The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition / An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics

by John Venn

The reference to the work just mentioned will serve to convey a general idea of the view of Probability adopted in this Essay. With what may be called the Material view of Logic as opposed to the Formal or Conceptualist,—with that which regards it as taking cognisance of laws of things and not of the laws of our own minds in thinking about things,—I am in entire accordance. Of the province of Logic, regarded from this point of view, and under its widest aspect, Probability may, in my opinion, be considered to be a portion. The principal objects of this Essay are to ascertain how great a portion it comprises, where we are to draw the boundary between it and the contiguous branches of the general science of evidence, what are the ultimate foundations upon which its rules rest, what the nature of the evidence they are capable of affording, and to what class of subjects they may most fitly be applied. That the science of Probability, on this view of it, contains something more important than the results of a system of mathematical assumptions, is obvious. I am convinced moreover that it can and ought to be rendered both interesting and intelligible to ordinary readers who have any taste for philosophy. In other words, if the large and growing body of readers who can find pleasure in the study of books like Mill's Logic and Whewell's Inductive Sciences, turn with aversion from a work on Probability, the cause in the latter case must lie either in the view of the subject or in the manner and style of the book.

I take this opportunity of thanking several friends, amongst whom I must especially mention Mr Todhunter, of St John's College, and Mr H. Sidgwick, of Trinity College, for the trouble they have kindly taken in looking over the proof-sheets, whilst this work was passing through the Press. To the former in particular my thanks are due for thus adding to the obligations which I, as an old pupil, already owed him, by taking an amount of trouble, in making suggestions and corrections for the benefit of another, which few would care to take for anything but a work of their own. His extensive knowledge of the subject, and his extremely accurate judgment, render the service he has thus afforded me of the greatest possible value.

Gonville and Caius College,
September, 1866.

[1] I am here speaking, of course, of those only who have expressly treated of the foundations of the science. Mr Todhunter's admirable work on the History of the Theory of Probability being, as the name denotes, mainly historical, such enquiries have not directly fallen within his province.

[2] This remark, and that at the commencement of the last paragraph, having been misunderstood, I ought to say that the only sense in which originality is claimed for this Essay is in the thorough working out of the Material view of Logic as applied to Probability. I have given a pretty full discussion of the general principles of this view in the tenth chapter, and have there pointed out some of the peculiarities to which it leads.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

The principal reason for designating this volume a second edition consists in the fact that the greater portion of what may be termed the first edition is incorporated into it. Besides various omissions (principally where the former treatment has since seemed to me needlessly prolix), I have added new matter, not much inferior in amount to the whole of the original work. In addition, moreover, to these alterations in the matter, the general arrangement of the subject as regards the successive chapters has been completely changed; the former arrangement having been (as it now seems to me) justly objected to as deficient and awkward in method.

After saying this, it ought to be explained whether any change of general view or results will be found in the present treatment.

The general view of Probability adopted is quite unchanged, further reading and reflection having only confirmed me in the conviction that this is the soundest and most fruitful way of regarding the subject. It is the more necessary to say this, as to a cursory reader it might seem otherwise; owing to my having endeavoured to avoid the needlessly polemical tone which, as is often the case with those who are making their first essay in writing upon any subject, was doubtless too prominent in the former edition. I have not thought it necessary, of course, except in one or two cases, to indicate points of detail which it has seemed necessary to correct.

A number of new discussions have been introduced upon topics which were but little or not at all treated before. The principal of these refer to the nature and physical origin of Laws of Error (Ch. II.); the general view of Logic, and consequently of Probability, termed the Material view, adopted here (Ch. X.); a brief history and criticism of the various opinions held on the subject of Modality (Ch. XII.); the logical principles underlying the method of Least Squares (Ch. XIII.); and the practices of Insurance and Gambling, so far as the principles involved in them are concerned (Ch. XV.). The Chapter on the Credibility of Extraordinary Stories is also mainly new; this was the portion of the former work which has since seemed to me the least satisfactory, but owing to the extreme intricacy of the subject I am far from feeling thoroughly satisfied with it even now.