Gun by gun the retirement began, each battery retaining a proportion of its guns in the forward position until the remainder had got safely away. It was a performance on the part of the officers, gunners and drivers which has never been surpassed; while other brigades were being forced to abandon their guns, the 162nd Brigade retained practically its full tactical powers. Only three guns, two of C/162 and one of A/162, could not be removed until nightfall and were then got away with the enemy only a few hundred yards distant, but not one single gun was lost to the Germans by the 162nd Brigade on April 25th, and in this achievement they stood practically alone. Many of the neighbouring batteries of other Divisions had earlier been silenced or had been forced to abandon their guns, and too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men of this Brigade who, in the face of overwhelming short-range fire, continued to serve their guns long after they might reasonably have been expected to retire, and even then withdrew them in an orderly manner.
On the withdrawal of the batteries being completed, Brigade Headquarters moved back to a prearranged rendezvous on the Reninghelst-Ouderdom road. No horses or transport could come up to assist in this, and the entire equipment had to be carried by the Headquarters' staff under the direction of Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant). A number of casualties were suffered during the march from shell-fire and from low-flying aeroplanes, but ultimately the new control-post was reached and command of the batteries was carried out from there.
Thus has been described in detail the story of the two brigades and the part they played in one of the great battles which threatened the Channel ports. Before we return to the main narrative again and describe the doings of the rest of that day, a word must be said of the officers and men who put up such a wonderful fight. Names have already been mentioned in connection with deeds of especial gallantry, and yet with hesitation has this been done, for how can one name in one battery be singled out from amongst the others when all behaved in such a magnificent way? Every officer, every man on that day showed such gallantry as can never be surpassed, and proud should be he who can say, "I served with the 33rd Divisional Artillery on April 25th, 1918!"
Yet two names must be mentioned, for without them this narrative would be incomplete. Through all the trials and horrors of the day, through all the great strain of the whole of this period every battery was inspired and encouraged by the presence of the two Brigade Commanders, Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler and Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner. When times were grim and depressing, when the enemy seemed to be pushing remorselessly on, when the brigades, with their backs to the wall, appeared to be forgotten by God and man, there was ever the presence of those two to cheer up and hearten the weary spirits of their officers and men. With the control of the artillery continually passing from one Division to another, even from one nation to another, but little was done for the gunners who were left to look after themselves. Orders from above were few and far between, and in many cases came too late to be of any use; communications from Division and Corps were seldom received, and it remained with the two Brigade Commanders to discuss between themselves the situation as it appeared to them, and to issue orders to the batteries accordingly. The battery commanders and their officers and men—wonderfully gallant fellows all—had behind them the moral support of their Brigade Commanders, but Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner had no such comforting support from above. Yet they were for ever calm, confident and cheerful, and bore the tremendous strain of acting on their own initiative in a way which the batteries strove hard to repay. Colonel Skinner was wounded on May 10th and taken away in an ambulance; Colonel Butler met a soldier's death in the final British advance in the autumn, but the names of both will ever bring to the minds of those who served under them a sense of deep gratitude and a happy memory of a very highly valued friendship.
The main narrative of the battle was broken off at the point where, at 10.0 A.M., the Germans had established themselves firmly across the Kemmel-Vierstraat road and had pushed on past Siege Farm towards the battery positions. It was about this time—shortly before it, to be exact—that the withdrawal of the 156th Brigade had begun, and it was about now that the culminating point of the battle was reached. Having got past Siege Farm, the enemy advance seemed to slow down as though requiring a breathing space, and for this the fire of the guns and of the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. who were still on Hill 44 was largely responsible. At 11.30 A.M., as already recounted, a strong attempt was made by some five hundred of the enemy to work round by the south to La Clytte so as to cut off the retreat of our troops, but this manœuvre was defeated, and Colonel MacCullock, taking the initiative, decided to counter-attack without delay. As many guns as could be collected were warned of the plan but, just as the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. prepared to launch their assault, a counter-attack was delivered by fresh British troops from the direction of La Clytte, with the result that Colonel MacCullock considered that any movement on his part was unnecessary.
A condition of stalemate now ensued. Whenever the enemy showed himself he was fired on, while he on his part began sniping very actively. Artillery fire was slow, taking the form of occasional rounds thrown about promiscuously and varied by five-minute barrages. The roads, however, were kept under constant fire by enemy high-velocity guns, while counter-battery work on both sides was maintained. About 3.30 P.M. one section of A/162, still in action near Millekruisse, fired at the request of the infantry on some Germans who were collected in huts on the far side of Cheapside, and shortly afterwards our infantry reinforcements arrived.
The situation now seemed well in hand, and during that night and the following day no further enemy advance took place. The 162nd Brigade, having succeeded in withdrawing all its guns except three, was able to come into action again immediately, and indeed some of its guns were in their fresh positions before the withdrawal of the remainder had begun. Therefore in a very short time they were all bombarding the enemy from a line east of the Zevecoten-Ouderdom road and, under the orders of the 9th Division, were covering an infantry brigade of the 49th Division along the La Clytte-Millekruisse road. The 156th Brigade had fewer serviceable guns and did not come into action again as a unit until next day, when positions were taken up one mile north of La Clytte and were occupied until the 28th. On the night of the 28th/29th the 156th Brigade pulled out and began to march to the Winnezeele rest area; the German attack on the 29th, about to be described, delayed this march for a few hours, but ultimately Winnezeele was reached. Next morning (30th) this brigade was again called up into action, but only for a few hours, and ultimately returned to Winnezeele with the prospect of a few days of rest ahead.
From April 26th to 28th the whole of the battery area was heavily shelled by the enemy, while the roads and wagon-lines were searched by high-velocity guns. The wagon-lines, indeed, came in for a very bad time and, after being shelled out of different camps, came ultimately to rest about one mile west-south-west of Poperinghe, with forward wagon-lines between Ouderdom and Reninghelst. On the 26th Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters were shelled out and forced to move to Reninghelst, and on the 27th the whole of the 162nd Brigade changed positions; "A," "B" and "C" batteries occupied an area near Goed Moet Mill, east-north-east of Ouderdom, "D" battery moved 600 yards north of Ouderdom, while Brigade headquarters went to De Drie Goen Farm.
On Tuesday, April 29th, even while the relief of the 156th Brigade was still in progress, the combined effort of both brigades was called upon to resist yet another German attack, for at 5.0 A.M. the enemy assaulted with eleven divisions in mass formation, the density being from six to eight bayonets to the yard. It was again the same story, from the batteries' point of view, of terrific shelling resolutely borne, but this time there was the satisfaction of knowing that the work of the guns had been successful. The attack, after getting up to within one hundred yards of the line held by the 49th Division, was repulsed, as was also a second assault at 6.0 A.M.; the German effort to turn the Ridge Wood flank proved a costly failure, and the enemy dead lay in rows in front of our line.
The fight of April 29th was the last big episode of the German offensive in Flanders. From that date onwards there were a number of local actions but no large-scale attacks, nor was any serious penetration made by the enemy. From May 1st until the 7th the 162nd Brigade continued to bombard the enemy and to be heavily shelled in return. On the 6th Brigadier-General Stewart and his Staff took over from the C.R.A. 9th Division the control of the artillery covering the front, which extended from Kruisstraathoek cross-roads on the north to just south of Vierstraat. This artillery consisted of the 50th, 51st and 122nd Brigades (9th Division), the 149th Brigade (30th Division) and the 162nd Brigade. On the 7th/8th, however, one section of the 162nd Brigade was relieved by the 121st and marched into rest at Winnezeele, while at the same time the 156th Brigade came up from the back area and took over the positions of the 149th Brigade, in the very area where the wagon-lines had been when the batteries were in action at Passchendaele five short weeks earlier.