April—August 1918.
| H.Q.R.A. | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| C.R.A. | Brigade Major. | Staff Captain. | |
| Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O. | Major T. E. Durie, D.S.O., M.C. | Capt. W. E. Bownass, M.C. | |
| Brig.-Gen. G. H. W. Nicholson, C.M.G. | Major W. A. T. Barstow, D.S.O., M.C. | ||
| 156th Brigade. | |||
| Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O. | |||
| Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C. | |||
| "A" Battery. | "B" Battery. | "C" Battery. | "D" Battery. |
| Major F. B. Carrell. | Major M. A. Studd, D.S.O., M.C. | Major Barker, D.S.O., M.C. | Major D. Jones, M.C. |
| Capt. S. G. Taylor, M.C. | |||
| Major W. G. Sheeres, M.C. | |||
| 162nd Brigade. | |||
| Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O. (wounded). | |||
| Lieut.-Colonel Ramsden. | |||
| Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Warren, D.S.O. | |||
| Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt, M.C. | |||
| "A" Battery. | "B" Battery. | "C" Battery. | "D" Battery. |
| Major G. Fetherston, D.S.O., M.C. | Major H. C. Cory, M.C. | Major M. M. I. Body, M.C. | Major F. L. Lee, M.C. |
| Major R. D. Russell, M.C. | |||
Meantime Colonel Skinner set out to find the infantry Brigadier in that part of the line, so that he might inform him of his plans. This was a long and tedious business in an unknown place in a now dark and rainy night, and, on finding the Brigadier, Colonel Skinner to his disgust, if not surprise, was told that the positions he had chosen had, since he had left them, practically fallen into the hands of the enemy. There was only one thing to do, and that quickly. Setting out as fast as possible, he covered the four miles to Dranoutre in pitch darkness and, arriving there at the same time as the batteries, he stopped them and held a consultation with the C.R.A. of the 19th Division, who had just been shelled out of his headquarters. After a short discussion regarding the general situation which, as can be judged by the foregoing narrative, was very obscure, the batteries marched at once into action between Rossignol Wood and Parrot Camp (North of Kemmel Village), and by 3.0 A.M. on Thursday, April 11th, were in action, Brigade Headquarters being at Parrot Camp. Thus they found themselves after a seventeen-mile march along roads congested with troops, transport, refugees and cattle, a march which had been preceded by over an hour's work on drill order the previous morning; unfavourable conditions, those, to usher in one of the greatest battles yet fought.
From April 11th onwards the batteries were under the administration of the 19th Division. Brig.-Gen. Stewart and his staff had, on April 9th, handed over control of the artillery in the Passchendaele sector to Colonel Paterson (119th Brigade R.F.A.), but had marched straight to Dranoutre, and on the 11th remained with headquarters of the 33rd Division. On that fateful day General Stewart commanded a composite infantry brigade until the early morning of the 12th, when he took over command of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on the Meteren front, south of the 156th and 162nd Brigades. The latter were therefore left with the C.R.A. 19th Division.
During this period from the 11th onwards both brigades underwent the severest trials. Great demands were made upon them; the batteries were required to shoot on a big area whenever an enemy attack showed signs of developing, yet never did the guns fail to carry out their work. Attempts were daily made to man O.P.'s on Kemmel Hill, but although the gallantry of observing officers and signallers always enabled communication to be established, the heavy and continuous fire which the enemy brought to bear upon the hill rendered it impossible for that communication to be maintained. In the case of the 156th Brigade observation was usually carried out from a point north-east of Wytschaete, while the batteries of the 162nd Brigade were able to obtain a very good view of the enemy from the ridge just in front of the guns.
From the moment that the batteries dropped into action they were shelled almost continuously, but no infantry actions developed. This was in a large part due probably to the efforts of the batteries, by which every sign of concentration was smashed at the outset. Especially was this the case on the 12th, when small bodies of the enemy were continually advancing in the open, but were as continually broken up by the fire of the guns. Every suspicion of movement was shelled and, whether movement was visible or not, harassing fire was maintained night and day. On the 15th information was received that our line was to be withdrawn to Vierstraat-Lindenhoek, but in the evening this retirement was cancelled, and the fatal morning of April 16th dawned to find the batteries still occupying the same positions.
Scale. 1:20,000.
A dense fog hung over the ground on Wednesday, 16th April, blotting out all vision and deadening sound. There was no suggestion of an enemy attack on the front covered by the batteries, no preliminary bombardment—other than the continuous shelling which had characterised every day since the offensive began—no S.O.S. signals, yet early in the morning of that day the enemy made a heavy attack from the south and, advancing his line in a north-westerly direction, captured Wytschaete Ridge, Wytschaete Village and Wood, together with the Hospice and Peckham. Apparently the Germans, making use of the thick fog, advanced without an artillery barrage, and the same fog hid the infantry S.O.S. signals. The first intimation of an attack was obtained by the Forward Observing officer of the 156th Brigade, who from his O.P. three hundred yards north-east of Wytschaete suddenly saw Germans twenty-five yards away. He opened rifle fire upon these at point-blank range, but needless to say was unable to stop them. He then tried to get away in order to warn the neighbouring batteries, but was shot in the stomach and later died of his wounds. The batteries, however, were by now fully roused and were pouring gun fire into the advancing troops to try and check their onslaught. Those of the 156th Brigade were just able to remain in their positions, and, as soon as dawn broke, set up O.P.'s on the ridge of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road, the original O.P.'s being by then in enemy hands. From this ridge observed fire was directed all day upon Wytschaete Village and Ridge, and great havoc was wrought amongst the Germans as they advanced in the open.
Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade was also enduring a deluge of shell similar to that which was descending upon the 156th but, being further to the right, was in more imminent danger of being captured, since the enemy advance was, as already described, taking the form of a north-westerly sweep from the south. Shorter and shorter grew the ranges of the guns, until at last the necessity of a retirement became imperative; reluctantly the withdrawal began, one section per battery at a time. In this operation conspicuous gallantry was shown by all ranks, for the gun positions were being torn and swept by a veritable tornado of shell which rendered the approach of the teams well-nigh impossible. As an instance of this, the retirement of a section of A/162 under Lieut. J. R. B. Turner may well be quoted; such heavy fire was directed upon his guns that the teams could not get near them, and guns and wagons had to be manhandled out of action. Under a hail of shell each gun in turn was saved, every temporary lull being taken advantage of for a team to dash in, limber up and get clear, and ultimately the section was successfully withdrawn. Similar deeds were enacted in every battery, and ultimately the whole brigade was withdrawn, the leading sections coming into action in fresh positions and covering the withdrawal of the remainder by their fire. By this means every gun was saved, while the continuity of the barrage covering our own infantry was never broken—a most gallant performance by the personnel of the batteries, and a fine example of the tactical handling of a brigade of artillery.