Major Colfox (D/162) had, on the previous night, run a forward gun right up to Chinstrap Lane, twelve hundred yards west of Roeux, and had registered it over open sights in the early morning, in the hope that enfilade fire from here might assist the infantry in their oft-tried task. Under a heavy barrage the infantry rushed to grips with the enemy, but no sooner had our guns started than the enemy opened a heavy concentrated machine-gun fire all along the front, while his guns put down a dense barrage within thirty seconds of the beginning of the attack. A footing was gained in the part of Tool Trench still held by the enemy, but strong bombing attacks were delivered from both flanks, and our troops under the pressure of these attacks were forced to withdraw. Devil's Trench once more had proved a death-trap.
This venture was followed up at 11.30 P.M. on May 30th by an assault on Hook and Tool Trenches, but the attack only added one more item to the now growing list of local failures. Our troops were evidently seen leaving their trenches, and this enabled the enemy to open heavy machine-gun and artillery fire on them. In spite of this, and of the mud and water caused by a thunderstorm during the afternoon, the attacking troops reached their objectives, but so heavy had been the casualties suffered whilst crossing No Man's Land that the remnants were not strong enough to deal with the garrison of the trench. Most of the attackers were driven out by a counter-attack following immediately on the assault, but a party of the Manchester Regiment established itself in Hook Trench and managed to hold on till noon next day. The guns poured shell over their heads and put down barrage after barrage for their protection, but it was of no avail. Shortly after midday a superior force of the enemy counter-attacked with fury, and this gallant little party was overcome.
The advent of June brought with it a further succession of local attacks—efforts to straighten our line, to remove important points held by the enemy and generally to improve our tactical position. It was evident, from the non-success of the French offensive in the south, that no more operations on a large scale would be carried out here, but it was also clear that Higher Command had decided in its mind that our line must embrace certain tactical features now in the hands of the enemy, and to this end further local undertakings had to be effected. Following on two Chinese bombardments on June 3rd and 4th, in which the 33rd Divisional Artillery took part to the south of the river, the 9th Division carried out a short and successful attack around Greenland Hill on the night of the 5th, and consolidated all its gains. Soon afterwards, on the 13th, a very successful attack upon Hook and Long Trenches was made by the 76th Infantry Brigade. During the previous week a systematic bombardment had been carried out night and day upon the enemy defences to obliterate his trenches and to weaken his morale. Each day, however, there had been no firing between 5.0 A.M. and 9.0 A.M., and the enemy had grown accustomed to a period of quiet at this time. When, therefore, the infantry rushed across at 7.20 A.M., our barrage not starting till 7.21 by which time they were in the hostile trenches, they caught the enemy quite unprepared and showing little resistance. All gains were held and, under cover of a protective barrage, the ground was consolidated.
At 7.15 A.M. next day (14th) a further attack under cover of a barrage resulted in the capture of Infantry Hill by our troops, and the morale of the latter, somewhat shaken by the continued reverses at Roeux and Devil's Trench during the previous weeks, began now to rise again to the pitch of confidence and assuredness so badly needed. So greatly did it improve, in fact, that when the enemy counter-attacked at 2.15 A.M. on the 16th, in an endeavour to regain Infantry Hill, he was severely punished and beaten off—except for the loss of two southern posts in front of Long Trench—despite the fact that the attack had been delivered with a strength of some seven hundred bayonets under cover of an intense artillery bombardment. A second hostile attempt at 2.30 A.M. on the 17th, although preceded by a two-hour bombardment, only resulted in our losing a small portion of Long Trench, and it now seemed as though Infantry Hill were securely in our hands.
Just prior to these attacks the 33rd Divisional Artillery had received orders to move out to the wagon-lines and to take over part of the line further south. The enemy's attitude, however, appeared threatening, and accordingly the departure of the batteries was postponed until the activity had died down. By June 20th all appeared to be quiet, and at 6.0 P.M., after twelve weeks of continuous battle on this front, the march to the wagon-lines was effected. Taking their guns with them, the batteries topped the ridge west of Battery Valley and marched back to the peace and rest of Arras once more.
The three months' fighting in this offensive had marked a brilliant chapter in the doings of the 33rd Divisional batteries. Under all conditions, in blizzards, in snow and mud, under intense shell-fire from the enemy they had maintained their reputation for straight shooting and complete reliability; moreover, and this was above all the most valued, they had won the entire confidence of the infantry. When the 3rd Division, which had carried out the operations of June 14th-19th under cover of the guns of 33rd Divisional Artillery, was withdrawn from the line, its G.O.C. Major-General Deverell wrote to General Stewart and asked that the personal thanks of the infantry might be conveyed to the batteries. "We wish them" he concluded in his letter, "all good fortune in the future and hope that we may again fight together with that close co-operation which has been so conspicuously marked whilst we have been together." High praise, that, and praise dearly won, for there were many gaps in the ranks as the brigades turned westwards. On each and every battery the offensive had left a heavy mark, and the faces of new arrivals bore witness to the many blanks which had had to be filled, but the greatest loss which the Divisional Artillery as a whole had suffered was borne especially by the 162nd Brigade. On May 23rd Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris was carried away on a stretcher in the advanced stages of para-typhoid. To the officers and men of his brigade his name seemed inextricably interwoven with the brigade itself, for he had "made" it, working it up from its early raw stage at La Bassée to the fine fighting instrument it now was. With his going a certain gloom fell upon the brigade, for all ranks realised that they had lost not only a very gallant leader but a very true friend.
Before he left, however, Colonel Harris had one great satisfaction. Throughout the battle of Arras the 162nd Brigade had made it its object always to be the furthest forward, always to be the nearest to the infantry. Its batteries were the first across No Man's Land on April 9th, the first to advance as each enemy line fell, the closest up behind the infantry throughout the operations, and early in May this achievement was officially recognised. There came one day from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig a message saying that a captured German 5·9 in. howitzer would be presented to the 162nd Brigade in recognition of the work it had carried out during the advance, and of the very fine manner in which it had on all occasions pushed up so close behind the infantry. Such a distinction has rarely, if ever before, been conferred upon a brigade of artillery, and to its commanding officer was due a full measure of praise in that he had worked it up to a pitch of efficiency which made such deeds possible.
One night the brigades spent in their wagon-lines at Arras, and early on the morning of the 21st they hooked in and moved off through Beaurains down the long road which led to Bapaume, to pit their strength this time against the fortifications of the Hindenburg Line.