all attributes of mind[80]
[15.]Recapitulation[81]

[Chapter IV.] Of Propositions.

§ [1.]Nature and office of the copula[85]
[2.]Affirmative and Negative propositions[87]
[3.]Simple and Complex[89]
[4.]Universal, Particular, and Singular[93]

[Chapter V.] Of the Import of Propositions.

§ [1.]Doctrine that a proposition is the expression of a relation between two ideas[96]
[2.]Doctrine that it is the expression of a relation between the meanings of two names[99]
[3.]Doctrine that it consists in referring something to, or excluding something from, a class[103]
[4.]What it really is[107]
[5.]It asserts (or denies) a sequence, a coexistence, a simple existence, a causation[110]
[6.]—or a resemblance[112]
[7.]Propositions of which the terms are abstract[115]

[Chapter VI.] Of Propositions merely Verbal.

§ [1.]Essential and Accidental propositions[119]
[2.]All essential propositions are identical propositions[120]
[3.]Individuals have no essences[124]
[4.]Real propositions, how distinguished from verbal[126]
[5.]Two modes of representing the import of a Real proposition[127]

[Chapter VII.] Of the Nature of Classification, andthe Five Predicables.

§ [1.]Classification, how connected with Naming[129]
[2.]The Predicables, what[131]
[3.]Genus and Species[131]
[4.]Kinds have a real existence in nature[134]
[5.]Differentia[139]
[6.]Differentiæ for general purposes, and differentiæ for special or technical purposes[141]
[7.]Proprium[144]
[8.]Accidens[146]

[Chapter VIII.] Of Definition.

§ [1.]A definition, what[148]
[2.]Every name can be defined, whose meaning is susceptible of analysis[150]
[3.]Complete, how distinguished from incomplete definitions[152]
[4.]—and from descriptions[154]
[5.]What are called definitions of Things, are definitions of Names with an implied assumption of the existence of Things corresponding to them[157]
[6.]—even when such things do not in reality exist[165]
[7.]Definitions, though of names only, must be grounded on knowledge of the corresponding Things[167]

[BOOK II.]
OF REASONING.

[Chapter I.] Of Inference, or Reasoning, in general.

§ [1.]Retrospect of the preceding book[175]
[2.]Inferences improperly so called[177]
[3.]Inferences proper, distinguished into inductions and ratiocinations[181]

[Chapter II.] Of Ratiocination, or Syllogism.

§ [1.]Analysis of the Syllogism[184]
[2.]The dictum de omni not the foundation of reasoning, but a mere identical proposition[191]
[3.]What is the really fundamental axiom of Ratiocination[196]
[4.]The other form of the axiom[199]

[Chapter III.] Of the Functions, and Logical Value, of theSyllogism.

§ [1.]Is the syllogism a petitio principii?[202]
[2.]Insufficiency of the common theory[203]
[3.]All inference is from particulars to particulars[205]
[4.]General propositions are a record of such inferences, and the rules of the syllogism are rules for the interpretation of the record[214]
[5.]The syllogism not the type of reasoning, but a test of it[218]
[6.]The true type, what[222]
[7.]Relation between Induction and Deduction[226]
[8.]Objections answered[227]
[9.]Of Formal Logic, and its relation to the Logic of Truth[231]

[Chapter IV.] Of Trains of Reasoning, and DeductiveSciences.

§ [1.]For what purpose trains of reasoning exist[234]
[2.]A train of reasoning is a series of inductive inferences[234]
[3.]—from particulars to particulars through marks of marks[237]
[4.]Why there are deductive sciences[240]
[5.]Why other sciences still remain experimental[244]
[6.]Experimental sciences may become deductive by the progress of experiment[246]
[7.]In what manner this usually takes place[247]

[Chapter V.] Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths.

§ [1.]The Theorems of geometry are necessary truths only in the sense of necessarily following from hypotheses[251]
[2.]Those hypotheses are real facts with some of their circumstances exaggerated or omitted[255]
[3.]Some of the first principles of geometry are axioms, and these are not hypothetical[256]
[4.]—but are experimental truths[258]
[5.]An objection answered[261]
[6.]Dr. Whewell's opinions on axioms examined[264]

[Chapter VI.] The same Subject continued.

§ [1.]All deductive sciences are inductive[281]
[2.]The propositions of the science of number are not verbal, but generalizations from experience[284]
[3.]In what sense hypothetical[289]
[4.]The characteristic property of demonstrative science is to be hypothetical[290]
[5.]Definition of demonstrative evidence[292]

[Chapter VII.] Examination of some Opinions opposed tothe preceding doctrines.

§ [1.]Doctrine of the Universal Postulate[294]
[2.]The test of inconceivability does not represent the aggregate of past experience[296]
[3.]—nor is implied in every process of thought[299]
[4.]Sir W. Hamilton's opinion on the Principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle[306]

[BOOK III.]
OF INDUCTION.

[Chapter I.] Preliminary Observations on Induction in general.

§ [1.]Importance of an Inductive Logic[313]
[2.]The logic of science is also that of business and life[314]

[Chapter II.] Of Inductions improperly so called.

§ [1.]Inductions distinguished from verbal transformations[319]
[2.]—from inductions, falsely so called, in mathematics[321]
[3.]—and from descriptions[323]
[4.]Examination of Dr. Whewell's theory of Induction[326]
[5.]Further illustration of the preceding remarks[336]

[Chapter III.] On the Ground of Induction.

§ [1.]Axiom of the uniformity of the course of nature[341]
[2.]Not true in every sense. Induction per enumerationem simplicem[346]
[3.]The question of Inductive Logic stated[348]

[Chapter IV.] Of Laws of Nature.

§ [1.]The general regularity in nature is a tissue of partial regularities, called laws[351]
[2.]Scientific induction must be grounded on previous spontaneous inductions[355]
[3.]Are there any inductions fitted to be a test of all others?[357]

[Chapter V.] Of the Law of Universal Causation.

§ [1.]The universal law of successive phenomena is the Law of Causation[360]
[2.]—i.e. the law that every consequent has an invariable antecedent[363]
[3.]The cause of a phenomenon is the assemblage of its conditions[365]
[4.]The distinction of agent and patient illusory[373]
[5.]The cause is not the invariable antecedent, but the unconditional invariable antecedent[375]
[6.]Can a cause be simultaneous with its effect?[380]
[7.]Idea of a Permanent Cause, or original natural agent[383]
[8.]Uniformities of coexistence between effects of different permanent causes, are not laws[386]
[9.]Doctrine that volition is an efficient cause, examined[387]

[Chapter VI.] Of the Composition of Causes.

§ [1.]Two modes of the conjunct action of causes, the mechanical and the chemical[405]
[2.]The composition of causes the general rule; the other case exceptional[408]
[3.]Are effects proportional to their causes?[412]

[Chapter VII.] Of Observation and Experiment.

§ [1.]The first step of inductive inquiry is a mental analysis of complex phenomena into their elements[414]
[2.]The next is an actual separation of those elements[416]
[3.]Advantages of experiment over observation[417]
[4.]Advantages of observation over experiment[420]

[Chapter VIII.] Of the Four Methods of ExperimentalInquiry.

§ [1.]Method of Agreement[425]
[2.]Method of Difference[428]
[3.]Mutual relation of these two methods[429]
[4.]Joint Method of Agreement and Difference[433]
[5.]Method of Residues[436]
[6.]Method of Concomitant Variations[437]
[7.]Limitations of this last method[443]

[Chapter IX.] Miscellaneous Examples of the Four Methods.

§ [1.]Liebig's theory of metallic poisons[449]
[2.]Theory of induced electricity[453]
[3.]Dr. Wells' theory of dew[457]
[4.]Dr. Brown-Séquard's theory of cadaveric rigidity[465]
[5.]Examples of the Method of Residues[471]
[6.]Dr. Whewell's objections to the Four Methods[475]

[Chapter X.] Of Plurality of Causes; and of the Intermixtureof Effects.

§ [1.]One effect may have several causes[482]
[2.]—which is the source of a characteristic imperfection of the Method of Agreement[483]
[3.]Plurality of Causes, how ascertained[487]
[4.]Concurrence of Causes which do not compound their effects[489]
[5.]Difficulties of the investigation, when causes compound their effects[494]
[6.]Three modes of investigating the laws of complex effects[499]
[7.]The method of simple observation inapplicable[500]
[8.]The purely experimental method inapplicable[501]

[Chapter XI.] Of the Deductive Method.

§ [1.]First stage; ascertainment of the laws of the separate causes by direct induction[507]
[2.]Second stage; ratiocination from the simple laws of the complex cases[512]
[3.]Third stage; verification by specific experience[514]

[Chapter XII.] Of the Explanation of Laws of Nature.

§ [1.]Explanation defined[518]
[2.]First mode of explanation, by resolving the law of a complex effect into the laws of the concurrent causes and the fact of their coexistence[518]
[3.]Second mode; by the detection of an intermediate link in the sequence[519]
[4.]Laws are always resolved into laws more general than themselves[520]
[5.]Third mode; the subsumption of less general laws under a more general one[524]
[6.]What the explanation of a law of nature amounts to[526]

[Chapter XIII.] Miscellaneous Examples of the Explanation ofLaws of Nature.

§ [1.]The general theories of the sciences[529]
[2.]Examples from chemical speculations[531]
[3.]Example from Dr. Brown-Séquard's researches on the nervous system[533]
[4.]Examples of following newly-discovered laws into their complex manifestations[534]
[5.]Examples of empirical generalizations, afterwards confirmed and explained deductively[536]
[6.]Example from mental science[538]
[7.]Tendency of all the sciences to become deductive[539]