Ghondati is a clear-headed patriot, and I am surprised that his counsel has not been sought for in this supreme moment of his country's history. His ideas relating to recognition by the Powers were rather remarkable. He did not think that any country could give help to Russia without either asking for conditions or being suspected of doing so. The only exception was England. The reason England is not suspected is that her Empire is so vast and varied in character that she has all the raw material for her trade and all the space she requires for her surplus population. Her help, unlike that of any other State so far, has been unselfish and unconditional. Ghondati quite saw that "this fact was producing a steady and permanent orientation of Russian opinion towards England, which, if cultivated by British statesmanship, would eventually give my country everything she required, while those whose help was always surrounded with conditions would have great difficulty to retain the advantages they secured only under the pressure of circumstances."
CHAPTER XXII
AMERICAN POLICY AND ITS RESULTS
At Nikolsk my train was stopped as the No. 4 Post train from Vladivostok had been wrecked by Bolsheviks, a startling situation considering that eleven months previously the whole power of Bolshevism had been destroyed in these maritime provinces. The station commandant was an old friend, who had given me his own private official carriage at the time when our little yellow brother had decided to lower the prestige of his white Ally in Eastern eyes by making British officers travel in cattle-trucks. He came into my car and began to explain how the cross-purposes of the American and Japanese forces were producing a state of uncertainty and disorder as bad, if not worse, than existed under the Bolshevik régime. Our conversation was cut short by the receipt of a telegram from the station-master at Kraevesk. It was to the effect that he was using his own line from his house, because a few minutes previously a detachment of the Red Guard had entered the station and, in the presence of the American soldiers who were guarding the railway, had placed himself and his staff under arrest and taken possession of the station; that the Reds had sent a message to Shmakovka ordering all Russian railway officials and staff to leave their posts, as the Bolshevik army, with the sanction of the American forces, was about to take over the line. The Red Guard officer in proof of his order stated "that fifteen American soldiers are now standing in the room from which I am sending this message." Having issued these orders in the presence of the Americans, they had removed the telegraph and telephone apparatus, and the station-master wished to know what he was to do and whether any help could be sent him. Imagine my utter astonishment at this message, containing, as it undoubtedly did, evidence of co-operation and understanding between the Bolshevik forces and one of our Allies.
In one of my numerous interviews with Admiral Koltchak at Omsk he had made some very serious statements regarding the American policy in the Far East, which he feared would result in reproducing the previous state of disorder. I assured him that the policy of the Allies was to resist disorder and support order, and that I could not believe America had come to Siberia to make his task more difficult, but to help him in every reasonable way. He agreed that such was the intention of the American people, but he feared that the American command was being used for quite other purposes. His officers had informed him that out of sixty liaison officers and translators with American Headquarters over fifty were Russian Jews or the relatives of Russian Jews; some had been exiled from Russia for political and other offences, and had returned as American citizens, capable of influencing American policy in a direction contrary to that desired by the American people. I assured him that this could not be, and that his people might themselves in this matter be under the influence of a near Eastern neighbour not friendly to American interference in Eastern affairs, and that under this influence they might greatly magnify the danger. My words seemed to ease the admiral's mind, but he regretfully replied that the reports were so voluminous and categorical in character that he thought I, as a representative of the people of England, as well as an officer of His Majesty's Army, ought to be made acquainted with the situation.
This matter had almost disappeared from my mind, but the message from the station-master at Kraevesk revived it with the vividness of a sudden blow. I at once determined to make myself acquainted as far as possible with the policy of the American commanders, and with this object in view I interviewed many American officers and soldiers. I found that both officers and men were most anxious to render all the help possible to maintain Koltchak's authority and crush disorder in the Far East, and, as they put it, "justify their presence in Siberia." Many felt that at the time they were only helping the Bolsheviks to recover their lost hold upon the people by providing neutral territory for Bolshevik propaganda; that when they arrived in the country in August, 1918, the English, Czechs, and Japanese, with the aid of such Russian units as then existed, had reduced the maritime provinces to order, but that their own efforts had produced a state of affairs similar to, if not worse than, those which existed during the actual Bolshevik occupation. I learnt from these American troops that their officers and officials, from General Graves downwards, had been in actual correspondence with Red Guard officers, and that more than one understanding had been arrived at between them; that for a time the ordinary American soldiers thought the understanding between the two forces was so general and friendly in character that no further hostile acts were to be contemplated between them. It was true that this wrecking of trains and attacks on the line guarded by American soldiers made things look serious, but they felt sure that the confidence existing between the American and Red Guard Headquarters was so well established that these acts of brigandage could only be due to some misunderstanding. The Kraevesk affair appeared to be only a symptom of a much wider policy, and not the foolish act of a negligent subordinate officer.
Following up my inquiries there fell into my hands a letter, dated May 24, from the American officer (Captain ——) commanding the American forces at Svagena, addressed to the officer commanding the Red Guard operating in that district. The American officer addressed the Red Guard commandant as a recognised officer of equal military standing. The American officer complained that after a recent fraternisation of the two forces which had taken place in accordance with previous arrangements near the "wood mill," on the departure of the Red troops he received reports that the Red Guard officer had ordered the destruction of certain machinery at the mill, and had also torn up two sections of the line at points east and west of the station at Svagena. The American captain enumerated other accusations against the Red Guard, such as threats to bayonet certain orderly disposed people who would not join the Bolshevik army, and warned the Red Commissar that these acts were contrary to the agreement entered into by the chiefs of the American and Red forces, and if such acts were repeated he would take steps to punish those who committed such breaches of their joint understanding.
I think this letter from the American officer at Svagena is positive proof of some local or general understanding between the American authorities and the Red army operating in the maritime provinces, and further, that this understanding had existed for many months; that it was this understanding which prevented the American forces joining in the combined Allied expedition to relieve the besieged Russian garrison in the Suchan district; that under this American-Bolshevik agreement the small scattered Red Guard bands who were dispersed by the Allies at the battle of Dukoveskoie in August, have collected together and formed definite military units. In other words, that the American policy, unconsciously or otherwise, has produced a state of indecision amongst the Allies, and unrest and anarchy amongst the population of the Transbaikal and Ussurie Provinces, which may prove disastrous to the rapid establishment of order in Russia.
There are other indications that the presence of the American forces in Siberia has been used by somebody for purposes not purely American. The business of the American command is to secure order in those districts which have been placed under its control by the Council of Allied Commanders. There is another self-evident and obvious duty, namely, to shape their conduct in such manner as to create friendly relations with such elements of Russian authority and order as are gradually appearing here and there, under the influence of the Supreme Governor, and also provide as little space and opportunity as possible for the collection and reorganisation of the elements of disorder. The policy of the American command, quite unintentionally perhaps, has been quite the reverse. Their policy has resulted in turning every Russian authority against them, or, where this has not happened, they have themselves turned against Russian authority. They have prepared plans and created opportunities for the reorganisation of the forces of disorder which, if it does not actually create a serious situation for themselves, will do so for those Allies who are trying to bring order out of chaos. The reduction of the whole country to order, to enable it to decide its own future form of Government, is as much an American as a British object. That some sinister underground influence has deflected American policy from this straight and honest course is quite obvious.