Queen’s Serjeants, Queen’s Counsel, and Serjeants-at-Law.
To remove certain doubts of very recent growth (cast upon a matter previously deemed plain enough), the following statement is the result of a very careful inquiry:—Queen’s serjeants are sworn to “serve and counsel the Queen and duly to minister the Queen’s affairs, and sue the Queen’s process after the course of the law and after their cunning, and they are to take no fee of any one against the Queen.” Queen’s counsel, as distinguished from Queen’s Serjeants, are appointed by Letters Patent under the Great Seal, giving them precedence “in our courts as elsewhere.” The oath administered to Queen’s counsel is precisely the same as the oath administered to Queen’s serjeants. Next after Queen’s counsel come serjeants-at-law, who, on taking their degree, swear that they shall “serve the Queen’s people and truly counsel them that retain them, after their cunning.” Sometimes a serjeant-at-law applies for a “Patent of Precedence,” which gives him precedence next after the last of the Queen’s counsel previously appointed. No oath is administered on the grant of a patent of precedence, as it implies no special service or duty to the Crown.
Do not make your Son an Attorney.
Apart from the heavy expenses which must, even under the most favourable circumstances, attend the introduction of a youth into the legal profession, the fact must never be lost sight of that the examination which articled clerks are now called upon to pass before they can be admitted is of such a rigorous nature that perhaps not one in ten of the established practising attorneys could undergo the ordeal. Then, if we consider that the legal profession is at the present moment vastly overstocked, and reflect upon the fact of numbers of clever young men, who finding it impossible to beat out a connexion for themselves, either make for one of the colonies, or settle down at home in managing clerkships, at salaries scarcely equal to the remuneration paid to skilled mechanics, there is quite enough to make us hesitate before placing our sons in law offices. Nor must the fact be overlooked, that the tendency of our legislation has been, and will continue to be, to simplify legal procedure as much as possible; to lower the scale of fees payable to attorneys and solicitors, and even to dispense in many instances, with the necessity for employing professional men at all.—S. Warren, Q.C.
Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords.
The proper constitution of the Supreme Court of Appeal justifies the utmost solicitude of the legislature and the country. The difficulties surrounding its reconstruction were found too great to admit of solution during the session of 1856, unexpectedly complicated as they were by the creation of that very distinguished judge, Baron Parke, a peer for life only, as Lord Wensleydale. The greatest constitutional lawyers in the House of Lords, supported by a considerable majority of peers, declared that the Crown had no power to create a peer for life only, with a right to sit and vote in that house; that such an act was illegal, and that the very essence of the British peerage consisted in its hereditary character. Issuing out of these discussions a Bill for reconstructing the appellate jurisdiction was sent down from the Lords to the Commons, but so late in the session that they declined then to entertain it. Whatever may be the ultimate fate of this measure, it is still practicable, even without adopting its special machinery, to preserve the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords—itself an object of the highest importance—by providing for more assistance from the legal and equitable judicial force of the country. In the meantime a well-earned hereditary peerage was conferred on Lord Wensleydale, under which he took his seat before the session closed.—Blackstone’s Commentaries, edited by Warren.
Payment of an Advocate.
In 1863, Chief Justice Erle gave judgment in the case of Kennedy v. Broun, which involved the right of the plaintiff, a barrister, to recover the sum of 20,000l., alleged to have been promised by Mrs. Broun, then Mrs. Swinfen, for professional services rendered in the matter of the Swinfen estates; the trial at Warwick having been compromised by Lord Chelmsford, then Sir Frederick Thesiger. An action was brought by Mr. Kennedy to recover the 20,000l. in question, and a verdict was given in his favour. A rule was obtained to set aside that verdict and enter it for the defendant. The Chief Justice, in a most elaborate judgment, said that the relation of the parties, as advocate and client, incapacitated the latter from making any promise of remuneration which could be recovered as a debt. The payment to an advocate was as honorarium not merces—and the opinion of all the judges, from the days of Justinian to the present time, supported that view. The rule for a new trial to enter the verdict for the defendants was therefore absolute. This of course quashed Mr. Kennedy’s claim.
Utter-Barristers.
“The term ‘Utter-Barrister’ occurs for the first time in the reign of Henry VIII. It is mentioned in the ‘Orders and Customs’ of the Middle Temple, where it is applied to one who, having continued in the house for five or six years, and profited in the study of the law, has been called by the benchers ‘to plead, argue, and dispute some doubtful matter before certain of the benchers,’ which ’manner of argument or disputations is called motyng; and this making of Utter-Barristers is as a preferment or degree given him for his learning.’”