About twenty days in the year, says Blackstone, are sufficient in Westminster Hall to settle, upon solemn argument, every demurrer or point of law that arises throughout the nation; but two months are annually spent in deciding the truth of facts before six distinct tribunals, exclusive of Middlesex and London, which afford a supply of causes much more than equivalent to any two of the largest circuits. (3 Bl. Com. 320.) The state of things in our own days is substantially the same.—Stephen’s Commentaries.
Trial by Jury.
In England, when the aspect of the French Revolution divided our public men into factions—in the evil time, when statesmen had talked complacently “of a vigour beyond the law,” when judges had tortured free speech into sedition, and when open violence and secret art were sapping the liberties we prize most dearly, English juries, with the approbation of the country, interposed frequently against political wrong, and vindicated the good cause that elsewhere had been abandoned. As for the loyalty and good sense of the nation as a whole, the mode in which it obeyed the Government attests this in a remarkable way; and though, of course, the Revolution in France stirred up some elements of disorder here, they were as nothing among the great mass of Englishmen. This truth is urged by Mr. Massey with more force than by any other historian, and it deserves to be put prominently forward, as several writers have asserted the contrary. In his very instructive summary of the state of English opinion at this period, he says:
“Because freedom had been abused at Paris, the liberties of Englishmen were assailed. The press was put under restraint; legions of spies were let loose upon the country, and no man could speak his mind in safety, or even do the most harmless act without fear of question. It is no wonder that the old English feeling was aroused, and that the State trials of 1794 were regarded with an intensity of interest which had not been equalled since that of the Seven Bishops. The public safety at that time depended on the trial by jury, and men were satisfied that their liberties were safe when it appeared that the great institution which had so often sustained them was still sound and unshaken.... Happily the prosecutions failed, and from their failure was derived that security which but for these trials would not have been ascertained.”—Times review of Massey’s History of England.
That sound and experienced judge, Sir John Coleridge, in a lecture delivered by him at the Athenæum, Exeter, stated that
He had been a judge for an unusually long period, and he should ever regard with admiration the manner in which juries discharged their duties. Again and again he had reason to marvel at their patience, and again and again he had observed questions put by a jury which had been omitted by counsel and judge, the answer to which had thrown a light that had guided them to the truth of the whole matter. He had often thought if he had the appointment of the magistrates in the country, that he would appoint those gentlemen who had served on petty juries on the Crown side for two assizes at least; for he was sure that a more practical knowledge of criminal law was learnt in that way than could be acquired by several months of careful reading. One thing should always be remembered, that stupid verdicts were no arguments against the institution, for no human institution, however wise in itself, could be expected to work perfectly. Let them improve their jurymen by raising the character of their national education; let them introduce into their panels all classes who by law were liable to serve; and when they had done that, and not till then, if they found it to fail, let them condemn the institution. They lived under a law which, though far from perfect, was framed in a wise and just spirit. They could not possibly overrate the blessing which they possessed, yet it was so much a matter of course that they were apt to think as little of it as they did of the sun that shone upon them from Heaven.
Attendance of Jurors.
The law on this subject has been thus concisely explained by Mr. Under-Sheriff Burchell. At the present period, persons who claim to be excused from attending as jurors should get their names removed from the jury-list. In July, within the first week, the Clerk of the Peace is to issue his warrant to the high constable for the overseers to prepare and make out a list of persons qualified as jurors. For three weeks in September the list is to be exhibited on the doors of churches and chapels, with a notification where objections are to be heard. Within the last seven days of September the justices are to hold a petty sessions to hear objections. If persons having exemptions do not attend to the subject, they may be returned and be liable to serve until the list is corrected in the September following. Some complaints are made of persons being returned by parish officers who had either removed or been dead for years. The law as stated prevails throughout the counties of England.
The Law of Libel.
It would be useless to attempt to define, within our limit, the principles of the Law of Libel—it would be attended with fruitless results; but we may be permitted to give such an outline of the subject as may be useful for reflection and research, if not for immediate practice. Now that the old saying, “The greater truth the greater libel,” is no longer applicable even to indictments for defamation, the popular idea of what is and what is not actionable is correct, so far as it goes. It is now generally understood that a false and malicious attack upon another man’s character is in all cases illegal; that a somewhat less offensive imputation than would support an action for mere words will render its author liable in damages if it be conveyed in writing, but that the law deems all statements of this kind to be justifiable which can be shown to be true. For the ordinary intercourse of life these rules and cautions are sufficient. No one can speak ill of his neighbour with impunity, unless he is prepared to make good his words to the letter; or, at least, to prove that they were spoken without malice or on a lawful occasion. With regard to the Press, it has been proclaimed again and again from the judicial Bench, that “fair comments” in a journal or periodical are not within the Law of Libel; but, then, what is to be the test of “fairness”? It is quite possible that a journalist’s comments may be made bonâ fide and out of a regard for the public welfare, and yet may be incapable in their very nature of legal proof. In the case of Campbell v. Spottiswoode, the former obtained a verdict against the printer of the Saturday Review for an alleged calumny against himself as editor and part-proprietor of the British Standard and Ensign. The defendant’s counsel relied at the trial, and in his argument before the Court of Queen’s Bench, on the “general privilege” of all who discuss public questions without actual malice. The Lord Chief Justice and the Court decided against him, on the ground that there is no such general privilege; and that the imputation of base motives throws upon a public critic, as it would upon a private detractor, the necessity of bringing them home to the party maligned. According to this doctrine, the jury is not to be allowed to compare the comments with the evidence before the writer, and to say whether they were “fair” and justified by appearances. Nothing short of their being strictly true in fact, and proved to be so in open court, will relieve the latter of his liability.