Origin of the Anti-Corn-Law League.

The first hint of this great political Association is to be found in the writings of the very individual whose labours tended so much to crown its efforts with success. In the well-known pamphlet, entitled England, Ireland, and America, by a Manchester Manufacturer, Mr. Cobden says:

“Whilst agriculture can boast almost as many associations as there are British counties, whilst every city in the kingdom contains its botanical, phrenological, or mechanical institutions, and these again possess their periodical journals (and not merely these, for even war sends forth its United Service Magazine)—we possess no association of traders, united together, for the common object of enlightening the world upon a question so little understood, and so loaded with obloquy, as free-trade.

“We have our Banksian, our Linnæan, our Hunterian Societies, and why should not at least our greatest commercial and manufacturing towns possess their Smithian Societies, devoted to the purpose of promulgating the beneficent truths of the ‘Wealth of Nations’? Such institutions, by promoting a correspondence with similar societies that would probably be organized abroad (for it is our example in questions affecting commerce that strangers follow), might contribute to the spread of liberal and just views of political science, and thus tend to ameliorate the restrictive policy of foreign governments through the legitimate influence of the opinions of its people.

“Nor would such societies be fruitless at home. Prizes might be offered for the best essay on the corn question, or lecturers might be sent to enlighten the agriculturists, and to invite discussion upon a subject so difficult and of such paramount interest to all.

The pamphlet from which the preceding extract is taken, was published in the early part of the year 1835, about four years before the formation of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and at a time when, owing to the very low price of grain, and the prosperity of the manufacturing districts, the question of the Corn-laws scarcely attracted the slightest attention, either in Manchester or in any other part of the country.

Wellington’s Military Administration.

Much misconception exists with respect to the military administration of the Duke of Wellington, who was, at the close of his life, commander-in-chief of the army. He is said to have been wedded to “Brown Bess,” but he is known to have encouraged the introduction of the Minié; and several of the reforms executed by Lord Herbert had been discussed by the Duke with approval. The celebrated letter of 1847 shows what were the thoughts of this great man in reference to our national defences, and they are not perhaps the least valuable legacy which Wellington has bequeathed to England. The following scheme of defence by the Duke, which Mr. Gleig for the first time published, is not perhaps the less interesting because it has been in part accomplished:—

“He considered the Channel Islands—Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney—to be the key of our outer line of defence. In each of these he required that a harbour of refuge should be constructed of sufficient capacity and depth of water to receive a stout squadron; and then, with Portsmouth well guarded on one flank and Plymouth on the other, he held that England would be perfectly safe from invasion on a large scale.... If Government gave him the Channel Islands, Seaford, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, all completely fortified, and ready to receive respectively their squadrons, then he was satisfied that, though it might be impossible to prevent marauding parties from landing here or there, England would be placed beyond the risk of invasion on such a scale as to endanger her existence, or even to put the capital in jeopardy.... Establishing then an outer line of defence, he asked for men and material wherewith to meet an enemy if he succeeded in breaking through that line. He would be satisfied with an addition of 20,000 men to the regular army, provided such a force of Militia were raised as would enable him to dispose of 70,000 men among the principal fortresses and arsenals of the kingdom; keeping at the same time two corps of 50,000 men in hand, one in the neighbourhood of London, the other near Dublin. He should thus have open to him all the great lines of railway, which would enable him to meet with rapidity any danger, from whatever side of the capital it might threaten.”