SEVENTH EDITION

LONDON:
LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER
MDCCCLXVIII

CONTENTS
OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.

[BOOK III.]
ON INDUCTION.—(Continued.)

[Chapter XIV.] Of the Limits to the Explanation of Laws ofNature; and of Hypotheses.

§ [1.]Can all the sequences in nature be resolvable into one law?[3]
[2.]Ultimate laws cannot be less numerous than the distinguishable feelings of our nature[4]
[3.]In what sense ultimate facts can be explained[7]
[4.]The proper use of scientific hypotheses[8]
[5.]Their indispensableness[16]
[6.]Legitimate, how distinguished from illegitimate hypotheses[18]
[7.]Some inquiries apparently hypothetical are really inductive[25]

[Chapter XV.] Of Progressive Effects; and of the ContinuedAction of Causes.

§ [1.]How a progressive effect results from the simple continuance of the cause[29]
[2.]—and from the progressiveness of the cause[33]
[3.]Derivative laws generated from a single ultimate law[36]

[Chapter XVI.] Of Empirical Laws.

§ [1.]Definition of an empirical law[38]
[2.]Derivative laws commonly depend on collocations[39]
[3.]The collocations of the permanent causes are not reducible to any law[41]
[4.]Hence empirical laws cannot be relied on beyond the limits of actual experience[41]
[5.]Generalizations which rest only on the Method of Agreement can only be received as empirical laws[43]
[6.]Signs from which an observed uniformity of sequence may be presumed to be resolvable[44]
[7.]Two kinds of empirical laws[47]

[Chapter XVII.] Of Chance, and its Elimination.

§ [1.]The proof of empirical laws depends on the theory of chance[49]
[2.]Chance defined and characterized[50]
[3.]The elimination of chance[55]
[4.]Discovery of residual phenomena by eliminating chance[57]
[5.]The doctrine of chances[59]

[Chapter XVIII.] Of the Calculation of Chances.

§ [1.]Foundation of the doctrine of chances, as taught by mathematics[61]
[2.]The doctrine tenable[63]
[3.]On what foundation it really rests[64]
[4.]Its ultimate dependence on causation[68]
[5.]Theorem of the doctrine of chances which relates to the cause of a given event[72]
[6.]How applicable to the elimination of chance[74]

[Chapter XIX.] Of the Extension of Derivative Laws to AdjacentCases.

§ [1.]Derivative laws, when not casual, are almost always contingent on collocations[78]
[2.]On what grounds they can be extended to cases beyond the bounds of actual experience[80]
[3.]Those cases must be adjacent cases[82]

[Chapter XX.] Of Analogy.

§ [1.]Various senses of the word analogy[86]
[2.]Nature of analogical evidence[87]
[3.]On what circumstances its value depends[91]

[Chapter XXI.] Of the Evidence of the Law of UniversalCausation.

§ [1.]The law of causality does not rest on an instinct[95]
[2.]But on an induction by simple enumeration[100]
[3.]In what cases such induction is allowable[102]
[4.]The universal prevalence of the law of causality, on what grounds admissible[105]

[Chapter XXII.] Of Uniformities of Coexistence not dependenton Causation.

§ [1.]Uniformities of coexistence which result from laws of sequence[110]
[2.]The properties of Kinds are uniformities of coexistence[111]
[3.]Some are derivative, others ultimate[113]
[4.]No universal axiom of coexistence[114]
[5.]The evidence of uniformities of coexistence, how measured[117]
[6.]When derivative, their evidence is that of empirical laws[117]
[7.]So also when ultimate[119]
[8.]The evidence stronger in proportion as the law is more general[120]
[9.]Every distinct Kind must be examined[121]

[Chapter XXIII.] Of Approximate Generalizations, and ProbableEvidence.

§ [1.]The inferences called probable, rest on approximate generalizations[124]
[2.]Approximate generalizations less useful in science than in life[124]
[3.]In what cases they may be resorted to[126]
[4.]In what manner proved[127]
[5.]With what precautions employed[130]
[6.]The two modes of combining probabilities[131]
[7.]How approximate generalizations may be converted into accurate generalizations equivalent to them[136]

[Chapter XXIV.] Of the Remaining Laws of Nature.

§ [1.]Propositions which assert mere existence[139]
[2.]Resemblance, considered as a subject of science[141]
[3.]The axioms and theorems of mathematics comprise the principal laws of resemblance[143]
[4.]—and those of order in place, and rest on induction by simple enumeration[145]
[5.]The propositions of arithmetic affirm the modes of formation of some given number[146]
[6.]Those of algebra affirm the equivalence of different modes of formation of numbers generally[151]
[7.]The propositions of geometry are laws of outward nature[154]
[8.]Why geometry is almost entirely deductive[156]
[9.]Function of mathematical truths in the other sciences, and limits of that function[158]

[Chapter XXV.] Of the Grounds of Disbelief.

§ [1.]Improbability and impossibility[161]
[2.]Examination of Hume's doctrine of miracles[162]
[3.]The degrees of improbability correspond to differences in the nature of the generalization with which an assertion conflicts[166]
[4.]A fact is not incredible because the chances are against it[170]
[5.]Are coincidences less credible than other facts?[172]
[6.]An opinion of Laplace examined[175]

[BOOK IV.]
OF OPERATIONS SUBSIDIARY TO INDUCTION.

[Chapter I.] Of Observation and Description.

§ [1.]Observation, how far a subject of logic[183]
[2.]A great part of what seems observation is really inference[184]
[3.]The description of an observation affirms more than is contained in the observation[187]
[4.]—namely an agreement among phenomena; and the comparison of phenomena to ascertain such agreements is a preliminary to induction[190]

[Chapter II.] Of Abstraction, or the Formation ofConceptions.

§ [1.]The comparison which is a preliminary to induction implies general conceptions[193]
[2.]—but these need not be pre-existent[194]
[3.]A general conception, originally the result of a comparison, becomes itself the type of comparison[198]
[4.]What is meant by appropriate conceptions[200]
[5.]—and by clear conceptions[203]
[6.]Further illustration of the subject[205]

[Chapter III.] Of Naming, as subsidiary to Induction.

§ [1.]The fundamental property of names as an instrument of thought[209]
[2.]Names are not indispensable to induction[210]
[3.]In what manner subservient to it[211]
[4.]General names not a mere contrivance to economize the use of language[213]

[Chapter IV.] Of the Requisites of a Philosophical Language,and the Principles of Definition.

§ [1.]First requisite of philosophical language, a steady and determinate meaning for every general name[215]
[2.]Names in common use have often a loose connotation[215]
[3.]—which the logician should fix, with as little alteration as possible[218]
[4.]Why definition is often a question not of words but of things[220]
[5.]How the logician should deal with the transitive applications of words[224]
[6.]Evil consequences of casting off any portion of the customary connotation of words[229]

[Chapter V.] On the Natural History of the Variations inthe Meaning of Terms.

§ [1.]How circumstances originally accidental become incorporated into the meaning of words[236]
[2.]—and sometimes become the whole meaning[238]
[3.]Tendency of words to become generalized[240]
[4.]—and to become specialized[243]

[Chapter VI.] The Principles of a Philosophical Languagefurther considered.

§ [1.]Second requisite of philosophical language, a name for every important meaning[248]
[2.]—viz. first, an accurate descriptive terminology[248]
[3.]—secondly, a name for each of the more important results of scientific abstraction[252]
[4.]—thirdly, a nomenclature, or system of the names of Kinds[255]
[5.]Peculiar nature of the connotation of names which belong to a nomenclature[257]
[6.]In what cases language may, and may not, be used mechanically[259]

[Chapter VII.] Of Classification, as subsidiary toInduction.

§ [1.]Classification as here treated of, wherein different from the classification implied in naming[266]
[2.]Theory of natural groups[267]
[3.]Are natural groups given by type, or by definition?[271]
[4.]Kinds are natural groups[274]
[5.]How the names of Kinds should be constructed[280]

[Chapter VIII.] Of Classification by Series.

§ [1.]Natural groups should be arranged in a natural series[284]
[2.]The arrangement should follow the degrees of the main phenomenon[285]
[3.]—which implies the assumption of a type-species[287]
[4.]How the divisions of the series should be determined[288]
[5.]Zoology affords the completest type of scientific classification[289]

[BOOK V.]
ON FALLACIES.

[Chapter I.] Of Fallacies in General.

§ [1.]Theory of fallacies a necessary part of logic[295]
[2.]Casual mistakes are not fallacies[297]
[3.]The moral sources of erroneous opinion, how related to the intellectual[297]

[Chapter II.] Classification of Fallacies.

§ [1.]On what criteria a classification of fallacies should be grounded[301]
[2.]The five classes of fallacies[302]
[3.]The reference of a fallacy to one or another class is sometimes arbitrary[305]

[Chapter III.] Fallacies of Simple Inspection, or à prioriFallacies.

§ [1.]Character of this class of Fallacies[309]
[2.]Natural prejudice of mistaking subjective laws for objective, exemplified in popular superstitions[310]
[3.]Natural prejudices, that things which we think of together must exist together, and that what is inconceivable must be false[314]
[4.]Natural prejudice, of ascribing objective existence to abstractions[321]
[5.]Fallacy of the Sufficient Reason[322]
[6.]Natural prejudice, that the differences in nature correspond to the distinctions in language[325]
[7.]Prejudice, that a phenomenon cannot have more than one cause[329]
[8.]Prejudice, that the conditions of a phenomenon must resemble the phenomenon[332]

[Chapter IV.] Fallacies of Observation.

§ [1.]Non-observation, and Mal-observation[341]
[2.]Non-observation of instances, and non-observation of circumstances[341]
[3.]Examples of the former[342]
[4.]—and of the latter[347]
[5.]Mal-observation characterized and exemplified[352]

[Chapter V.] Fallacies of Generalization.

§ [1.]Character of the class[356]
[2.]Certain kinds of generalization must always be groundless[356]
[3.]Attempts to resolve phenomena radically different into the same[357]
[4.]Fallacy of mistaking empirical for causal laws[359]
[5.]Post hoc, ergo propter hoc; and the deductive fallacy corresponding to it[364]
[6.]Fallacy of False Analogies[366]
[7.]Function of metaphors in reasoning[373]
[8.]How fallacies of generalization grow out of bad classification[375]

[Chapter VI.] Fallacies of Ratiocination.

§ [1.]Introductory Remarks[377]
[2.]Fallacies in the conversion and æquipollency of propositions[377]
[3.]Fallacies in the syllogistic process[379]
[4.]Fallacy of changing the premises[379]

[Chapter VII.] Fallacies of Confusion.

§ [1.]Fallacy of Ambiguous Terms[384]
[2.]Fallacy of Petitio Principii[396]
[3.]Fallacy of Ignoratio Elenchi[405]

[BOOK VI.]
ON THE LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES.

[Chapter I.] Introductory Remarks.

§ [1.]The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of Physical Science, duly extended and generalized[413]
[2.]How far this can be attempted in the present work[415]

[Chapter II.] Of Liberty and Necessity.

§ [1.]Are human actions subject to the law of causality?[417]
[2.]The doctrine commonly called Philosophical Necessity, in what sense true[418]
[3.]Inappropriateness and pernicious effect of the term Necessity[420]
[4.]A motive not always the anticipation of a pleasure or a pain[424]

[Chapter III.] That there is, or may be, a Science ofHuman Nature.

§ [1.]There may be sciences which are not exact sciences[426]
[2.]To what scientific type the Science of Human Nature corresponds[429]

[Chapter IV.] Of the Laws of Mind.

§ [1.]What is meant by Laws of Mind[432]
[2.]Is there a science of Psychology?[433]
[3.]The principal investigations of Psychology characterized[435]
[4.]Relation of mental facts to physical conditions[440]

[Chapter V.] Of Ethology, or the Science of the Formation ofCharacter.

§ [1.]The Empirical Laws of Human Nature[445]
[2.]—are merely approximate generalizations. The universal laws are those of the formation of character[447]
[3.]The laws of the formation of character cannot be ascertained by observation and experiment[449]
[4.]—but must be studied deductively[454]
[5.]The Principles of Ethology are the axiomata media of mental science[455]
[6.]Ethology characterized[459]

[Chapter VI.] General Considerations on the Social Science.

§ [1.]Are Social Phenomena a subject of Science?[461]
[2.]Of what nature the Social Science must be[463]

[Chapter VII.] Of the Chemical, or Experimental, Method in theSocial Science.

§ [1.]Characters of the mode of thinking which deduces political doctrines from specific experience[466]
[2.]In the Social Science experiments are impossible[468]
[3.]—the Method of Difference inapplicable[469]
[4.]—and the Methods of Agreement, and of Concomitant Variations, inconclusive[471]
[5.]The Method of Residues also inconclusive, and presupposes Deduction[472]

[Chapter VIII.] Of the Geometrical, or Abstract Method.

§ [1.]Characters of this mode of thinking[476]
[2.]Examples of the Geometrical Method[478]
[3.]The interest-philosophy of the Bentham school[479]

[Chapter IX.] Of the Physical, or Concrete Deductive Method.

§ [1.]The Direct and Inverse Deductive Methods[486]
[2.]Difficulties of the Direct Deductive Method in the Social Science[489]
[3.]To what extent the different branches of sociological speculation can be studied apart. Political Economy characterized[492]
[4.]Political Ethology, or the science of national character[497]
[5.]The Empirical Laws of the Social Science[500]
[6.]The Verification of the Social Science[502]

[Chapter X.] Of the Inverse Deductive, or Historical Method.

§ [1.]Distinction between the general Science of Society, and special sociological inquiries[506]
[2.]What is meant by a State of Society?[506]
[3.]The Progressiveness of Man and Society[508]
[4.]The laws of the succession of states of society can only be ascertained by the Inverse Deductive Method[511]
[5.]Social Statics, or the science of the Coexistences of Social Phenomena[513]
[6.]Social Dynamics, or the science of the Successions of Social Phenomena[521]
[7.]Outlines of the Historical Method[522]
[8.]Future prospects of Sociological Inquiry[525]

[Chapter XI.] Additional Elucidations of the Science of History.

§ [1.]The subjection of historical facts to uniform laws is verified by statistics[529]
[2.]—does not imply the insignificance of moral causes[532]
[3.]—nor the inefficacy of the characters of individuals and of the acts of governments[535]
[4.]The historical importance of eminent men and of the policy of governments illustrated[540]

[Chapter XII.] Of the Logic of Practice, or Art; includingMorality and Policy.

§ [1.]Morality not a science, but an Art[544]
[2.]Relation between rules of art and the theorems of the corresponding science[544]
[3.]What is the proper function of rules of art?[546]
[4.]Art cannot be Deductive[548]
[5.]Every Art consists of truths of Science, arranged in the order suitable for some practical use[549]
[6.]Teleology, or the Doctrine of Ends[550]
[7.]Necessity of an ultimate standard, or first principle of Teleology[552]
[8.]Conclusion[554]

BOOK III.
CONTINUED.
OF INDUCTION.