Although the Army barrage on October 1st had coincided with and had helped to defeat an enemy counter-attack, its primary object was to prepare for a renewed offensive on our part, and this offensive now took definite shape. After firing another practice barrage on October 2nd and maintaining throughout the 2nd and 3rd a destructive fire upon the enemy system—the while long strings of pack horses refilled the ever-diminishing dumps of ammunition around the guns—the batteries in the early morning of October 4th set range-drum and dial sight to the opening elevation of yet another barrage, this time no practice but as a definite and vital protection to infantry moving forward to the assault. Despite the rain and the ever deepening mud the offensive was ordered to be continued.
At 6.0 A.M. on Thursday, October 4th, on the zone covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery the infantry of the 5th Division advanced to the attack, supported by one hundred and eight 18-pdrs., thirty-six 4·5 in. howitzers, sixteen 6 in. howitzers and an assortment of heavier howitzers and 60-pdrs. Their right lay upon the northern edge of Gheluvelt Wood and their left upon Juniper Cottages, and, with the barrage moving ahead of them at the rate of one hundred yards in six minutes, they essayed the capture of the high ground south-west of Reutel together with the eastern slopes of the Polderhoek spur. The actual line of their one and final objective ran from a point 500 yards south of Reutel, past the south-west corner of Juniper Wood and east of Polderhoek Château to the northern edge of Gheluvelt Wood, the holding of which line would cover the communications of the 21st Division across Polygon Beek on the left in their attempt to capture Reutel; the objective of the 5th Division, in fact, was the southward continuation of the first objective of the 21st Division, and formed the right flank of an attack which, further north, was intended to penetrate deeply into the enemy lines. On the right of the troops covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery the infantry of the 37th Division were to advance their left slightly to conform with the line of attack.
Throughout the night of the 3rd/4th the enemy had carried out an intense bombardment of our front line system and had, from time to time, swept the battery positions with shell-storms from 5·9 in. and 4·2 in. howitzers. To this hostile bombardment the batteries had, at the request of the infantry, energetically replied at intervals during the night, but the opening rounds of the barrage at six o'clock in the morning smashed their way into the beginnings of an enemy counter-attack which was concentrating on the front of our own attack. Fortunately the barrage dropped before the enemy concentration was complete, and the fire of our guns at zero broke up the enemy attempt before it could come to a head. Notwithstanding this, however, very considerable opposition was met with, and only on those parts of the front where the infantry managed to keep right close under the barrage fire of the batteries was complete success achieved.
The barrage, as already stated, had been arranged to move forward at the rate of sixteen yards per minute until it should reach a line two hundred yards beyond the objective. Here it was to halt, fire a round of smoke shell from every alternate gun as a warning that the protective line had been reached, and be maintained at a slow rate to cover the infantry while they were digging in. In addition, moreover, to this standing barrage, it was arranged that every now and then the batteries should search by short lifts for one thousand yards beyond the line of the protective barrage; while at 8.10 A.M., by which time the objective of the 5th Division should have been fully secured, the barrage was to move on towards Gheluvelt in conformation with the fire covering the 21st Division further north in their advance on the second objective, thereby suggesting a resumption of the advance on the 5th Division front. In point of fact, however, no further advance beyond the first objective on the front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery was intended; the batteries, when they reached the extreme limit of their range, were to drop back to the protective barrage line again, their work of drawing attention away from the 21st Divisional front being finished.
As events turned out, the operations of the 5th Division were not entirely successful. The 13th Infantry Brigade, under the guns of Lieut.-Colonel Butler's Group (the right group), reached the final objective with the right battalion in the afternoon, after being held up for a time by a strong point north of Lewis House. The left battalion of the same brigade, however, encountered strong opposition at Polderhoek Château and was unable to keep up with the barrage. Survivors of the assaulting troops actually reached Polderhoek Château and even penetrated beyond it, but after severe hand to hand fighting a line was taken up two hundred yards west of the Château. The left infantry brigade (95th), covered by the guns of Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's Group, was also unable in places to keep up with the barrage. The right battalion found that the ground between the Reutelbeek and the company on the southern edge of Cameron Covert was so sodden as to be absolutely impassable; a detour to the right and left was accordingly made, and a line consolidated in the 13th Brigade area and between Cameron Covert and the stream. The left battalion of this brigade at the same time did actually reach its final objective, but so heavy was the hostile fire coming from the high ground around Poezelhoek that the position became untenable, and a line was taken up in the area of the 21st Division on the left, running from Reutel westward and facing south, while the 21st Division formed a defensive flank by continuing this line to Cameron Covert.
By three o'clock in the afternoon the right brigade disentangled the muddle and formed a general line running from the northern edge of Gheluvelt Wood north-north-east to the Scherriabeek and then on to a point fifty yards short of Polderhoek Château; here there was a gap of some 150 yards, and the line then continued due north for another hundred yards, to be carried on northwards through Polderhoek Wood to Cameron Covert by the left brigade. It was well that even this rough line was organised, for throughout the afternoon infantry and gunners alike were hotly engaged by the enemy in numerous counter-attacks. In all, five attacks were launched by the enemy on the right brigade front during the afternoon, and three more in the evening, and in each case every gun which could be brought to bear was switched round to help the exhausted infantry. After the most severe fighting, and after continuous firing by the batteries throughout the remainder of the day, the infantry were able to report that all gains were held; rifle and artillery fire had smashed every enemy attempt to advance, and our new line was securely held. During the night of October 4th/5th the left battalion of the left brigade, under cover of the guns, withdrew from the 21st Divisional area and took up a line through the middle of Cameron Covert, and so on the morning of the 5th the line stood solid. On this part of the front the objective had not been captured except upon the extreme right, and the casualties had been tremendous. Further to the left, however, success had been met with, and Reutel Village, Abraham Heights and Gravenstafel were now in our hands.
It may be complained that this chapter has dealt too fully with the infantry operations, and has not sufficiently recorded the daily life of the batteries and their experiences during the attacks. The answer to this complaint is, briefly, that the batteries had no daily life but rather a daily death, while their experiences—day in, day out—were invariably the same. Morning, noon and night the men were splashing about in mud, trying to keep their ammunition clean and their guns serviceable; daily they were shelled, sometimes with long deliberate bombardments, sometimes in hurricane shell-storms which descended upon them for forty minutes or so two or three times a day. They were always wet, always cold; they continually saw the guns and ammunition, which they had spent hours in cleaning and preparing, blown to bits in the passing of a second; they helped to bring up more guns, more ammunition, and saw, in the serving of these new guns, their mates blown to pieces, shattered, torn. They grew to believe that relief would never come, that for all time they must exist in the grim shadows of Maple Copse, of Fosse Wood and of Armagh Wood. They felt, as they saw the shells crashing down all around them, that they were forgotten by God and man. There is no daily history of the batteries to record save the success or failure of the operations in which they took part, and for the supporting of which they paid this heavy price. There lies the true history of the batteries, and that it is which in these pages must be recorded.
From October 5th there ensued a pause during which the batteries strained every nerve to get up more ammunition from the dumps, to clear up their shell-wrecked positions and to sort out the gun line personnel into some sort of workable detachments. B/162 came up into action again from the wagon-lines on the 7th and took over its old position from B/242, and for a few days such registration and reconstruction of positions was carried out as was possible, having regard for the heavy enemy fire which continually swept the entire area in which the batteries were located. Only for a short time was there a lull, however, for a fresh attack had been ordered to be carried out on October 9th.
On Tuesday, the 9th, the 5th Division attempted to complete the capture of the Polderhoek ridge and, by extending its left to Polygon Beek, to form connection with the 17th Division. For this purpose the weight of artillery, the pace of the creeping barrage and the formation of the standing barrage were to be identical with those of the 4th, but the objective in this case was to include the whole of Polderhoek Château and Wood together with Cameron Covert, and was to bend back to the then front line at Joist Farm on the north. The 15th Infantry Brigade was responsible for the attack on the right, while on the left the 95th Infantry Brigade was ordered to pivot on a stationary left flank and, clearing all the ground east of Cameron Covert to as far south as the Reutelbeek and as far eastwards as the line of the objective, was to form the connection between the left of the 15th Brigade and the right of the 17th Division.
Zero hour was shortly after 6.0 A.M., and three minutes after the beginning of the barrage the infantry advanced to the assault. The ground, already a sea of mud, was churned up yet more by the intensity of the barrage, and the troops forming the extreme right of the 5th Division, by their efforts to avoid portions of ground which were utterly impassable, lost direction and moved towards the south-east. The mistake was presently discovered, but too late to catch up the barrage, and a line was taken up a little in advance of the previous front line immediately north of the Scherriabeek. Simultaneously the left and centre companies of the right battalion advanced on their proper course, but came under intense fire from Gheluvelt and Polderhoek Château, and only one platoon—themselves all wounded—reached the Château; ultimately, owing to heavy casualties, they withdrew to their original front line. Loss of direction was responsible also for the failure of the left battalion of this brigade to reach its objective. Moving too much towards the right it came under heavy fire from some houses north of the Château and, suffering many casualties, was held up. By ten o'clock in the morning, despite the fiercest efforts by the batteries to beat down the opposition, the whole brigade was back in its old line. The left brigade, having no forward movement on the right to which to conform, did not advance at all.